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Throughout the four years at the University of Bern, I was lucky to get support,
inspiration, and methodological advice from various outstanding people. In particular, I
want to thank Max von Ehrlich whom I always could consult to discuss any problem or
question concerning my projects and who always tried the best to improve my work, and
encouraged me to go a step further. I am also grateful to Blaise Melly and Michael Gerﬁn,
who gave valuable comments and suggestions on methodological issues. I further want to
thank the people at the Center for Regional Economic Development (CRED) that were
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good friends. They really made some though periods with lots of working hours at the
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I have been accompanied by good friends who have always been there to support me
when needed. I want to thank Andi, Simon, Xaver, Andres, Vera, Martine, Su, Roni,
and Philip. A special thank goes to Simone Lussi, who supported me emotionally during
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1 Introduction
This thesis consists of three essays in development and political economics. The rules
of the game given by a speciﬁc institutional setting critically aﬀect the potential devel-
opment trajectory of individuals, ﬁrms, regions, and countries. All three papers treat
topics relevant to countries economic development and prosperity: infrastructure, polit-
ical institutions, and technology diﬀusion. Economic growth and well-being depend on
market access provided through infrastructure, they rely on the functioning of government
institutions, yet they also hinge on the availability of technological know-how.
This thesis contributes to the literature in distinct ways. While a lot of research has
been conducted on these topics, the three papers go further than many existing studies by
taking the analysis to a spatially more detailed level. New data sources and geographic
information system technique allow for a more precise analysis at the local level. In short,
they allow for a localised political economy.
The spatially more accurate we can measure and analyse the activities of economic
agents and political units, the better we may understand the impacts of the rules of the
game on economic prosperity. The better we know how economic agents behave in a
speciﬁc institutional environment, the more precise policies may be designed to increase
the wealth of regions and nations.
Novel data processing methods using Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and me-
dia content analysis enable an ever more precise measurement of political and economic
activity. GIS allows for new ways of processing existing data by adding a geographic refer-
ence, yet also to generate new data. Media content analysis uses information in newswires
and newspaper articles to extract relevant data. Both techniques are useful to process
data speciﬁcally in developing countries where oﬃcial data is often not available. These
data processing techniques are applied in all three research projects.
Chapter two, which is joint work with Konstantin Büchel, investigates how railway
infrastructure aﬀects regional development in 19th century Switzerland. Both from a
national growth and regional development perspective, the expansion of the railway net-
work was seen as a driver of prosperity. Entrepreneurs as well as politicians aimed to
instigate a quick construction of the network to gain access to international markets. The
expansion of the railway network was a priority in the development after the federal state
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was founded in 1848. We analyse the connection between the expansion of the Swiss rail-
way network during the second half of the 19th century and various measures of regional
development.
The small-scale municipalities of Switzerland present an unparalleled setup that allows
to analyse the impact of the expansion of the railway network at a level of geographic de-
tail not seen in other studies. We compile a unique data set that combines geo-referenced
railway network information and various proxies for regional economic development, in-
cluding population growth rates for more than 2800 municipalities, as well as data on
sectoral work shares and the body height of conscripts in 178 districts.
The main econometric concerns are potential selection eﬀects in the construction of
railway lines. It may well be that the construction of railways followed regional economic
development instead of having driven economic growth. To address this concern, we apply
an inconsequential units IV approach to take a possible endogeneity in the construction
of railway lines into account.
We ﬁnd that the annual population growth rates of municipalities with access to the
railway network were about 0.4 percentage points higher than annual growth rates of mu-
nicipalities without a railway connection. The positive eﬀect of railway access on popula-
tion growth was markedly localised, however, as we ﬁnd strong evidence for displacement
eﬀects: Municipalities in the vicinity of railway tracks but without direct access experi-
enced the lowest population growth, suggesting that people moved closer to the railway
line after it went into service.
We complement the analysis on population growth through the analysis of two poten-
tial drivers behind migration ﬂows, namely industrialisation inferred from sectoral work
shares and improved living conditions measured via the body height of conscripts. Our
estimates consistently show that the railway access led to a change in the structural com-
position of the economy. The share of agricultural labour decreased substantially faster
in districts with above-average railway access, while the same districts experienced an
accelerated growth in manufacturing employment. An analysis of body height records
provides evidence that railway had a positive net eﬀect on the population's (biological)
well-being, most likely through improvements in nutrition and labour conditions. These
ﬁndings signify that railway facilitated industrialisation and improved living conditions.
Both factors  themselves indicators of regional development  likely drove migration
towards better connected localities, as highlighted both by our municipality and district
results on population growth.
Chapter three studies the political resource curse for the case of Nigeria with a speciﬁc
focus on local government council elections. Decentralisation of governments is seen as a
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key element of development. A decentralised government is generally believed to be more
responsive and accountable to the citizens. Yet, decentralisation is particularly critical in
an environment where large shares of government revenues are not internally generated
but arise from natural resource proceeds. Firm control over governments, the so-called
capture of governments by strong political groups, becomes more attractive as windfalls of
resource revenues are simply received without eﬀort of collecting taxes. As in the case of
Nigeria, capture of governments is most likely in places with weak democratic institutions
where the voting population is little educated and not well informed about public ﬁnances,
thus, incapable of holding politicians accountable.
This paper investigates how the conduct or absence of local government council elec-
tions in Nigeria aﬀects development. Whether local elections are held or unconstitutional
caretaker committees appointed instead is contingent upon idiosyncratic decision power
of state governments. I will argue that state capture by governors with its consequen-
tial withholding of local elections depends on the amount of tax revenue transfers that
ﬂow into state and local governments. Tax revenues depend on global oil prices and oil
production, are collected centrally and then distributed to the federal, the state, and the
local governments. Higher transfers thus make the control over local governments more
attractive.
Recently, there has been a surge in studies that analyse subnational governance in
resource rich economies. Most of the recent studies, however, focus on South-American
and Asian countries. Hence, this paper contributes to the understanding both of the local
governance in Nigeria but also presents a case study for the political resource curse in an
African country.
I assemble a unique data set by combining information on local government council
elections in the 774 local government areas, information of tax revenue disbursements on
a monthly basis, and nighttime light emissions recorded by satellites to measure devel-
opment at the local level. An extensive media content analysis is conducted scanning
thousands of Nigerian newspaper articles to evaluate for each local government whether
government councils were elected by the people or appointed by the state governor. This
detailed data set enables for an analysis of the political resource curse at the local level.
The evidence suggests that higher revenue transfers worsen the problem of capture of
state governments, leading to appointment of caretaker committees instead of conducting
elections. By applying a 2-stage least squares instrumental variable approach, I identify
the eﬀect of local council elections on annual light growth while controlling for possible
confounding factors. The robust evidence supports the notion that local elections in-
deed improve the development prospects of local government areas and that withholding
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elections is detrimental.
Chapter four, joint with Huong Quynh Nguyen, sheds light on the relevance of spatial
proximity with regard to spillover eﬀects from technologically superior foreign invested
ﬁrms on the local industries' productivity growth in Vietnam. Spillover eﬀects are ﬂows of
know-how related to business and technology from one ﬁrm to another through imitating
production processes or personal contacts. Adoption of advanced technologies from the
technology frontier is seen as one of the main drivers of growth in developing countries.
In this respect, it is essential for domestic ﬁrms to make use of technology imitation
opportunities and copy know-how from foreign direct invested companies.
The opening up of the economy since 1986 led to an unprecedented relocation of
foreign ﬁrms to Vietnam. Especially the revision of investment laws in 1999 and 2005 and
the accession to the World Trade Organisation in 2007 accelerated the inﬂow of foreign
capital and know-how. It is therefore particularly interesting to evaluate whether domestic
manufacturing ﬁrms were able to beneﬁt from the foreign technological knowledge.
We complement the existing literature on foreign direct investment spillovers in one
important way: we analyse the relevance of geographic proximity for foreign direct invest-
ment spillovers using exceptionally detailed geo-referenced information on the location of
around 67'000 domestic and foreign invested ﬁrms. Our study is the ﬁrst to geo-code the
Vietnamese Enterprise Survey at the level of the ward, the lowest administrative unit in
Vietnam. Through this elaborate data process we receive a ﬁrm level data set that con-
tains an exceptionally detailed geographic component. It allows to measure the presence
of foreign ﬁrms in the close surrounding of each domestic ﬁrm.
Our empirical strategy entails two steps. In the ﬁrst step, we estimate ﬁrm level
total factor productivity using a production function approach. In the second step, we
identify the eﬀect of the change in the presence of foreign invested ﬁrms around each
domestic manufacturing ﬁrm on the domestic ﬁrm's productivity growth. We employ a
simple analytical framework by evaluating spillover eﬀects in circular areas of diﬀerent
radii around each domestic ﬁrm.
Our results aﬃrm that spillover eﬀects are indeed localised and quickly fade with
increasing distance. Spillover eﬀects seem to be strongest between 2 and 10 kilometres and
attenuate rapidly across geographic space. Results also show strong support in favour of
relevant spillover eﬀects from foreign investments on the local small and medium business
sector, which is a stark result in terms of business development policy.
2 Fast Track to Growth?
The Impact of Railroads on Regional
Economic Development in 19th Century
Switzerland
Joint with Konstantin Büchel
2.1 Introduction
The rapid advance of railways is widely seen as a major driving force of economic develop-
ment in the 19th century. It made overland transport at competitive rates possible, which
facilitated the integration of formerly isolated areas into the regional and global economy.
As this market widening enabled increased regional specialisation and gains from trade,
it is argued that railway substantially accelerated aggregate economic growth.1
Then as now, investments in transportation infrastructure have repeatedly been en-
dorsed by policy makers as a means to promote regional economic development. Economic
considerations, both from a national growth and regional development point of view, also
dominated the political debate on the foundation of a national railway network in 19th
century Switzerland. Being a small export-oriented market with few natural resources,
Switzerland was particularly dependent on fast and reliable means of transport. For this
reason the federal government emphasized that a well designed railway network was criti-
cal to the country's welfare.2 In 1852 the provision of railway infrastructure was mandated
1Based on the concept of social savings, ﬁrst proposed by Fogel (1962, 1964), the impact of railway
infrastructure on aggregate output has been calculated to range between 5% and 10% for the US, and
between 1% and 11% for European countries (Leunig, 2010). In a recent study, Donaldson and Hornbeck
(ming) show that extensions to internal waterways and roads would have mitigated at most 20% of the
losses from removing railways in the US, refuting the famous argument by Fogel (1964) that railways
could have been easily substituted by other available means of transport.
2Original quote from the federal council's statement delivered to the national assembly on 7th April
1851 [BBl 1851, Vol. 1(19):352]: Was wir [...] vor Allem als Hauptzweck eines schweizerischen Eisenbahn-
netzes betrachten, besteht in Erleichterung des Verkehrs im Innern. Auf dem europäischen Kontinent
ist kaum ein Land wie die Schweiz, das so wenig im Stande ist, seine Bedürfnisse auf eigenem Boden
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to private companies. From a regional economic growth perspective this raised concerns
that domestic disparities would widen, if underdeveloped and thinly populated areas were
neglected by railway entrepreneurs.3
How early railway access impacted regional growth in Switzerland has not yet been
studied quantitatively. We compile a data set that combines geo-referenced railway net-
work information and various proxies for regional economic development, including pop-
ulation growth rates for more than 2 800 municipalities as well as data on sectoral work
shares and the body height of conscripts in 178 districts. The small-scale municipalities
of Switzerland present a unique setup, that allows us to analyse the impact of railway
at a level of detail not seen in other studies. Particular attention is paid to potential
selection eﬀects induced through strategic routing: An inconsequential units IV approach
and placebo tests based on data from the pre-railway era allow us to infer whether trans-
portation infrastructure indeed promoted growth or just followed favourable regional de-
velopments.
The empirical evaluation of how transport infrastructure aﬀects economic activity has
recently attracted increased attention (see Redding and Turner, 2014).4 Fishlow (1965)
was one of the ﬁrst economic historians who systematically analysed the direction of
causation in this context. Based on his study of 19th century USA, he concludes that
railway construction seems to have followed demand rather than cause regional population
growth. Combining GIS-tools and econometric methods, Atack et al. (2010) revisited
Fishlow's analysis for counties in the American Midwest from 1850 to 1860. They ﬁnd
that railway access increased population density by about 3 percentage points within
the decade studied. The impact of railway access in Switzerland was of comparable
magnitude, as our preferred models yield an average railway induced growth eﬀect of 0.4
percentage points per year. While Atack et al. (2010) explore the impact of railway on
population growth in a mostly rural environment similar to our case, US counties are
zu erzeugen, das daher in so hohem Grade interessiert ist, dass es seine Konsumgegenstände, seine Roh-
produkte wohlfeil beziehen und seine Fabrikate wohlfeil ausführen kann. Kaum ein Land [...] wo die
Schnelligkeit des Personenverkehrs und der Warensendungen von so hohem Werthe ist, wo das Englische
Sprichwort `Zeit ist Geld' in gleichem Masse seine praktische Anwendung ﬁndet.
3Opponents of a private provision ﬁercely warned that railway companies will cherry-pick the most
proﬁtable lines, as the majority report by the parliamentary railway commission in 1852 illustrates [BBl
1852, Vol. 2(27): 49-127].
4In the main text, we only discuss studies on railways built in the 19th century. Comparable questions
were also studied for highway infrastructure built in the 20th century, for instance by Duranton and
Turner (2012) or Faber (2014). For Switzerland, Dessemontet (2011) documents in detail how the spatial
pattern transformed from a very strong centre-periphery specialisation in 1939 to a much more sprawled
distribution in 2000, with road-accessibility being an important determinant of employment density. In
line with the results by Dessemontet (2011), Müller et al. (2010) show that the rate of urban growth
increases with proximity to a motorway exit.
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rather coarse units of analysis in comparison to Swiss municipalities. Exploiting the ﬁne
granular level of our data, we cannot only investigate the direct impact of railway access;
we can also examine local displacement eﬀects of railway infrastructure as well as eﬀect
heterogeneity along various dimensions.5 Our results show a non-monotonic functional
relation between distance to the railway network and population growth: The positive
eﬀect of railway was markedly localised, as municipalities situated more than 2 km from
the railway network experienced a slowdown in growth. The negative eﬀect of railway
was largest for municipalities at 6 to 8 km distance from the railway tracks and reversed
back to zero for places at least 20 km away.
A well-researched consequence of expanding railway infrastructure is the faster growth
of cities, as documented by studies for Prussia (Hornung, 2015), Sweden (Berger and En-
ﬂo, ming), and Africa (Jedwabi and Moradi, 2016). Switzerland also experienced rapid
urbanisation during the early railway era, yet the vast majority of people lived in markedly
small rural municipalities throughout the 19th century. Hence, our analysis naturally com-
plements studies on railway and city growth, bringing the demographic developments in
peripheral areas into focus. Our estimated eﬀect of railway access on population growth is
considerably smaller than the impact reported for cities, which typically ranges between
1 and 2 percentage points per year. This substantiates the notion that railway access
primarily promoted growth in cities and regional centres, while the impact was consid-
erably smaller in rural municipalities along the rail tracks. Nonetheless, our ﬁndings do
not lend support to the home market eﬀect hypothesis as in Krugman (1980), since we
ﬁnd little evidence for negative growth eﬀects of transportation infrastructure, even in
the least populous communities.
Population growth often serves as a proxy for regional development, because compre-
hensive income and production statistics for the 19th century are scarce. On theoretical
grounds, freedom of movement facilitates migration ﬂows that equalise real wages across
space, implying migration from uncompetitive to competitive areas (e.g. Redding and
Sturm, 2008). Indeed, our analysis shows that railway access primarily had an impact on
population growth via the local migration balance that is calculated based on birth and
death statistics. Reduced trading costs are considered to be the main mechanism that
links railway  and transportation infrastructure in general  to competitive advantages
and economic activity. Donaldson (ming) reports conclusive evidence for this channel;
based on data for India between 1853 to 1930, he shows that the advance of railways sub-
5The second most detailed analysis in terms of spatial units is that of Koopmans et al. (2012) who
analyse population growth in Dutch municipalities. Those are about ten times larger than Swiss munic-
ipalities, and the authors do not analyse local reorganisation or eﬀect heterogeneity. Furthermore, it is
questionable whether their results have a causal interpretation, as Koopmans et al. (2012) neither provide
placebo tests nor exploit exogenous variation.
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stantially lowered trade costs and promoted intra-Indian trade ﬂows. Improved trading
conditions due to railway access caused a signiﬁcant increase in agricultural income, as
is documented for the US (Donaldson and Hornbeck, ming), India (Donaldson, ming),
and Ghana (Jedwabi and Moradi, 2016). Other studies provide evidence that obtain-
ing railway access accelerated industrialisation, since it promoted capital investments in
manufacturing companies (Tang, 2014) and increased the average ﬁrm size (Atack et al.,
2008; Hornung, 2015). These ﬁndings for the agricultural and industrial sector raise the
question of what the net eﬀect was of railway on structural change. We show that districts
with average railway access experienced an additional 9 percentage point shift in labour
shares from the agricultural to the manufacturing sector within 40 years compared to
unconnected districts. This evidently suggests that improved railway infrastructure was
an important driver of industrialisation in Switzerland. Considering that the (sparsely
available) income records document higher wages in the manufacturing than in agriculture
(see Brugger, 1978; Gruner, 1987), railway-induced industrialisation may have been a key
pulling factor shaping migration patterns. Although we lack the data to investigate this
claim in detail, an analysis of body height records provides evidence that railway indeed
had a positive net eﬀect on the population's (biological) well-being, most likely through
improvements in nutrition and labour conditions.
The next section describes the historical setting. Section 3 introduces the data used
in the empirical analysis. Section 4 explains the empirical strategy to identify the causal
eﬀect of railway access on regional development. Section 5 discusses the results for the
municipality and district level. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Historical Background
Although Switzerland was one of Europe's most industrialised countries in the early 19th
century, railway technology caught up relatively late.6 Since 1836 entrepreneurs in Zurich
sought to connect Switzerland's largest city to the foreign railway network at the German
border in Koblenz and the French border in Basel, but since they failed to raise enough
funds their endeavour stopped halfway in Baden. The ﬁrst 23 km of railway tracks in
Switzerland, which are known as Spanisch-Brötli-Bahn, were opened in 1847, at a time
when Great Britain (9 800 km), Germany (5 800 km), France (2 900 km), and the US
6Bairoch (1965) compares nine European countries, the US, and Japan in terms of industrial devel-
opment between 1800 and 1900, with Switzerland coming in fourth or ﬁfth place throughout the 19th
century.
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(13 500 km) had already built several thousand kilometres of railway.7
When the Swiss federal state was founded in 1848, the formation of a national railway
network soon became one of the main priorities on the political agenda. Alfred Escher,
president of the national council, forcefully warned his fellow members of parliament in
1849 that Switzerland would run the risk of becoming isolated within Europe if it failed
to build a railway network quickly.8 In 1850, the government commissioned two English
engineers, Robert Stephenson and Henry Swinburne, to provide a technical expertise for
the construction of a national railway system. After ﬁerce debates and a close vote, the
plan submitted by the English engineers for a state-run railway network was rejected by
the national assembly. The Railway Act of 1852 authorised cantonal administrations to
grant concessions to private companies, which were supposed to build and run Switzer-
land's railway network without public funding (Weissenbach, 1913, 6). This new legal
framework along with the introduction of a single currency and the elimination of inter-
nal tariﬀs in 1848 evidently reassured previously reluctant investors, and within a decade
private railway companies connected Switzerland's major cities north of the Alps. By the
end of the century Switzerland had one of the world's densest railway networks with a
total length of around 3 700 km (see Table 2.1).
Switzerland is a land-locked country with no navigable rivers except for the Rhine in
the border town of Basel. Before railway became available, carts were the main means
of transportation complemented by inland navigation on lakes.9 It has been estimated
that railway reduced land transport costs by a factor of eight (Donaldson, ming), which
stimulated two major developments in Switzerland: First, the agricultural sector started
7Humair (2008) cites the fragmented system of tariﬀs, currencies and jurisdictions of the pre-modern
Swiss confederation as key institutional barriers that inhibited adequate funding by (foreign) investors.
Furthermore, he points to the opposition of various social and economic stakeholders, as well as disputes
about route planning that delayed railway investments. The international rail network statistics represent
total track length in 1850 and are taken from Sperber (2009, 10) and Adams (1895, 6).
8Original quote from Alfred Escher's speech delivered in the national assembly on 12th November
1849 [BBl 1849, Vol. 3(6):161]: Es tauchen Pläne auf, gemäss denen die [europäischen] Bahnen um die
Schweiz herumgeführt werden sollen. Der Schweiz droht somit die Gefahr, gänzlich umgangen zu werden
und in Folge dessen in der Zukunft das traurige Bild einer europäischen Einsiedelei darbieten zu müssen.
9The relative importance of inland navigation prior to 1848 has not yet been conclusively determined,
as detailed transport statistics are not available for that period. The historical research available suggests
that inland navigation was a regionally important  but secondary  complement to overland transport.
First, Switzerland only had 25 steamboats in 1850 (Schiedt, 2009, 172). Second, costs for transshipping
were signiﬁcant, which limited potential savings on the relatively short portage routes on lakes (Schiedt,
2009, 173). Third, estimates by Frey (2010) suggest that the accessibility of Swiss municipalities in 1850
was almost entirely determined by roads (93%-100%), and hardly inﬂuenced by inland navigation (0%-
7%). Fourth, Schiedt (2007) documents the broad modernisation of Switzerland's road infrastructure
from 1740 to 1780 (around 1 000 km) and from 1830 to 1840 (around 6 000 km). The fact that these
investments accounted for up to 40% of cantonal ﬁnances underlines the importance attributed to roads
by policy-makers in pre-modern Switzerland.
10 Infrastructure and Growth in 19th Century Switzerland
Table 2.1: Railway Density in Selected Countries, 1900
Railway Network in km
per 10tsd per 100
Inhabitants Sq-Km
Germany 9.7 9.3
Austria-Hungary 8.2 5.4
France 10.9 7.9
Italy 5.0 5.5
Great Britain 8.6 11.0
USA 42.2 3.8
Switzerland 12.4 9.1
Lowland (excluding alpine area)1 11.6 18.4
1: Railway lines and population of districts with a mean elevation below 1 000 m.a.s.l., representing the area of
our robustness analysis. Source: Geering and Hotz (1903, 105-106).
shifting production from grain to dairy products. While the production of milk increased
by more than 70% until the end of the century, the production of grain decreased by
40%, a drop that was compensated by the quadrupling of grain imports (Frey and Vogel,
1997, chapter 8). Second, railway triggered large quantities of coal imports from Germany
and France, which increased from 1 360 tons in 1851 to 16 000 tons ten years later, and
more than 200 000 tons at the end of the century, representing 15% to 20% of the freight
transported by rail between 1850 and 1900. Coal promoted an improved mechanisation
of the Swiss industry, and cleared the way for energy-intensive sectors such as steel works,
salterns, and cement production (Marek, 1991, chapter 6).
Besides lowering the transportation costs of cargo, railway substantially shortened
travel-times. Frey (2006) illustrates on the basis of detailed stagecoach and train schedules
that the time required to visit all cantonal capitals was halved between 1850 and 1870. By
the end of the century, travel-times were even reduced by 80% compared to the pre-railway
period. Despite these substantial improvements in accessibility, Frey and Schiedt (2005,
57) argue that railway contributed little to the public's mobility during the ﬁrst 40 years,
as it was unaﬀordable for the vast majority.10 In 1880, Swiss railway companies only
carried 25 million passengers, which corresponds to an average of nine train journeys per
person per year. A gradual decline in fares during the 1890s and rising incomes made train
travel more widespread, with yearly passenger numbers rapidly increasing to 63 million
in 1900 and 110 million in 1910.11 For most of the 19th century, however, rail journeys
10A look at fares and wages in the 1880s illustrates this point: An average worker, who earned about
0.30 CHF per hour, had to pay 0.90 to 1.40 CHF for a return-ticket on a 10 km railway route (NOB,
1883).
11Passenger statistics were obtained from the Schweizerische Eisenbahnstatistik (SPE, 1900), which is
partly accessible online at http://www.bahndaten.ch/ (last access: 01.02.2016).
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remained a privilege for the wealthy and commuting by train was rather insigniﬁcant.
The advent of railway took place in a period characterised by strong growth: Swiss
GDP estimates available for the period after 1850 reveal that real output grew by approxi-
mately 250% within 50 years, while the population increased from 1 665 000 inhabitants in
1800 to 2 393 000 in 1850, and 3 315 000 by the end of the 19th century. This growth was
not uniformly distributed across the country, however, as Switzerland witnessed substan-
tial domestic migration typically from peripheral regions to the fast growing urban centres
(e.g. Rey, 2003). The acceleration of urban growth in Switzerland coincides with the con-
struction of the earliest railway lines. To illustrate this point, Figure 2.1 part (a) plots
population statistics (1850=100) for a sample of seven cities with comparable population
data for 1800 and 1836/37. While cities grew at a similar rate to other municipalities prior
to railway construction (i.e. between 1800 and 1847), the picture changed completely in
the second half of the 19th century. Urban population started increasing tremendously
while the rest of the country kept growing at a relatively constant rate. Part (b) of Figure
2.1 presents a simple diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences analysis of the annual population growth
rate of the seven cities compared to the national population growth rate using periods
before and after the introduction of railway technology. Except for Thun, the growth
rates of the cities increased by 0.5 to 3 percentage points relative to the national trend
after the railway network was established. Of course this simple analysis cannot establish
a causal relation, since early railway construction coincides with improved market inte-
gration following the birth of the modern federal state in 1848. Nonetheless, it reveals a
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suggestive pattern that ﬁts well with recent ﬁndings on urbanisation and railway access
in other countries.12
Although urban centres experienced rapid growth, Switzerland remained a rurally
dominated country throughout the 19th century. In 1850, less than 10% of Switzerland's
population lived in towns of more than 10 000 inhabitants, a ratio that remained decidedly
below the 50% mark until the end of the century. In the following, we primarily analyse
how demographic dynamics in Switzerland's rural areas were aﬀected by railway access.
2.3 Data
We track the expansion of Switzerland's railway network using data from the GIS Dufour"
project, which developed a digital map of historic roads, railway, and waterway lines
based on the ﬁrst national map commissioned by Henri Dufour in 1850 (source: Egli
et al., 2005). In addition to mapping traﬃc routes, the GIS Dufour project also collected
information on their opening and closing dates from various historical sources. Based
on this rich data set, we deﬁne a binary indicator, referred to as railway access, that
takes the value 1 if one or more railway lines cross over the territory of a municipality.13
Accordingly, we call municipalities treated after they received their ﬁrst railway access,
and untreated if no railway line passed through. Column 5 in Table 2.2 shows the
percentage of treated municipalities for each decade and column 6 reports the population
share that was connected to the railway.
Municipalities are the lowest administrative unit in Switzerland, with 1 to 40 munici-
palities forming a district, and 1 to 30 districts forming a canton, the equivalent of a US
state. In order to evaluate the impact of railways at the district level, we calculate the
population weighted share of municipalities that had direct access to the railway network
for each district and decade.
Our main outcome of interest is annual population growth. Population statistics are
taken from the census (Eidgenössische Volkszählung") which has been conducted by
the Swiss Statistical Oﬃce (and its precursor) since 1850.14 The national census has
12For instance, Hornung (2015) shows that railway access accelerated population growth in Prussian
cities by an additional 1 to 2 percentage points per year, which is quantitatively similar to the increase
in Switzerland's urban growth rates after 1850.
13We use municipal boundaries from oﬃcial administrative maps of Switzerland valid from January
2000. This ensures that the spatial administrative division used to determine a municipality's railway
access is congruent with the classiﬁcation employed in the census data.
14Detailed information on the data set, which can be downloaded from www.bfs.admin.ch, is provided
in Schuler et al. (2002).
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics: Population and Railway Access in Swiss Municipalities
Swiss Pop.
(in mio.)
Average Pop.:
All Municip.
Average Pop.:
Municip. w. Rail
Share of Municip.
with Rail (%)
Share of Pop.
with Rail (%)
1850 2.39 840 8603 0.3 3.2
1860 2.51 877 2049 12.9 30.0
1870 2.66 927 2006 17.4 37.5
1880 2.83 986 1817 29.3 53.9
1890 2.92 1013 1797 35.1 62.4
1900 3.32 1150 2067 39.0 70.3
Source: Own calculations based on Swiss census data and GIS-Dufour data.
always surveyed the population on the municipality level in intervals of 10 years, with the
exception of the 1890-wave, which was collected in 1888. We infer the population for 1890
by performing an extrapolation of growth rates in the adjacent periods, i.e. 1880 to 1888
and 1888 to 1900, respectively.15 In order to account for territorial reorganisations, we use
the municipality classiﬁcation for 2000 and clean population ﬁgures based on the data set's
documentation on territorial mergers and divisions.16 For the cantons of Zurich, Bern,
Aargau and Solothurn, we complement the census data with population statistics from the
Helvetische Zählung" conducted around 1800 and the Tagsatzung" in 1837. These early
population counts are currently being harmonised with the post-1850 census data in an
ongoing project by Schuler and Schluchter (ress). In what follows, we refer to this subset
of municipalities, representing around 900 of the 2700 municipalities, as the pre-railway
sample or pre-treatment sample (see Figure 2.3). District population ﬁgures between 1850
and 1900 are derived by aggregating up municipality statistics, and are then complemented
with district-level data for 1800 collected by Schluchter (1988). We construct our main
dependent variable, the annual population growth rate for each municipality and each
district based on the population ﬁgures for 1800, 1837 (municipalities only), and 1850 to
1900.17
A concern may be that population changes caused by railway-related construction
work is falsely attributed to improvements in a municipality's or district's accessibility.
In order to address such concerns, we resort to Rey (2003, 147149) who compiled a list of
Swiss municipalities and districts that experienced extraordinary demographic volatility
due to railway construction work (mainly tunnelling). These observations are removed
15Mathematically, we calculated the population count (POP90) of 1890 as follows:
PGR80,88 = (
POP88
POP80
)1/8; PGR88,00 = (
POP00
POP88
)1/12; POP90 =
1
2
POP88 · (PGR80,88)2 + 12POP88 · (PGR88,00)2.
16For instance, the municipality of Turgi (ID=4042) with a population of 645 in 1888, was part of the
municipality Gebenstorf (ID=4029) until 1883. When calculating annual growth rates between 1880 and
1890 for Gebenstorf, we subtracted 645 from its population in 1880.
17Annual population growth is computed as follows: APGt = 100 · (ln(POPt1)− ln(POPt0))/(t1− t0).
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from our sample in all steps of the analysis that evaluate the aﬀected time period.18
The population and railway access data is complemented with district statistics on
surpluses of births over deaths so that migration balances can be calculated (source: cen-
sus since 1870), as well as sectoral work shares (source: census since 1860) and the body
height of conscripts (source: Staub, 2010) which we interpret as complementary proxies
for regional development. In order to merge the data sets reliably, we deﬁne a common
district identiﬁer and compare the population ﬁgures as reported in the various sources.
Diﬀerences in population counts are retraced using the documentation on territorial re-
organisations from the Swiss Statistical Oﬃce. Whenever applicable, district population
ﬁgures are equalised between the data sources, for instance by changing the assignment
of municipalities to districts. Districts where the revised population statistics diﬀer by
more than 2% are excluded from the statistical analysis.19
2.4 Empirical Strategy: Instrumental Variable Approach
Railway access is not randomly assigned to municipalities, but may be correlated with
numerous observable and unobservable characteristics such as population size, growth
potential, economic structure, or the availability of cheap land. Since Switzerland's main
railway infrastructure was built and run by private entrepreneurs until 1902, concerns
related to targeted and selective routing cannot be ignored. Although a number of control
variables are available, cross-sectional OLS regression may not be suﬃcient to account for
these endogeneity issues. A priori, it is unclear whether an upward or downward bias
dominates, thus making it diﬃcult to interpret plain regression estimates.
We address these concerns by adopting an inconsequential units IV approach ﬁrst pro-
posed by Banerjee, Duﬂo and Qian (2004; 2012) and later used in several studies on
transport infrastructure, including Hornung (2015) and Atack et al. (2010). The underly-
ing idea is compelling: In the early stages of transport infrastructure developments, major
cities  hereinafter main nodes  are typically connected ﬁrst. If railway companies built
their routes such that two main nodes are connected as directly as possible, railway access
would be randomly assigned to municipalities lying along these inter-node connections. It
is likely, however, that railway companies deliberately take detours, for instance to con-
18In this respect it is important to note that we evaluate the impact of railway access on population
growth rates in the short- and long-term: While railway construction work may have had a confounding
eﬀect on short-term population growth rates, it is unlikely that long-term growth trends were aﬀected by
the inﬂow and outﬂow of construction workers.
19Table A.3 in the appendix provides a complete list of districts that are included in and excluded from
the analysis, respectively.
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nect municipalities with a high growth potential or to avoid expensive land acquisitions
in dense areas. As these targeted detours induce selection eﬀects, it is not suﬃcient to
restrict the analysis to inter-node lines as they were actually built. Instrumental variables
based on least-cost paths between nodes solve this issue. The IV approach bases inference
on the randomly chosen subset of municipalities that received railway access because they
lie on the most direct route between nodes, i.e. on a least-cost path.
2.4.1 Main Nodes
Main nodes are selected along two dimensions in this study, namely economic and trans-
port strategic importance. As a ﬁrst group, we chose the 20 most populous municipalities
in 1850 that held the historical town status.20 In medieval times, towns privileges included
judicial liberties, coinage, the right to collect tariﬀs, and the right to hold markets, which
we consider a good proxy for historically grown economic importance. These 20 nodes
are supplemented by 23 locations listed as central traﬃc junctions in plans delivered to
the federal government by Robert Stephenson and Henry Swinburne in 1850.21 Since 10
municipalities are included in both sets, this yields 33 main nodes, that we believe were
of primary economic or transport strategic importance, thus making them attractive to
railway companies. These 33 municipalities are excluded from the sample in all steps of
the statistical analysis, as they have gained access to the railway for reasons potentially
endogenous to population growth.
Table 2.3 shows that 30 out of 33 municipalities selected as main nodes were connected
to the railway network by the early 1860s, which we consider to be the ﬁrst wave of
railway construction. The remaining four nodes, which are all located south of the Alps,
received railway access in the 1870s, constituting the second wave of railway development
in Switzerland.
2.4.2 Least-Cost Paths
Whether or not a least-cost path is drawn between two nodes is determined based on
records of actual railway openings (source: Wägli, 1998; Weissenbach, 1913). Lines are
selected only if the primary intention of the railway company was to connect two nodes,
excluding routes that established inter-node connections gradually over long periods of
20Whether or not a municipality held the historical town status is determined based on Guyer (1960).
21Figure A.1 in the appendix displays the original plan outlined by the two English engineers, including
the set of main nodes used in our analysis.
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Table 2.3: Main Nodes
Municipality
Population
in 1850
RW
Access Municipality
Population
in 1850
RW
Access
Among 20 Largest Towns & Listed as Node in 1850-Expertise
Zurich 41585 1847 Luzern 10068 1859
Bern 29670 1857 Schaﬀhausen 8477 1857
Basel 27844 1844/54 Chur 6183 1858
Lausanne 17108 1856 Thun 6019 1859
Winterthur 13651 1855 Solothurn 5370 1857
Among 20 Largest Towns Listed as Node in 1850-Expertise
Geneva 37724 1858 Aarau 4657 1856
St. Gallen 17858 1856 Yverdon 3619 1855
Chaux-de-Fonds 12638 1857 Morges 3241 1855
Fribourg 9065 1862 Bellinzona 3209 1874
Le Locle 8514 1857 Baden 3159 1847
Neuchatel 7901 1859 Locarno 2944 1874
Altstaetten 6492 1858 Biasca 2035 1874
Lugano 5939 1874 Walenstadt 1868 1859
Biel 5609 1857 Rorschach 1751 1856
Vevey 5201 1861 Olten 1634 1856
Brugg 1581 1856
Lyss 1568 1864
Romanshorn 1408 1855
Notes: The 20 largest towns are selected based on the Swiss census and an index of municipalities with historical town privilege from
Guyer (1960). The list of nodes as suggested in the 1850-expertise by R. Stephenson and H. Swinburne is taken from Weissenbach
(1913). Population ﬁgures are based on municipality border zoning from January 2000.
time.22 For the selected inter-node lines, we draw cost eﬃcient routes on a 200 m x 200 m
grid with the ArcGIS-tool Least Cost Path" factoring in three cost parameters: distance,
slope, and river crossings. In order to estimate the cost parameters, we extract information
from the Swiss Traﬃc Atlas (source: NOB, 1883) on the total construction costs of 48
railway lines built by 1881, and combine it with information on mileage as well as slopes
covered by the actual route of the tracks using a 25 m x 25 m height model for Switzerland
(source: Swisstopo, 2004). A regression of total construction costs per kilometre on the
routes' average slope yields average construction costs of 180 000 CHF per kilometre and
an additional 15 000 CHF penalty per degree climbed. The costs of building bridges are
determined based on the regression's residual for a 2 km track section that includes a
216 m long bridge over the river Rhine in Basel. We obtain costs of 800 000 CHF for the
rail bridge in Basel, which we linearly scale down for smaller rivers based on federal water
22This excludes, for instance, the railway line connecting the nodes Bern and Luzern: Its ﬁrst part was
ﬁnished in 1864, connecting Bern with Langnau, while the section LangnauLuzern opened 11 years later
in 1875.
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quantity statistics (source: Pfaundler and Schönenberger, 2013).
This procedure results in a least-cost path for every inter-node railway connection built
in 19th century Switzerland, including information on the original route's opening date.
Finally, we intersect the least-cost paths with municipal boundaries, giving us a measure,
LCPw, coded 1 if a municipality is traversed by a least-cost path during the construction
wave w, and coded 0 if all the least-cost paths bypass outside the municipality in the
given time span.
2.4.3 Estimation and Identifying Assumption
The data and instrumental variable, LCPwic , described in the previous sections are used
to estimate the eﬀects of railway access, RAwic, established during construction wave w,
on annual population growth, APGtic, in municipality i of canton c during decade t. The
ﬁrst and second stage regressions take the form
RAwic = α1 + β1LCP
w
ic + ϕ1X
1850
ic + κ1c + ic, and (2.1)
APGtic = α2 + β2R̂A
w
ic + ϕ2X
1850
ic + κ2c + ηic (2.2)
where κc denotes cantonal ﬁxed eﬀects, and X
1850
ic is a vector of municipality control
variables described below.
A word on timing. The cross-sectional analysis exploits the fact that the construction
of Switzerland's railway was carried out in three waves (see Figure 2.2): Between 1847
and 1864 the main trunk lines were established, including the east-west connection linking
Geneva (westernmost city), Bern (capital), Zurich (largest city), and St. Gallen (eastern-
most city). During the second wave, 1869 to 1882, further inter-city lines were completed
and the ﬁrst north-south route through the Alps was opened. After 1882, the ramiﬁcation
advanced and mostly small branch lines were added. The focus of the analysis lies on
the ﬁrst wave, i.e. w=18471864, and the second wave, i.e. w=18691882. Equations (1)
and (2) are estimated separately for both waves, and ﬁve decades of annual population
growth available, i.e. t=185060; 186070; 188090; 18901900. When the second wave of
railway constructions is analysed, all municipalities with access prior to 1869 are excluded
from the sample.
Two assumptions are needed in order to allow for a causal interpretation of βˆ2: First,
the instrumental variable and the treatment have to be correlated (i.e. β1 6= 0), which
can be tested formally based on the ﬁrst stage correlation. Second, the exclusion restric-
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Figure 2.2: Construction of the Swiss Railway Network: 1st Wave 184764, 2nd Wave
186982, 3rd Wave 18831900.
Source: Own calculations based on GIS-Dufour data
tion must hold, implying that the instrument needs to be as good as randomly assigned
conditional on control variables, and may aﬀect the outcome only through the ﬁrst stage
(e.g. Angrist and Pischke, 2009, 117). While our large and highly statistically signiﬁcant
estimates for β1 verify the ﬁrst assumption, the exclusion restriction could be violated if
locations along the least-cost path are correlated with municipality characteristics due to
history or geography. In order to justify the exclusion restrictions, we include a number
of control variables, which are brieﬂy motivated hereafter (further information on the
controls are presented in the Appendix, 2.A.1).
By construction, municipalities nearby nodes are more likely to lie on a least-cost
path than municipalities farther away. If proximity to a city or major traﬃc junction
is correlated with population growth, the exclusion restriction would be violated. We
therefore include the log distances of each municipality to its closest town node and to its
closest Stephenson-Swinburne node as controls in our regressions.
The least-cost paths reﬂect direct routes between main nodes that avoid steep slopes
and unnecessary river crossings. Location along these paths could be correlated with the
economic structure of municipalities since they potentially coincide with historical trade
routes that aﬀected business prior to adoption of the railway technology. To account
for this issue, we include a road access variable that measures whether a municipality is
passed through by a major inter-cantonal road (source: GIS-Dufour, Egli et al., 2005).
Before railway became available, these paved roads constituted the main inter-regional
transport routes within Switzerland, and therefore should pick up possible confounding
eﬀects due to the potential correlation between historical trade routes and our instrument.
Additionally, we include an indicator for medieval town privileges (source: Guyer, 1960),
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which were  amongst others  given to municipalities of trade strategic importance, and
therefore may be correlated with both the likelihood of a municipality being crossed by a
least-cost path and its population growth.
Naturally, our least-cost path algorithm tends to favour riversides, lake fronts, and low
altitudes, as such terrain is often characterized by low gradients. A concern could be, that
these places are also advantageous to economic development: Water turbines along rivers,
for instance, were an important energy source in 19th century Switzerland, shipping on
lakes was a regionally important complement to overland transport, while low altitudes
pose favourable climatic conditions compared to higher elevations. Therefore, we include
measures for hydro power potential, adjacency to lakes, and the log of elevation in our
regressions.
A last set of controls is supposed to account for growth eﬀects of subsequent railway
access, and pre-determined population dynamics, namely annual population growth prior
to railway access, the log of population size in 1850, as well as a municipality's log area
in square kilometres.
Despite this broad set of control variables, it may still be possible that unobserved
characteristics are correlated with both our instrument and the growth potential of mu-
nicipalities, which would confound our estimate of β2. We therefore follow an approach
recently suggested in a similar setting by Hornung (2015), and complement our cross-
sectional analysis with panel-models that take care of time-invariant unobserved hetero-
geneity by including municipality ﬁxed eﬀects, pii. We regress the annual population
growth rate of municipality i in decade t, APGict, on the instrumented dummy variable
indicating railway access in the previous decade, RAict−1. The ﬁrst and second stage IV
panel-regressions are speciﬁed as
RAict = pi3i + β3LCPict + λ3t + λ3t · κ3c + ξict, and (2.3)
APGict = pi4i + β4R̂Aict−1 + λ4t + λ4t · κ4c + εict (2.4)
where time ﬁxed eﬀects, λt, control for population growth cycles on the national level,
and cantonal-time ﬁxed eﬀects, λt · κc, account for cycles on the regional level.23
While the advantage of this approach is the elimination of potentially unobserved
time-constant confounders, it washes out a lot of variance in the variables of interest and
identiﬁes the eﬀect of railway access based on within-municipality variation only. Since
23Map A.4 in the appendix depicts the time-variation in our instrument.
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the Swiss census was conducted with a periodicity of ten years, the timing of treatment
and eﬀect is rather imprecise in our setting: To eliminate concerns of reverse causality
and because main lines were mostly built in the second half of the 1850s and 1870s, we
use the ﬁrst lag of railway access in our preferred panel speciﬁcation, e.g. railway access
between 1851 and 1860 aﬀects population growth during the decade 1860 to 1870 and
onwards. The following section reports and discusses the estimation results for both the
cross-sectional and the panel-data analysis.
2.5 Results on Railway Access and Regional Develop-
ment
Suggestive evidence for the impact of railway access on population growth is presented
in Table 2.4, which compares the mean population growth rates for municipalities gain-
ing railway access during the earliest wave of railway construction (18471864) to the
growth rates of municipalities bypassed by these railway lines. While a two-sided T-test
of diﬀerences in means (see column 4) suggests that population growth rates were not
statistically diﬀerent in the two groups during the pre-railway period, growth rates signif-
icantly diverged with the construction of the earliest railway lines during the 1850s and
subsequent decades. Overall, this simple comparison in means suggest that municipalities
with railway access grew on average 0.25 to 0.55 percentage points faster per year than
unconnected municipalities.
In order to identify the causal impact of railway access on population growth rates,
we now turn to our econometric analysis which is discussed in four subsections. The main
evaluation concerns annual population growth at the municipal level, which is presented
ﬁrst. Discussing results on cross-section (section 2.5.1) and panel data (section 2.5.2)
regressions, we complement the advantages of both approaches. In section 2.5.3 we at-
tempt to get a clearer grasp of the heterogeneity of eﬀects. The obvious question that
arises is whether the construction of the railway infrastructure beneﬁted all connected
communes equally or led to a concentration of economic activity and divergence in the
municipalities' growth rates. Furthermore, we analyse displacement eﬀects of railway ac-
cess on nearby municipalities. Finally, section 2.5.4 completes the municipality analysis
by evaluating the robustness of results for population growth at the district level, and
examining whether the railway induced population growth is due to migration or birth
surpluses. It also presents evidence of railway access accelerating structural change and
increasing the body height of conscripts.
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Table 2.4: Annual Population Growth Rates by Railway Access Status in 1864
Pre-Railway Samplea Whole Switzerlanda Nodesb
Rail No Rail Rail No Rail
Obs. Mean Mean Diﬀ. Obs. Mean Mean Diﬀ. Obs. Mean
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1800-1837 903 0.89 0.92 =0.03
(0.49) (0.48) (0.04)
1837-1850 903 0.60 0.66 =0.07
(0.71) (0.89) (0.08)
1850-1860 903 0.13 =0.017 0.30∗∗ 2811 0.57 0.02 0.55∗∗∗ 33 1.63
(0.87) (1.06) (0.09) (1.26) (1.14) (0.06) (1.32)
1860-1870 903 0.59 0.20 0.39∗∗∗ 2827 0.47 0.22 0.25∗∗∗ 33 1.60
(0.88) (1.26) (0.09) (1.25) (1.04) (0.06) (1.16)
1870-1880 898 0.46 =0.06 0.52∗∗∗ 2788 0.45 =0.02 0.47∗∗∗ 33 1.34
(0.96) (1.03) (0.09) (1.11) (1.09) (0.06) (1.04)
Notes: Means and comparison of means for the ﬁrst wave of railway construction (1847-1864). Columns (4) and (8) present a two-sided
T-test of the diﬀerence in means of municipalities with railway access to those without railway access. a: Sample excludes nodes and
municipalities strongly aﬀected by railway construction work (source: Rey, 2003, 147-149). b: Sample includes all 20 largest towns nodes
and Stephenson & Swinburne nodes. Standard deviations in parentheses in columns (2), (3), (6), (7), and (10). Standard errors in
parentheses in columns (4) and (8). + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
2.5.1 Cross-Sectional Analysis: Population Growth in Municipal-
ities
The cross-sectional analysis focusing on railway lines constructed between 1847 and 1864
is presented ﬁrst, followed by a discussion on the second wave of railway development that
lasted from 1869 to 1882. Our benchmark results are based on a sample including all the
municipalities of Switzerland, except for the 33 main transport nodes and municipalities
that experienced extraordinary demographic volatility due to railway construction work.
Table 2.5 presents the ﬁndings for the ﬁrst wave of railway expansion (18471864),
illustrated in Figure 2.3. The ﬁrst column reports results for a placebo test based on
the pre-railway period between 1800 and 1850. Both the OLS and IV coeﬃcients for
the pretreatment period are close to zero and statistically insigniﬁcant. This indicates
that conditional on our control variables, population growth rates in treated and un-
treated municipalities were similar previous to the railway era. This changed following
the construction of the railway network. Column (2) captures the eﬀects of railway lines
on long-term population growth between 1850 and 1900. Municipalities that were con-
nected to the railway network between 1847 and 1864 experienced a signiﬁcant increase
in population growth during the second half of the 19th century.
The IV estimates, shown in the middle panel of Table 2.5, imply an additional annual
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Table 2.5: The Impact of Railway Access (184764) on Annual Population Growth Rates,
Cross-Sectional Estimates at the Municipal Level
Long Run 10 Year Periods
180050a 18501900 185060 186070 187080 188090 18901900
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS: Annual Population Growth Rates and Railway Access
Rail Access 184764 0.00 0.41∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08)
R2 0.26 0.28 0.17 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.12
Observations 903 2770 2791 2790 2748 2743 2769
IV, Second Stage: Annual Population Growth Rates and Railway Access
Rail Access 184764 0.15 0.39∗∗∗ =0.06 0.31∗ 0.58∗∗ 0.32+ 0.47∗
(0.15) (0.10) (0.15) (0.15) (0.18) (0.18) (0.22)
Observations 903 2770 2791 2790 2748 2743 2769
IV, First Stage: Actual Railway Access 184764 and Least-Cost Paths
LCP 184764 0.25∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
R2 0.29 0.39 0.33 0.33 0.37 0.37 0.39
Observations 903 2770 2791 2790 2748 2743 2769
Notes: The dependent variable is annual population growth in percent. The controls used are distance to the nearest town node (log),
distance to the nearest Stephenson-Swinburne node (log), subsequent railway access (binary), access to main road (binary), access to
navigable water (binary), elevation (log), water power potential (binary), town privilege (binary), population in 1850 (log), area in km2
(log), annual district population growth 18001850, and cantonal ﬁxed eﬀects. Sample: All municipalities of Switzerland, excluding nodes
and municipalities strongly aﬀected by railway construction work (source: Rey, 2003, 147-149). a: Pre-railway sample available for four
cantons (ZH, BE, SO, AG). The instrument is based on a least-cost path for railway lines between the 20 largest cities and Stephenson-
Swinburne nodes. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
growth of 0.39 percentage points, which translates into a relative population increase of
over 20% within 50 years. An average municipality with early railway access and 750
inhabitants in 1850 would therefore have gained around 160 additional inhabitants by
1900 compared to an identical municipality without railway access. Note that the ﬁrst
stage, which is presented in the table's bottom panel, yields a strong and highly signiﬁ-
cant correlation between the instrument and the railway access variable. This alleviates
concerns related to weak instruments.
Looking at every decade individually, we obtain fairly stable coeﬃcients. According
to our preferred IV estimates in columns (4) to (7), municipalities with railway access
experienced additional annual growth of 0.31 to 0.58 percentage points compared to mu-
nicipalities without a railway connection. This eﬀect is signiﬁcant at the 10% level or
higher, except for the ﬁrst decade of railway construction from 1850 to 1860 suggest-
ing that railway access impacted population growth with a time lag. The OLS and IV
coeﬃcients are similar in magnitude, which substantiates the claim that early railway com-
panies prioritised direct connections between large cities, and did not necessarily target
fast growing municipalities along the way.
The results for the second wave of railway construction (18691882), which expanded
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Table 2.6: The Impact of Railway Access (186982) on Annual Population Growth Rates,
Cross-Sectional Estimates at the Municipal Level
Long Run 10 Year Periods
185070a 18701900 185060a 186070 187080 188090 18901900
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS: Annual Population Growth Rates and Railway Access
Rail Access 186982 0.24∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08)
R2 0.15 0.22 0.15 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.11
Observations 2344 2344 2365 2364 2324 2320 2344
IV, Second Stage: Annual Population Growth Rates and Railway Access
Rail Access 186982 =0.08 0.51∗∗ 0.01 =0.19 0.37 0.60∗ 0.49
(0.19) (0.18) (0.27) (0.23) (0.29) (0.26) (0.35)
Observations 2344 2344 2365 2364 2324 2320 2344
IV, First Stage: Actual Railway Access 186982 and Least-Cost Paths
LCP 186982 0.36∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
R2 0.32 0.32 0.29 0.29 0.27 0.28 0.32
Observations 2344 2344 2365 2364 2324 2320 2344
Notes: The dependent variable is annual population growth in percent. The controls used are distance to the nearest town node (log),
distance to the nearest Stephenson-Swinburne node (log), subsequent railway access (binary), access to main road (binary), access to
navigable water (binary), elevation (log), water power potential (binary), town privilege (binary), population in 1850 (log), area in km2
(log), cantonal ﬁxed eﬀects, and population growth 18501860 (except for columns a , where district population growth 18001850 is used).
Sample: All municipalities, excluding nodes and municipalities strongly aﬀected by railway construction work (source: Rey, 2003, 147-149).
The instrument is based on a least-cost path for railway lines between the 20 largest cities and Stephenson-Swinburne nodes. Huber-White
standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
the network by another 1 500 km of tracks, are presented in Table 2.6. Municipalities
that gained railway access by 1864 were excluded from these regressions. Again, the ﬁrst
stage results for the IV models yield large and highly signiﬁcant correlations between our
instrument and railway access.
Columns (1), (3), and (4) display placebo tests based on an analysis of population
growth rates from 1850 to 1870 and railway access obtained between 1869 and 1882. The
OLS regressions produce a positive and statistically signiﬁcant correlation, indicating
that municipalities with a higher population growth rate in this pre-treatment period
were more likely to receive railway access between 1869 to 1882. The IV approach seems
to mitigate this issue, with coeﬃcients being close to zero or negative and statistically
insigniﬁcant in both the short (185060; 186070) and long run perspective (185070).
While pre-treatment annual growth rates are not correlated with the instrumented
railway access indicator, we obtain strong correlations for the post-treatment period.
Estimates for the long run eﬀect spanning 30 years from 1870 to 1900 are displayed in
the second column and show a positive and highly signiﬁcant eﬀect of railway access on
population growth, with the IV estimate amounting to 0.51. Columns (5) to (7) report
the analogous results for each decade separately, which display positive eﬀects of railway
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access across all speciﬁcations, while in two cases the coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcant with
t-values between 1.3 and 1.4. The eﬀects of railway access on population growth rates
vary between 0.37 and 0.6 percentage points. As for the results on the ﬁrst wave of railway
expansion, the post-treatment IV estimates are not statistically diﬀerent from the OLS
estimates in this second set of cross-sectional regressions.
Tables B.5 and B.6 in the appendix (section 2.B.1) present the same set of results for
municipalities belonging to districts with a mean elevation below 1 000 m.a.s.l. Although
population growth dynamics might be diﬀerent in the barren alpine regions, the main
estimates are not substantially aﬀected by this robustness exercise.
Taken together, the results for both waves of railway construction suggest that railway
access caused an increase in annual population growth rates, with the average eﬀect lying
between 0.39 and 0.51 percentage points for our preferred long run IV speciﬁcations. The
following section analyses the impact of railway access on population growth based on
panel data techniques.
2.5.2 Panel Data Analysis: Population Growth in Municipalities
The cross-section estimations include various control variables that account for munici-
pality speciﬁc characteristics. Nevertheless, unobserved characteristics may still inﬂuence
the particular growth potential of a municipality. The ﬁxed eﬀect estimation allows us
to base inference on within municipality variation, which eliminates biases from time-
invariant unobserved characteristics. Table 2.7 presents our preferred panel estimations
that use the lag of railway access as main explanatory variable.
We provide results for OLS and IV ﬁxed eﬀects estimations for three diﬀerent samples.
The ﬁrst sample includes all the municipalities in Switzerland (see column 1 & 2). The
second sample excludes municipalities where the mean district elevation is higher than
1 000 m.a.s.l. in order to remove the barren alpine region (see column 2 & 3). The third
sample is restricted to municipalities for which pre-railway population data is available, so
that the decade from 1840 to 1850 can be included in the estimation as well (see column 3
& 4). For all samples the main nodes and municipalities aﬀected by railway construction
work are excluded.
The IV coeﬃcients in columns (2), (4) and (6) range between 0.41 to 0.44 for all three
samples and are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level or higher. Remarkably, they are
also very close to the long run eﬀects estimated in the cross section (ﬁrst wave: 0.39,
second wave: 0.51). Although this eﬀect is less than half of the estimates reported for
cities (see Berger and Enﬂo, ming; Hornung, 2015), it is not negligible. A coeﬃcient of 0.42
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Table 2.7: The Impact of Railway Access on Annual Population Growth Rates, Panel
Estimates at the Municipal Level
Whole Switzerlanda Below 1 000 mb Pre-Treatment Samplec
OLS FE IV FE OLS FE IV FE OLS FE IV FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Annual Population Growth Rates in Decade t and Railway Access in Decade t− 1
Lag Railway Access 0.08∗ 0.42∗∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.41∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.44∗
(0.04) (0.13) (0.04) (0.13) (0.06) (0.18)
R2 0.05  0.05  0.17 
Municipalities 2731 2731 2020 2020 821 821
Observations 13651 13651 10100 10100 4926 4926
Municpality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Canton Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is annual population growth rate in percent. Full sample, a: All municipalities of Switzerland, excluding
nodes and municipalities strongly aﬀected by railway construction work (source: Rey, 2003, 147-149). Below 1 000 m sample, b: All
municipalities of districts with mean elevation below 1 000 m.a.s.l., excluding nodes and municipalities strongly aﬀected by railway con-
struction work (see Rey, 2003, 147-149). c: This estimation additionally includes the pre-treatment period 18371850, but is restricted to
a smaller sample of municipalities for which pre-railway population data is available (four cantons: ZH, BE, SO, AG), excluding nodes and
municipalities strongly aﬀected by railway construction work (source: Rey, 2003, 147-149). The instrument is based on a least-cost path
for railway lines between the 20 largest cities and Stephenson-Swinburne nodes. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10,
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
translates into an additional population count of 23% after 50 years for municipalities that
got connected to the railway infrastructure compared to municipalities without railway
access. In the next section, we explore local displacement eﬀects of railway and impact
heterogeneity across treated municipalities.
2.5.3 Displacement Eﬀects and Heterogeneity across Municipal-
ities
Compared to other studies that investigate the impact of railway infrastructure, the small
size of Swiss municipalities allows for a detailed spatial evaluation of growth eﬀects. For
example, both Atack et al. (2010) and Donaldson and Hornbeck (ming) use US counties
as units of analysis, which have a median land area of 1 610 km2 compared to less than
7 km2 of a median-sized Swiss municipality.24 Hornung (2015), on the other hand, uses
Prussian cities as unit of analysis, and therefore provides no insights for railway eﬀects in
rural areas.
One important question that can be addressed based on the spatially small-scaled data
relates to the local displacement eﬀects of transportation infrastructure. For instance,
Chandra and Thompson (2000) ﬁnd that US highways led to a local shift of production
24Information on the area of US counties is based on the US Census 2000 available at http:
//factfinder.census.gov/; the area of Swiss municipalities is based on our own calculations in GIS
using the Swiss boundary ﬁles.
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from unconnected regions to neighbouring regions with highway access. If railway caused
such local reorganisations, we would expect negative population growth eﬀects in close
proximity to the railway. Figure 2.5 shows two local polynomial regression of residual
growth on the log distance to the railway in 1864, covering the periods from 1850 to 1870
and from 1850 to 1900. Both graphs are indeed hump-shaped, supporting the hypothesis
of local displacement eﬀects from nearby municipalities to those with direct railway access.
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Figure 2.5: Distance to Railway and Population Growth, Local Polynomial with 95%
Conﬁdence Band.
Settings: Kernel: Epanechnikov, Degree=0, Bandwith (a)=0.46 (b)=0.43, Pwidth (a)=0.7 (b)=0.64
Residuals: Calculated based on OLS regression of population growth (18501870; 18501900) on control variables, i.e. distance to the nearest
town node (log), distance to the nearest Stephenson-Swinburne node (log), access to main road (binary), access to navigable water (binary),
elevation (log), water power potential (binary), town privilege (binary), population in 1850 (log), area in km2 (log), and annual district
population growth 18001850, and cantonal ﬁxed eﬀects.
To further investigate this claim, Table B.11 in the appendix reconstructs our baseline
cross-section results, yet provides a spatially disaggregated analysis by including a set
of distance dummies. Distance to the railway is calculated as distance between a mu-
nicipality's geographic centroid and the closest railway track, with each distance dummy
covering a band with a width of 2 km.25 Railway only had a positive growth impact on
municipalities that either had direct access to the railway network, or were very close to
the railway line. Reproducing the results from the local polynomial regressions, munic-
ipalities located more than 2 km from the railway network experienced a slowdown in
population growth with the negative eﬀect peaking at 6 to 8 km. Taken together, this
strongly points towards a local reorganisation of economic activity as municipalities in
25We only present OLS results for this part, since instrumenting a series of distance dummies is beyond
the power of our instrument. Considering the results in Tables 2.4 and 2.5 we are not too concerned
about selection issues. Moreover, selection is probably even less likely for the set of municipalities that
were close to the railway tracks but did not gain direct access. Indeed, the results in column (1) of Table
B.11 do not point towards selection eﬀects.
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Table 2.8: The Impact of Railway Access (184764) and Interaction Terms on Annual
Population Growth Rates, Cross-Sectional Estimates at the Municipal Level
Long Run 18501900
(1) (2) (3)
OLS: Annual Population Growth and Railway Access
Rail Access 184764 0.41∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Rail Access 184764 x Population 1850 0.05
(0.04)
Rail Access 184764 x Distance 20 Cities =0.07
(0.06)
R2 0.28 0.28 0.28
Observations 2770 2770 2770
IV: Annual Population Growth and Railway Access
Rail Access 1847-64 0.39∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.12) (0.10)
Rail Access 184764 x Population 1850 0.08
(0.10)
Rail Access 184764 x Distance 20 Cities =0.05
(0.14)
Observations 2770 2770 2770
FS 1: F-statistic 146.87 81.99 86.01
FS 2: F-statistic  67.62 76.78
Notes: The dependent variable is the annual population growth rate in percent. The controls used are distance to the nearest town
node(log), distance to the nearest Stephenson-Swinburne node (log), subsequent railway access (binary), access to main road (binary),
access to navigable water (binary), elevation (log), water power potential (binary), town privilege (binary), population in 1850 (log),
area in km2 (log), annual district population growth 18001850, and cantonal ﬁxed eﬀects. Sample: All municipalities of Switzerland,
excluding nodes and municipalities strongly aﬀected by railway construction work (source: Rey, 2003, 147-149). The instrument is based
on a least-cost path for railway lines between the 20 largest cities and Stephenson-Swinburne nodes. Huber-White standard errors in
parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
the direct vicinity of railway tracks (2 km10 km) experienced slowing population growth,
suggesting that people moved closer to the railway line after it went into service.
With regard to eﬀect heterogeneity, it is interesting to investigate whether large mu-
nicipalities beneﬁted more from railway access in terms of population growth than small
ones, as the home-market channel from economic geography models would suggest. In
Table 2.8 we therefore add an interaction term of railway access with population size
prior to the railway construction in 1850. Column (2) presents both OLS and IV esti-
mates including that interaction term. The estimated coeﬃcient turns out to be small
and insigniﬁcant at conventional levels. Consequently, one may conclude that municipal-
ity size was not a key moderating factor for the impact of railway access, thus rejecting
implications related to the home-market eﬀect.
Urbanisation in Switzerland advanced quickly in the second half of the 19th century, as
Figure 2.1a unambiguously illustrates. This may raise concerns that the eﬀect of railway
access was mainly driven by urbanisation forces. We therefore check whether the impact of
railway access varies with distance to the urban centres. While distance to the 20 largest
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cities certainly has a strongly negative impact on population growth rates as seen in Table
B.4 in the appendix, the interaction of distance to the 20 largest cities with railway access
has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the population growth rate. This alleviates concerns that the
railway access dummy primarily picks up urbanisation eﬀects, and suggests that railway
access was equally beneﬁcial in peripheral areas and in the direct vicinity of the main
urban centres.
Finally, we investigate the impact of railway access at diﬀerent percentiles of the
population growth distribution using quantile regressions. As Figure B.5 in the appendix
reveals, railway access increased population growth across all percentiles evaluated, with
somewhat stronger eﬀects on faster growing municipalities.
Overall, our results at the municipal level show that railway moderately increased pop-
ulation growth in directly connected municipalities. This impact was fairly homogeneous
across municipalities of diﬀerent sizes, diﬀerent geographical locations, and diﬀerent per-
centiles of the growth distribution. However, our ﬁndings also suggest that unconnected
municipalities in the close vicinity of railway lines experienced a slump in population
growth rates, probably due to displacement eﬀects, as reported for highways by Chandra
and Thompson (2000) for instance.
2.5.4 District Level: Population Growth, Migration, Sectoral Work
Shares, and Body Height
This section reports and discusses the estimation results based on district data. While
studying the municipal level provides a cleaner setup for identiﬁcation, district data allows
for a number of extensions. First, the previously discussed results raise the question of
whether railway had a positive net impact on local population growth, or simply led to
a local zero-sum-shift from municipalities without railway access to municipalities with
railway access. District level data can shed light on this question, as one would expect a
positive impact of railway access on district population growth in the ﬁrst scenario only.
Second, Swiss municipality data does not reveal whether changes in the population count
are driven by changes in migration, birth surpluses, or both. Census data including district
birth and death statistics can be used to examine the two channels separately. Third, one
may test the hypothesis that railway access promoted regional economic development
based on further indicators alongside population growth. District statistics on sectoral
work shares and the body height of conscripts allow us to gain insights into the impact
of railway on structural change and the biological well-being of the Swiss population.
This last step may also provide answers to the question why railway expansion aﬀected
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population dynamics, since shifts in labour demand and altered living conditions are
potential drivers of migrations ﬂows.
We use the population weighted share of municipalities directly connected to the
railway network as our main explanatory variable on the district level. Reﬂecting the
three waves of railway constructions in 19th century Switzerland, we deﬁne three mea-
sures that indicate the additional railway access gained by districts in each period, i.e.
RASHR1847−64, RASHR1865−82, and RASHR1883−99.26 These three railway variables are
used as main explanatory variables in our OLS regressions of the form
Y tic = α5+γ1RASHR
47−64
ic +γ2RASHR
65−82
ic +γ3RASHR
83−99
ic +ϕ5D
1850
ic +κ5c+ϑic, (2.5)
where Yic stands for the outcome of interest in period t, κc denotes cantonal ﬁxed
eﬀects, andD1850ic is a vector of district control variables, including the population weighted
log distance to the nearest city, population weighted access to a main road, log mean
district elevation, log population in 1850, and population growth between 1800 and 1850.
We do not report the results for the IV equivalent of equation (2.5), since a test for weak
instruments along Stock and Yogo (2005) suggests that instrumenting RASHR47−64ic and
RASHR65−82ic would be unreliable due to low ﬁrst stage correlations.
We complement the cross-sectional analysis with OLS and IV district ﬁxed eﬀects
panel estimations, the latter being speciﬁed as
RASHRict = pi6i + β6LCPSHRict + λ6t + λ6t · κ6c + ξict, and (2.6)
Yict = pi7i + β7RASHR
∧
ict−1 + λ7t + λ7t · κ7c + εict (2.7)
where time ﬁxed eﬀects, λt, control for population growth cycles on the national level,
and cantonal-time ﬁxed eﬀects, λt·κc, account for cycles on the regional level. LCPSHRict
serves as instrument, which is deﬁned as the population weighted share of municipalities
in district i and decade t that lie on the least-cost path explained in section 2.4.2.
26We calculate the population weighted share of municipalities with railway access for each year and
district. RASHR1847−64i stands for district's i population weighted share of municipalities with railway
access in 1864. It is equal to the additional share of population weighted railway access compared to the
initial situation with no railway access at all (before 1847). RASHR1865−82i gives district's i population
weighted share of municipalities with railway access in 1882 minus its population weighted share of
municipalities with railway access in 1864. Finally, RASHR1883−99i is district's i population weighted
share of municipalities with railway access in 1899 minus its population weighted share of municipalities
with railway access in 1882.
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Table 2.9 shows the district level distribution of railway access. During the ﬁrst wave
of railway construction 84 of the 178 Swiss districts were connected to the railway network,
and by 1900 this number increased to 158. The districts' average share of people living in
a municipality with railway access climbed to 26% by 1864, and reached 55% by the end of
the century. With respect to our main explanatory variable RASHRw, this translates into
district averages of 26% for the ﬁrst wave, 19% for the second wave, and 10% for the third
wave. These numbers are used in the remainder of this study for back-of-the-envelope
calculations of impact magnitudes for districts with average railway access compared to
identical districts without a railway connection.
Table 2.9: Share of Population with RW-Access, District Level Distribution
Mean across Districts Number of Districts with
w Marginala Cumulative No Access (=0) Full Access (=1)
184764 0.26 0.26 84 3
186582 0.19 0.45 34 8
188399 0.10 0.55 20 10
Notes: a This column shows the mean across the explanatory variable RASHRt.
Did these railway improvements aﬀect population growth at the district level, as
observed for municipalities? The results in Table 2.10 indeed suggest that railway access
had a positive net-impact on district population growth, and did not simply lead to a local
zero-sum-shift from municipalities without railway access to municipalities with railway
access. A district that was fully connected to the railway network experienced an average
increase in the annual population growth rate of 0.4 to 0.8 percentage points compared
to districts without railway access, which is slightly larger than the eﬀects found at the
municipal level. The panel-IV coeﬃcient is rather imprecisely estimated, however, and is
insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from our preferred municipality estimates, which range from 0.4
to 0.5. Furthermore, the equivalent coeﬃcient for the sub-sample of districts with mean
elevation below 1 000 m.a.s.l. is 0.63 (see Table C.12 in the appendix), and therefore halves
the gap to the municipality estimates. While we ﬁnd signiﬁcant and robust correlations
between railway access and population growth across diﬀerent models and sub-samples,
a placebo test based on district population growth prior to the railway era in column (1)
does not yield signiﬁcant coeﬃcients for the railway access variables.
The previous ﬁndings unequivocally suggest that gaining railway access increased pop-
ulation growth. In a next step, we explore whether the additional growth is driven by
larger birth surpluses or the migration balance. Based on the districts' birth and death
statistics as reported in the Swiss census since 1870, we calculate the birth surplus as
well as the migration balance for each decade and district as a share of the districts'
populations. The cross-sectional and panel OLS regressions presented in Table 2.11 yield
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Table 2.10: The Impact of Railway Access on Annual Population Growth Rates, Cross-
Sectional and Panel Estimates at the District Level
Cross Section Panel FE Panel IV FE IV FS
180050 18501900 18501900 18501900 18501900
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RASHR 184764 0.18 0.52∗∗∗ Lag RASHR 0.41∗∗ 0.84+
(0.12) (0.15) (0.15) (0.43)
RASHR 186582 0.14 0.70∗∗∗ LCPSHR 0.43∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.17) (0.09)
RASHR 188399 0.05 0.61∗∗
(0.12) (0.22)
R2 0.58 0.49 R2 (within) 0.33  0.73
Observations 136 126 Observations 600 600 600
Districts 120 120 120
Notes: The dependent variable is the annual population growth rate in percent. RASHR is deﬁned as the share of a district's population
that lives in a municipality with direct access to the railway network. The controls used are distance to the nearest node (log, population
weighted), access to main road (population weighted), mean district elevation (log), population in 1850 (log), and population growth
18001850. The sample comprises all districts, except for districts including one of the 33 nodes, and districts strongly aﬀected by railway
construction work (source: Rey, 2003, 147-149). The instrument is based on a least-cost path for railway lines between the 20 largest
cities and Stephenson-Swinburne nodes. The ﬁrst stage regression is shown in the last column. LCPSHR is the population weighted
share of municipalities in a district that lie on the least-cost path. Panel estimations include district ﬁxed eﬀects, year ﬁxed eﬀects and
year-cantonal ﬁxed eﬀects. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
a positive correlation between railway access and the migration balance as well as the
excess of birth over death counts. Comparing a district without railway infrastructure to
an identical district with average railway access, the cross sectional estimates in column
(1) translate into a railway induced increase in the net migration rate of 2.1% of the
initial population within 10 years.27 The panel estimates in column (3) are quantitatively
similar to the cross-sectional results and suggest that connecting 55% of a district's pop-
ulation to the railway network would cause an increase in the net migration balance of
2.8 percentage points in the following decade. Turning to the second measure, average
railway access is associated with an increase in the district's birth surplus of 0.5% to 1%
of its initial population depending on the regression model used.28
As both dependent variables are measured in terms of a district's population, these
results indicate that railway access had a considerably larger impact on the migration
balance than on the birth surplus. Having said this, it should be noted that the migra-
tion balance was negative for three out of four districts between 1870 and 1900. Hence,
improved railway access had a positive impact of population growth rates because it cush-
ioned the outﬂow of people to urban centres rather than causing a net inﬂow. In summary,
one may conclude that railway access had a weakly positive impact on the birth surplus
and at the same time signiﬁcantly improved the migration balance by attenuating the net
27Based on the cross-sectional results, the ten-year eﬀect of railway access on the migration balance of an
average district is calculated based on Table 2.9 and 2.11 as follows: (0.26·10.18+0.19·15.44+0.1·7.26)/3 =
2.1.
28Based on the cross-sectional results, the ten-year eﬀect of railway access on the birth surplus of an
average district is calculated based on Table 2.9 and 2.11: (0.26 · 3.52 + 0.19 · 3.68 + 0.1 · 0.83)/3 = 0.5.
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Table 2.11: The Impact of Railway Access on Migration and Birth Surplus, Cross-
Sectional and Panel Estimates at the District Level
Cross Section (18701900) Panel FE (18701900)
Migrationa Birth Surplusb Migrationa Birth Surplusb
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RASHR 184764 10.18+ 3.52∗∗ Lag RASHR 5.06∗ 1.79∗
(5.82) (1.22) (2.02) (0.84)
RASHR 186582 15.44∗ 3.68∗∗
(6.36) (1.32)
RASHR 188399 7.26 0.83
(5.90) (2.08)
R2 0.54 0.63 R2 (within) 0.30 0.32
Observations 112 112 Observations 327 327
Districts 109 109
Notes: RASHR is deﬁned as the share of a district's population that lives in a municipality with direct access to the railway network.
Dependent variable, a : A district's net balance of migration ﬂow, indicates inﬂow - outﬂow. b: A district's birth surplus as a share of
average population. Railway access is measured by the share of the population that has access (municipalities with railway line) to the
railway network. The sample comprises all districts, except for districts including one of the 33 main nodes, and districts strongly aﬀected
by railway construction work (source: Rey, 2003, 147-149). The controls used in the cross-section estimation are distance to the nearest
city (log, population weighted), access to main road (population weighted), mean district elevation (log), population in 1850 (log), and
population growth 18001850. Cross-section estimations include cantonal ﬁxed eﬀects. Panel estimations include district ﬁxed eﬀects, year
ﬁxed eﬀects and year-cantonal ﬁxed eﬀects. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
outﬂow of people. Overall, these two eﬀects translate on average into an additional annual
population growth rate of 0.4 to 0.8 percentage points caused by full railway access.
In a last step, we complement the analysis of population growth by examining the
impact of railway infrastructure on the sectoral composition and the biological standard of
living. These two variables allow us to evaluate whether the conclusions derived from the
population statistics are robust to the use of other proxies of regional economic develop-
ment. Furthermore, we may learn why railway expansion aﬀected population dynamics;
railway induced changes in labour demand and living conditions could have been two
potential factors shaping Switzerland's domestic migration ﬂows.
While historians have discussed various channels through which railway infrastructure
potentially accelerated structural change, to our knowledge no study has so far aimed to
quantify these eﬀects in the Swiss context. One important consequence of railway expan-
sion in Switzerland was the shift in agricultural production from grain to dairy products,
as explained in section 2.2. Frey and Vogel (e.g. 1997, chapter 8) point out that interna-
tional demand for dairy products and the availability of cheap grain from abroad made
dairy farming ﬁnancially more attractive. Since milk is highly perishable, quick and reli-
able transport from producers to the processing industry was crucial, making accessible
regions better suited to this type of farming.29 At the same time animal husbandry was
29Consider the ﬁrst condensed milk producer in Switzerland as an illustrative example. It started
operating in Cham, 20 km south of Zurich, two years after being connected to the railway network in
1864. In around 1880, it was supplied by 1350 farmers, absorbing more milk than Switzerland's largest
city Zurich (Frey and Vogel, 1997, 279).
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less labour intensive than grain cultivation, meaning that the shift to dairy farming led to
stagnating or even decreasing agricultural workforce numbers. On top of that, employees
in the agricultural sector traditionally supplemented their income with home-based manu-
facturing work. With the advance of industrial mechanisation, driven among other things
by large-scale coal imports via rail, this source of supplemental income began to vanish
continuously. This process made farming jobs less attractive, and therefore potentially
accelerated the decline in agricultural workforce numbers. On the other hand, railway ac-
cess arguably oﬀered opportunities in the manufacturing sector and service industry. For
instance, the availability of cheap coal not only accelerated mechanisation, but also cleared
the way for energy-intensive sectors such as steel works, salterns, and cement production
(see section 2.2). Furthermore, railway infrastructure allowed industrial entrepreneurs to
relocate to areas that oﬀered cheap land and labour, without being penalised by uncom-
petitively high transport costs. The quintupling of freight volumes from 1870 to 1900
and the more than 350 privately owned  typically very short  interchange rail tracks
illustrate how heavily manufacturers relied on this new means of transport.30 Regarding
services, the railway expansion coincided with a growing popularity of tourism and leisure
activities. Early travel books such as Baedeker's Schweiz provide detailed accounts of
train connections, documenting their attractiveness for (wealthy) tourists.31 It is certainly
no coincidence that nowadays well-known alpine sights like the Rigi (1 795 m.a.s.l.) at
the Lake of Lucerne or the Jungfraujoch (3 466 m.a.s.l.) in Grindelwald were connected
by rack railways from as early as 1871 and 1912.
We measure sectoral composition based on work shares of the agricultural, manufac-
turing, and service sector. The cross-sectional regressions aim to explain the percentage
point change in sectoral work shares between 1860 to 1900 using our period speciﬁc district
level measures for railway access along a set of controls. In the panel data models, the
sectoral work shares for each decade are regressed on the lagged value of the time-variant
railway access indicator, or its ﬁrst-stage prediction in the IV setup.
The cross-sectional regressions (see Table 2.13) and the panel models (see Table 2.12)
reveal an unambiguous pattern. Improvements in the railway access of districts are associ-
ated with a shift from the agricultural sector to the manufacturing and services industries.
The estimated coeﬃcients imply that in districts with average railway access the agricul-
30Statistics on freight and privately owned interchange tracks were obtained from the Schweizerische
Eisenbahnstatistik (SPE, 1900), which is partly accessible online from http://www.bahndaten.ch/ (last
access: 01.02.2016).
31Baedeker's Schweiz, which appeared in 31 revised editions between 1840 and 1905, began oﬀering
descriptions of localities and recommended routes with detailed travel directions, typically information on
train connections such as train operator, journey time, fares, and interchange facilities. It also included a
map of Switzerland's railway network, as well as a general section on traveling by train with information
on fares, circular tickets, and Switzerland's oﬃcial railway guide.
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Table 2.12: The Impact of Railway Access on Sectoral Work Shares, Panel Estimates at
the District Level
Panel FE (18601900) Panel IV FE (18601900)
Agriculture Manufact. Services Agriculture Manufact. Services
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Lag RASHR =7.74∗∗∗ 6.26∗∗∗ 1.48 =9.69+ 9.14+ 0.55
(1.72) (1.36) (0.99) (5.16) (4.72) (1.59)
R2 (within) 0.54 0.48 0.51   
Districts 117 117 117 117 117 117
Observations 550 550 550 550 550 550
Notes: RASHR is deﬁned as the share of a district's population that lives in a municipality with direct access to the railway network.
Dependent variable: A district's sectoral work share in percent (agriculture, manufacturing, services). The sample comprises all districts,
except for districts including one of the 33 main nodes, and districts strongly aﬀected by railway construction work (source: Rey, 2003,
147-149). The instrument is based on a least-cost path for railway lines between the 20 largest cities and Stephenson-Swinburne
nodes. Panel estimations include district ﬁxed eﬀects, year ﬁxed eﬀects and year-cantonal ﬁxed eﬀects. Huber-White standard errors in
parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
tural work share declined by an additional 4.6 to 8.3 percentage points between 1860
and 1900 compared to districts without a railway connection.32 At least two-thirds of
this railway induced drop in agricultural employment were absorbed by an increase in
the industrial workforce, while employment gains in the service sector compensated for
one-third or less. Considering that the average drop in the agricultural work share was
9.2 percentage points in the same period, the drop explained by railway infrastructure
improvements at the district level is substantial.
Although very few sources document industry-speciﬁc wages paid during the 19th
century in Switzerland, the available records suggest that wages in the secondary sector
were higher than in the primary sector.33 Since better connected localities experienced
on average a faster shift from agricultural employment to better paid manufacturing jobs,
railway related sectoral change may explain why districts with well-developed railway
infrastructure experienced higher population growth than districts with poor railway ac-
cess. This notion also reﬂects a common narrative within the agrarian community at the
time, which claimed that employment opportunities in the manufacturing sector and the
promise of higher living standards in the city were responsible for the rural exodus, thus
jeopardising the traditional social order (Gruner, 1987, 1404).
32Based on the cross-sectional results, the 40 year eﬀect of railway access on the agricultural work share
of an average district is calculated based on Table 2.9 and 2.13: 0.26·(−14.6)+0.19·(−17.2)+0.1·(−12.2) =
−8.3.
33The database Historical Statistics of Switzerland Online (www.fsw.uzh.ch/histstat/) compiles all
industry speciﬁc income statistics available for the 19th century, its main sources being Brugger (1978)
for the primary sector and Gruner (1987) for the secondary sector. While the database is relatively
comprehensive for manufacturing jobs, wages paid in the agricultural sector are only available for the
cantons of Geneva and Thurgau. A comparison of average incomes earned in various occupations and
regions yields wage diﬀerences between the primary and secondary sector ranging from -20% (construction
worker vs. senior farm labourer) to +250% (worker in horology industry vs. herdsman). By far most of
these comparisons suggest that manufacturing jobs were better paid, even though we did not discount
wages in the primary sector for the very poor employment opportunities during the winter months.
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Table 2.13: The Impact of Railway Access on Sectoral Work Shares and Body Height,
Cross-Sectional Estimates at the District Level
Sectoral Shares (18601900)a Body Heightb
Agriculture Manufacturing Services 18901910
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RASHR 184764 =14.56∗∗ 9.16∗∗ 4.89∗
(4.48) (3.44) (2.32)
RASHR 186582 =17.20∗∗∗ 12.35∗∗∗ 4.25∗ RASHR 184782 0.17
(4.65) (3.61) (2.14) (0.29)
RASHR 188399 =12.22∗ 2.46 8.82∗ RASHR 188299 0.93∗∗
(5.83) (3.46) (4.16) (0.29)
R2 0.49 0.54 0.39 R2 0.73
Observations 123 123 123 Observations 125
Notes: RASHR is deﬁned as the share of a district's population that lives in a municipality with direct access to the railway network.
Dependent variable, a: Percentage point change in a district's sectoral work share (agriculture, manufacturing, services). b: Centimeter
change in a district's conscripts average body height between 1884/91 and 1908/12. The controls used are distance to the nearest city
(log, population weighted), access to main road (population weighted), mean district elevation (log), population in 1850 (log), population
growth 18001850, and cantonal ﬁxed eﬀects. Additionally, models in columns a control for the district's sectoral work share in 1860
(agric., indust., services), while column b includes the district's average body height for the 1884/91 conscription. The sample comprises
all districts, except for districts including one of the 33 main nodes, and districts strongly aﬀected by railway construction work (source:
Rey, 2003, 147-149). Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
While fragmentary income data makes it impossible to investigate these claims further,
the body height data of conscripts allow us to directly compare improvements in living
standards across Switzerland. Since the 1970s, interdisciplinary research  known as new
anthropometric history  established body height and other anthropometric measures as
indicators for the biological standard of living.34 The adult height of a population serves
as a measure of the population's nutritional status from birth through adolescence. Early
childhood and the adolescent growth spurt are considered sensitive periods, during which a
person's stature is most keenly aﬀected by nutritional abundance or scarcity (Steckel, 2009,
8). A broad list of factors inﬂuencing nutritional status and physical growth have been
studied, including social class (e.g. Schoch et al., 2012), business cycles (e.g. Sunder and
Woitek, 2005), industrialisation (e.g. Steckel and Floud, 1997) and public infrastructure,
such as sanitary and electric facilities (e.g. Thomas and Strauss, 1992) or road access (e.g.
Gibson and Rozelle, 2003). These studies ﬁnd that economically favourable conditions
and well-developed infrastructure are positively correlated with nutrition intake and body
height. The study closest to our analysis of body height is Solakoglu (2007), who evaluates
the eﬀect of railway on nutritional intake in the US postbellum period. Her ﬁndings
suggest that railway infrastructure increased nutritional intake signiﬁcantly. Relating her
estimates to ﬁndings on calorie intake and body height by Craig and Weiss (1998), she
computes a railway-induced average stature growth of an additional 1.1 cm between 1867
and 1906.
Railway access may have an impact on body height through various channels, including
34Steckel (1995) reviews 145 articles on body height and human welfare written between the late 1970s
and 1994, while Steckel (2009) covers 326 studies on this topic published between 1995 and 2008.
Chapter 2 37
the price and availability of nutrition and medical treatment, the quantity and physical
nature of labour during adolescence, as well as the dissemination of infectious diseases. To
quantify the net impact of railway infrastructure on body height, we study body height
data from two conscription periods (source: Staub, 2010). The ﬁrst cross-section comprises
the body height of men physically examined between 1884 and 1891, with their year of
birth ranging from 1865 to 1872. The second cross-section includes the body height of
men physically examined between 1908 and 1912, with their year of birth ranging from
1889 to 1893.35 We intend to explain the change in body height of recruits between these
two periods using the change in district railway access and a set of controls (Figure C.6 in
the appendix illustrates the timing for this test). Since we use the change in body height
between two conscription periods and control for the initial body height of recruits, one
would expect that only the third wave of railway constructions, i.e. between 1883 to
1899, has explanatory value. On one hand, recruits registered in the ﬁrst military survey
available (1884 to 1891) were at least 11 years old by the time the earliest of these railway
lines went into service so that possible railway induced improvements in their nutritional
status were hardly suﬃcient to translate into body height gains. On the other hand, men
recruited in the second period (1908 to 1912) were at most 10 years old when the last
third-wave lines entered into operation, which allowed their stature to be aﬀected by the
beneﬁts of improved railway access during childhood and the adolescent growth spurt.
The last column of Table 2.13 shows the results for the regression of body height
changes in centimetres on railway access at the district level. As hypothesised, railway
access prior to 1883 is not signiﬁcantly correlated with changes in the districts' average
body height between the two conscription rounds, while railway improvements between
1883 to 1899 are associated with a highly statistically signiﬁcant growth eﬀect. According
to the coeﬃcient for RASHR 188399, the average body height of young men increased
by an additional 9.3 mm if they were domiciled in a district that gained full railway
access between 1883 and 1899 compared to contemporaries living in a district without
improvements in railway access.36 This implies an additional gain in the conscripts'
average body height of 1 mm for districts with average railway improvements between
1883 and 1899 relative to districts without additional railway connections in the same
period. Compared to the average increase in body height across districts in the same
period, which is 2.2 cm, these railway induced gains in body height were only marginal,
35Although the Swiss military authorities surveyed conscripts' body measurements every year, regional
averages were computed and documented by the statistical oﬃce for multi-year periods only. The data
from the years 1884 to 1891 and 1908 to 1912 are the earliest records available that can be used in a
district comparison; see Staub (2010, 101102) for details.
36Restricting the sample to districts with a mean elevation of less than 1 000 m.a.s.l. (see column 4 in
Table C.14 in the appendix) yields almost identical results.
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however.
In summary, the regression results for all indicators of regional economic development
analysed in this section indicate that railway improvements had a positive and statistically
signiﬁcant impact. In comparison to districts without any railway connections, those
districts with average railway access experienced a moderate increase in population growth
per year (around 0.2 to 0.4 percentage points), a substantially accelerated structural
change in the economy (additional 4.6 to 8.3 percentage point shift in work shares from
the primary to the secondary/tertiary sector), and a minor gain in biological well-being.
Hence, the results for both the municipal and district levels support the hypothesis that
railway access promoted regional economic development.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper investigates how railway infrastructure aﬀects regional development by study-
ing railway expansion and population growth in Switzerland during the second half of
the 19th century. We ﬁnd that the annual population growth rates of municipalities with
access to the railway network were about 0.4 percentage points higher than annual the
growth rates of municipalities without a railway connection. This result proves to be
very robust to adjustments in the econometric framework (cross-section and panel IV ),
changes in the sample (whole of Switzerland and lowlands), examinations of diﬀerent con-
struction periods (18471864 and 18691882 ), as well as adaptations in the spatial units
considered (municipalities and districts). The positive eﬀect of railway access on popula-
tion growth was markedly localised, however, as we ﬁnd strong evidence for displacement
eﬀects: Municipalities in the vicinity of railway tracks but without direct access experi-
enced the lowest population growth, suggesting that people moved closer to the railway
line after it went into service. The district analysis of birth, death, and migration statis-
tics conﬁrm that railway primarily had an impact on population growth via the local
migration balance.
We supplement the analysis on population growth with an evaluation of two potential
drivers behind migration ﬂows, namely industrialisation inferred from sectoral work shares
and improved living conditions measured via the body height of conscripts. Our estimates
consistently show that the share of agricultural labour decreased substantially faster in
districts with above-average railway access, while the same districts experienced an accel-
erated growth in manufacturing employment. Concerning body height, our estimations
based on recruitment data yield a weakly positive but highly statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect
of railway improvements between two conscription rounds and the gain in the recruits'
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average body height per district during that period. These ﬁndings signify that railway
facilitated industrialisation and improved living conditions. Both factors  themselves
indicators of regional development  likely drove migration towards better connected lo-
calities, as highlighted both by our municipality and district results on population growth.
Adding to the well-established ﬁndings on railway access and city growth, our study
of Switzerland complements the recent literature on the impact of early railway lines in
western countries. We show that not only urban centres but also small rural municipalities
along the main lines beneﬁted from railway access. While the estimated eﬀects in rural
areas are less than half that reported for cities, our ﬁndings do not strictly support the
home-market hypothesis, as we ﬁnd no evidence pointing towards a growth slowdown in
peripheral municipalities after they received access to the railway network.
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2.A Data Appendix
2.A.1 Control Variables
Table A.1: Variable Description & Data Sources
Municipal Level
Annual Population Growth 100 · (log(POPi,t2)− log(POPi,t1))/(t2− t1) Census (1850, 60, 70, 80, 88,
1900), Schuler and Schluchter
(ress)
Treatment Variable
Railway Access Binary indicator. Equals one if railway intersects a municipality's
boundary.
GIS-Dufour (Egli et al., 2005)
Control Variables
Distance to Town Node Natural logarithm of the distance between a municipality's centroid and
the closest town node's centroid in kilometers. Town nodes are deﬁned
as Switzerland's 20 largest towns in 1850.
Swisstopo (2007)
Distance to Stephenson-
Swinburne Node
Natural logarithm of the distance between a municipality's centroid
and the closest Stephenson-Swinburne node in kilometers. If the clos-
est Stephenson-Swinburne node is also a town node, we compute the
distance based on the second closest Stephenson-Swinburne node.
Swisstopo (2007)
Access to Main Road in 1850 Binary indicator. Equals one if road of primary importance intersects
a municipality's boundary, see 2.A.1.
GIS-Dufour (Egli et al., 2005)
Access to Navigable Water Binary indicator. Equals one if municipality adjoins navigable water. Swisstopo (2007)
Elevation Natural logarithm of the mean elevation (in 100m) calculated based on
a 25 m x 25 m height model.
Swisstopo (2004)
Water Power Potential Binary indicator. Equals one if a river with a water ﬂow of at least
1 m3/s crosses a municipality and  in doing so  overcomes a height
diﬀerence of 10m or more, see 2.A.1.
Swisstopo (2007), Pfaundler
and Schönenberger (2013)
Town Privilege Binary indicator. Equals one if municipality holds the historical town
status.
Guyer (1960)
Population in 1850 Natural logarithm of a municipality's population in 1850. Census (1850)
Municipal Area Natural logarithm of municipal area in square kilometers. Swisstopo (2007)
District Pop. Growth 180050 100 · (log(POPd,t2)− log(POPd,t1))/50 Schluchter (1988), Census
District Level
Annual Population Growth 100 · (log(POPd,t2)− log(POPd,t1))/(t2− t1) Census (1850, 60, 70, 80, 88,
1900)
Migration Balance 100 · (POPd,t2 − POPd,t1 − Birthsurplusd,t1−2)/(POPd,t1) Census (since 1870)
Birth Surplus 100 · (#Birthsd,t1−2 −#Deathsd,t1−2)/( 12POPd,t1 + 12POPd,t2) Census (since 1870)
Work Share: Agriculture Cross-Section: Percentage point change in work share of agric. sector
18601900; Panel: Work share in agric. sector
Census (since 1860)
Work Share: Manufacturing Cross-Section: Percentage point change in work share of industrial
sector 18601900; Panel: Work share in industrial sector
Census (since 1860)
Work Share: Services Cross-Section: Percentage point change in work share of service in-
dustry 18601900; Panel: Work share in service industry
Census (since 1860)
Change in Body Height of Con-
scripts
Centimeter change in a district's conscripts average body height be-
tween 1884/91 and 1908/12
Staub (2010)
Treatment Variable
Pop. Share with Railway Access Population (as per 1850) weighted share of municipalities that had di-
rect access to the railway network
GIS-Dufour (Egli et al., 2005)
Standard Control Variables
Mean Distance to Town Node Population weighted (as per 1850) minimal distances from a district's
municipalities to the nearest city-node.
Swisstopo (2007), Census
Pop. Share with Road Access Share of population (as per 1850) with direct access to road of primary
importance.
GIS-Dufour (Egli et al., 2005)
Elevation Mean elevation (in 100m) of district calculated based on a 25 m x 25 m
height model.
Swisstopo (2004)
Population in 1850 Natural logarithm of a district's population in 1850. Census (1850)
District Pop. Growth 180050 100 · (log(POPd,t2)− log(POPd,t1))/50 Schluchter (1988), Census
Additional Control Variables
Work Share in 1860 A district's work share in agriculture/industry/services in 1860 Census (since 1860)
Body Height of Conscripts in
1884/91
A district's conscripts average body height as measured between 1884
91.
Staub (2010)
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Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics
Municipal Level Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Annual Population Growth, 18501900 (cross-section) 2844 0.15 0.66 =2.43 5.90
Annual Population Growth, 18501900 (pooled) 14 330 0.15 1.27 =16.05 22.23
Treatment Variable
Railway Access, 18501900 (pooled) 17 322 0.22 - 0 1
Control Variables
LN(Distance to Town Node) 2854 2.90 0.63 0.68 4.44
LN(Distance to Stephenson-Swinburne Node) 2854 3.08 0.74 0.21 4.64
Access to Main Road in 1850 2887 0.38 - 0 1
Access to Navigable Water 2887 0.06 - 0 1
LN(Elevation in 100m) 2887 1.97 0.49 0.78 3.40
Water Power Potential 2887 0.42 - 0 1
Town Privilege 2887 0.04 - 0 1
LN(Population) in 1850 2847 6.25 0.92 3.56 10.64
LN(Municipal Area) 2887 2.00 1.04 =1.14 5.64
District Level Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Annual Population Growth, 18501900 (cross-section) 178 0.35 0.48 =6.00 2.36
Annual Population Growth, 18501900 (pooled) 944 0.51 1.85 =4.50 51.10
Migration Balance, 18701900 (cross-section) 143 =12.11 16.39 =44.83 40.12
Migration Balance, 18701900 (pooled) 429 =4.09 6.59 =29.30 24.60
Birth Surplus, 18701900 (cross-section) 143 7.40 3.40 =9.60 15.59
Birth Surplus, 18701900 (pooled) 429 7.40 3.72 =13.42 20.02
∆ Work Share: Agricult., 18601900 (cross-section) 161 =9.17 9.70 =36.22 14.97
Work Share: Agricult., 18601900 (pooled) 784 51.27 19.23 2.18 96.24
∆ Work Share: Manuf., 18601900 (cross-section) 161 4.09 8.49 =16.34 29.04
Work Share: Manuf., 18601900 (pooled) 784 36.32 17.15 2.43 84.12
∆ Work Share: Services, 1860-1900 (cross-section) 161 5.07 4.00 =2.28 26.96
Work Share: Services, 18601900 (pooled) 784 12.41 6.59 1.33 50.17
∆ Body Height of Conscripts, 1884/911908/12 176 2.16 0.99 0.00 6.00
Treatment Variable
Pop. Share with Railway Access, 18501900 (pooled) 1068 0.35 0.34 0 1
Standard Control Variables
LN(Mean Distance to Town Node) in 1850 158 3.00 0.57 1.59 4.27
Pop. Share with Road Access in 1850 178 0.76 0.21 0 1
LN(Elevation in 100m) 178 2.12 0.52 1.20 3.26
LN(Population) in 1850 178 9.32 0.62 7.30 11.07
Annual Population Growth, 18001850 (cross-section) 175 0.69 0.31 =0.30 1.49
Additional Control Variables
Work Share: Agriculture in 1860 149 55.06 17.57 7.85 92.84
Work Share: Manufacturing in 1860 149 35.45 15.95 4.64 76.58
Work Share: Services in 1860 149 9.49 4.72 2.52 32.39
Body Height of Conscripts in 1884/91 176 163.40 1.47 159.4 166.9
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Road Network
We use information on the development of the road network in the 18th and 19th century
from the GIS-Dufour project (Egli et al., 2005). GIS-Dufour documents all roads and
their classiﬁcation according to the cantonal road laws. The road laws were enacted in
most cantons in the years 18301840 and they diﬀer from canton to canton. However,
most cantonal laws include at least a classiﬁcation on roads of primary importance, i.e.
class 1 roads. To control for road accessibility we use information on the class 1 road
network, and identify municipalities with access to a class 1 road. Figure A.2 shows the
ﬁrst class road network in the year 1850.
Potential for Water Power Generation
Early Swiss industrial development used hydropower as an important source to run indus-
trial machines. Since Switzerland itself had no coal deposits, wood was a limited power
source and there was no high-capacity means of transportation for fossil fuels, water was
the main source of power for industrial development prior to the railway era (Schnitter,
1992). By the year 1876 Switzerland had hydroelectric power plants installed with a
capacity of 70 350 horse power (Weissenbach, 1876). For each municipality we deﬁne a
potential for hydroelectric power based on existing hydropower technologies. The main
parameters determining the potential for hydropower are the water cumulative ﬂows and
the gradient that the water falls. The Francis Turbine was invented in the year 1849 by
James B. Francis and the most advanced technology at the beginning of the railway era
in Switzerland. Taking the technical constraints of the Francis Turbine into account, we
deﬁne a simpliﬁed indicator for hydro power potential based on two conditions: First,
the water ﬂow has to reach a minimum of at least 1 m3/s. Second, the height diﬀerence
between the point of entry and exit of a river ﬂowing through a municipality has to be
at least 10 m. If a watercourse satisfying both conditions runs through a municipality, it
is assigned value 1, and otherwise 0. We construct this variable based on detailed infor-
mation on water drain measured for each water body in Switzerland combined with data
on larger river water ﬂows measured by metering stations.37 Using GIS we determine for
every water body the point of entry and exit for each municipality and the height diﬀer-
ence between entry and exit point. We then code municipalities as having the potential
for industrial hydropower generation using the parameters mentioned above.
37Data on water drain is available at http://www.bafu.admin.ch/wasser/13462/13496/15016/index.html?lang=de
(Pfaundler and Schönenberger, 2013); data from metering stations along larger Swiss rivers is available
at http://www.hydrodaten.admin.ch/de/stationen-und-daten.html.
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2.A.2 Maps
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Figure A.1: Original Stephenson & Swinburne Plan with Main Nodes
Notes: The ﬁgure displays the original Stephenson & Swinburne railway plan and the selected main nodes. The selection of nodes is based
on the proposed traﬃc hubs of Stephenson & Swinburne and the 20 largest municipalities in the year 1850 that had the town privilege. Some
towns were both a hub in the original Stephenson & Swinburne plan and belonged to the 20 largest cities in 1850.
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Figure A.2: Roads of Primary Importance in 1850
Notes: Road network displaying roads with a classiﬁcation 1 according to the cantonal road laws in 1850, based on the GIS-Dufour project
(Egli et al., 2005).
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2.A.3 Sample of Districts
Table A.3: Sample of Districts across Diﬀerent Dependent Variables
ID District ID District ID District ID District
Canton Zurich Canton of Schwyz Canton of St. Gallen Canton of Ticino
101 Aﬀoltern 501 Einsiedeln 1701 St. Gallenn,s,b 2101 Bellinzonan,c
102 Andelﬁngen 502 Gersau 1702 Rorschachn 2102 Blenio
103 Bülach 503 Höfe 1703 Unterrheintal 2103 Leventinac
104 Dielsdorfs,b 504 Küsnacht 1704 Oberrheintaln 2104 Locarnon,c
105 Hinwil 505 March 1705 Werdenberg 2105 Luganon,c
106 Horgen 506 Schwyzc,b 1706 Sargansn 2106 Mendrisio
107 Meilen Canton of Obwalden 1707 Gaster 2107 Rivieran,c
108 Pfäﬃkon 600 Obwalden 1708 See 2108 Vallemaggia
109 Uster Canton of Nidwalden 1709 Obertoggenburg Canton of Vaud
110 Winterthurn,b 700 Nidwalden 1710 Neutoggenburg 2201 Aigle
111 Zürichn,s,b Canton of Glarus 1711 Alttoggenburg 2202 Aubonne
Canton of Bern 800 Glarus 1712 Untertoggenburg 2203 Avenches
201 Aarbergn Canton of Zug 1713 Wil 2204 Cossonay
202 Aarwangens,b 900 Zugc 1714 Gossaun,s,b 2205 Echallens
203 Bernn,b Canton of Fribourg Canton of Grisons 2206 Grandson
204 Bieln,s,b 1001 Broye 1801 Albulac 2207 Lausannen,b
205 Büren 1002 Glane 1802 Bernina 2208 Lavaux
206 Burgdorf 1003 Gruyere 1803 Glennerc,s 2209 Morgesn
207 Courtelary 1004 Saanen 1804 Heinzenbergc 2210 Moudonn,b
208 Delemontb 1005 See 1805 Hinterrheinc 2211 Nyon
209 Erlach 1006 Sense 1806 Imbodenc,s 2212 Orbe
210 Franches-Montagne 1007 Veveyse 1807 Inn 2213 Oron
211 Fraubrunnen Canton of Solothurn 1808 Malojac 2214 Payerne
212 Frutigenc 1101 Balsthal 1809 Moesa 2215 Enhaut
213 Interlaken 1102 Bucheggb.-Kriegst. 1810 Müstair 2216 Rolle
214 Konolﬁngens 1103 Dorneck-Thierstein 1811 Oberlandquart 2217 Vallee
215 Laufen 1104 Olten-Goesgenn 1812 Plessurn 2218 Veveyn
216 Laupen 1105 Solothurn-Lebernn 1813 Unterlandquartc 2219 Yverdonn
217 Moutier Canton of Basel-Stadt 1814 Vorderrheins Canton of Valais
218 La Neuveville 1200 Baseln,b Canton of Aargau 2301 Brigc
219 Nidaus,b Canton of Basel-Land 1901 Aaraun 2302 Conthey
220 Oberhasli 1301 Arlesheimb 1902 Badenn 2303 Entremont
221 Porrentruy 1302 Liestal 1903 Bremgarten 2304 Goms
222 Saanen 1303 Sissach 1904 Bruggn 2305 Herens
223 Schwarzenburg 1304 Waldenburg 1905 Kulm 2306 Leuk
224 Seftigen Canton of Schaﬀhausen 1906 Laufenburgs 2307 Martigny
225 Signau 1401 Oberklettgaus 1907 Lenzburgc 2308 Monthey
226 Simmental, Nieder-c 1402 Reiats 1908 Muric 2309 Raronc
227 Simmental, Ober- 1403 Schaﬀhausenn,s 1909 Rheinfelden 2310 Saint-Maurice
228 Thunn,s,b 1404 Schleitheim 1910 Zoﬁngen 2311 Sierre
229 Trachselwald 1405 Stein 1911 Zurzachs 2312 Sion
230 Wangens,b 1406 Unterklettgaus Canton of Thurgau 2313 Visp
Canton of Lucerne Canton of Appenzell (AR) 2001 Arbonn,s Canton of Neuchatel
301 Entlebuchs,b 1501 Hinterlandp 2002 Bischofszellp,s,b,h 2401 Boudrys
302 Hochdorf 1502 Mittellandp 2003 Diessenhofen 2402 Chaux-de-Fondsn
303 Luzernn,b 1503 Vorderlandp 2004 Frauenfeldp,s,b,h 2403 Loclen
304 Sursees,b Canton of Appenzell (AI) 2005 Kreuzlingenp,s,b,h 2404 Neuchateln
305 Willisau 1600 Appenzell 2006 Münchwilenp 2405 Val-de-Ruzs
Canton of Uri 2007 Steckbornp,s,b,h 2406 Val-de-Travers
400 Uric 2008 Weinfeldenp,s,b,h Canton of Geneva
2500 Genevan,b
Notes: n: Districts including one of the 33 main nodes. Excluded in all regression models. c: Districts that were aﬀected by railway
construction work in a given decade (see Rey, 2003, 147149). Observation is excluded in all regressions covering the concerned period.
p: Population data for 1800 cannot be merged reliably for these districts. Observation is excluded in all cross-section regressions. s:
The employment data cannot be merged reliably for these districts, at least in certain decades. Observation is excluded in regressions
with sectoral composition as dependent variable covering the concerned period. b: The birth and death statistics cannot be merged
reliably for these districts, at least in certain decades. Observation is excluded in regressions with migration or birth surplus as dependent
variable covering the concerned period. h: The body height data cannot be merged reliably for these districts, at least in certain decades.
Observation is excluded in regressions with body height as dependent variable covering the concerned period.
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2.B Empirical Appendix: Municipal Level
Table B.4: The Impact of Railway Access (184764) on Annual Population Growth Rates
(18501900), Cross-Sectional Estimates at the Municipal Level
OLS IV IV, First Stage
(1) (2) (3)
Railway Access 184764 0.41∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.10)
LCP 184764 0.33∗∗∗
(0.03)
Road Access 1850 0.05∗ 0.06+ 0.16∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
Water Access 0.07 0.07 0.13∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.03)
Log Elevation =0.25∗∗∗ =0.25∗∗∗ =0.07∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.02)
Water Power Potential 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01)
Log Distance to Town Node =0.24∗∗∗ =0.24∗∗∗ =0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01)
Log Distance to Steph.-Swinb. Node 0.04+ 0.04+ =0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Log Population 1850 =0.05 =0.05 0.07∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01)
Log Area 0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ =0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.01)
Town Privilege 0.36∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.07+
(0.07) (0.07) (0.04)
Subsequent Railway Access 0.29∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ =0.23∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.01)
District Pop. Growth 180050 =1.58 =1.58 1.41
(7.45) (7.41) (2.62)
R2 0.28  0.39
Observations 2770 2770 2770
Notes: The dependent variable is annual population growth in percent. Sample: All municipalities, excluding nodes and
municipalities strongly aﬀected by railway construction work (source: Rey, 2003, 147-149). The instrument is based on a least-
cost path for railway lines between the 20 largest cities and Stephenson-Swinburne nodes. Huber-White standard errors in
parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
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2.B.1 Robustness: Municipalities in Districts below 1 000 Meters
Table B.5: The Impact of Railway Access (184764) on Annual Population Growth Rates,
Cross-Sectional Estimates (Sample: Mean District Elevation below 1 000 m.a.s.l.)
Long Run 10 Year Periods
180050a 18501900 185060 186070 187080 188090 18901900
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS: Annual Population Growth Rates and Railway Access
Rail Access 184764 =0.02 0.42∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
R2 0.27 0.30 0.12 0.07 0.14 0.14 0.17
Observations 826 2018 2018 2018 2000 2000 2018
IV, Second Stage: Annual Population Growth Rates and Railway Access
Rail Access 184764 0.13 0.42∗∗∗ 0.12 0.34∗ 0.62∗∗ 0.38+ 0.38
(0.16) (0.12) (0.17) (0.16) (0.21) (0.20) (0.25)
Observations 826 2018 2018 2018 2000 2000 2018
IV, First Stage: Actual Railway Access 184764 and Least-Cost Paths
LCP 184764 0.24∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
R2 0.29 0.37 0.31 0.31 0.35 0.36 0.37
Observations 826 2018 2018 2018 2000 2000 2018
Notes: The dependent variable is annual population growth in percent. The controls used are distance to the nearest town node (log), distance
to the nearest Stephenson-Swinburne node (log), subsequent railway access (binary), access to main road (binary), access to navigable water
(binary), elevation (log), water power potential (binary), town privilege (binary), population in 1850 (log), area in km2 (log), annual district
population growth 18001850, and cantonal ﬁxed eﬀects. Sample: Municipalities of districts with a mean elevation below 1 000 m.a.s.l.,
excluding nodes and municipalities strongly aﬀected by railway construction work (source: Rey, 2003, 147-149). a: Pre-railway sample
available for 4 cantons. The instrument is based on a least-cost path for railway lines between the 20 largest cities and Stephenson-Swinburne
nodes. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
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Table B.6: The Impact of Railway Access (186982) on Annual Population Growth Rates,
Cross-Sectional Estimates (Sample: Mean District Elevation below 1 000 m.a.s.l.)
Long Run 10 Year Periods
185070a 18701900 185060a 186070 187080 188090 18901900
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS: Annual Population Growth Rates and Railway Access
Rail Access 186982 0.19∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.17∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
R2 0.12 0.27 0.11 0.07 0.10 0.13 0.17
Observations 1669 1669 1669 1669 1653 1653 1669
IV, Second Stage: Annual Population Growth Rates and Railway Access
Rail Access 186982 =0.38∗ 0.43∗ =0.31 =0.45+ 0.23 0.56∗ 0.48
(0.19) (0.17) (0.25) (0.24) (0.29) (0.26) (0.32)
Observations 1669 1669 1669 1669 1653 1653 1669
IV, First Stage: Actual Railway Access 1869-82 and Least-Cost Paths
LCP 1869-82 0.38∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
R2 0.33 0.33 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.30 0.33
Observations 1669 1669 1669 1669 1653 1653 1669
Notes: The dependent variable is annual population growth in percent. The controls used are distance to the nearest town node (log), distance
to the nearest Stephenson-Swinburne node (log), subsequent railway access (binary), access to main road (binary), access to navigable water
(binary), elevation (log), water power potential (binary), town privilege (binary), population in 1850 (log), area in km2 (log), cantonal ﬁxed
eﬀects, and population growth 18501860 (except for columns a , where district population growth 18001850 is used). Sample: Municipalities
of districts with mean elevation below 1 000 m.a.s.l., excluding nodes and municipalities strongly aﬀected by railway construction work (source:
Rey, 2003, 147-149). The instrument is based on a least-cost path for railway lines between the 20 largest cities and Stephenson-Swinburne
nodes. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
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2.B.2 Robustness: Pre-Treatment Sample
Table B.7: The Impact of Railway Access (184764) on Annual Population Growth Rates,
Cross-Sectional Estimates (Sample: Municipalities with Pre-Railway Data Available)
Pre-Treatment Post-Treatment
180037a 183750b 180050a 18501900c
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS: Annual Population Growth Rates and Railway Access
Rail Access 184764 0.03 =0.11 0.00 0.56∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06)
R2 0.21 0.10 0.26 0.29
Observations 903 903 903 900
IV, Second Stage: Annual Population Growth Rates and Railway Access
Rail Access 184764 0.13 0.24 0.15 0.95∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.30) (0.15) (0.24)
Observations 903 903 903 900
IV, First Stage: Actual Railway Access 184764 and Least-Cost Paths
LCC 184764 0.25∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
R2 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29
Observations 903 903 903 900
Notes: The dependent variable is annual population growth in percent. The controls used are distance to the nearest city (log), distance to
the nearest Stephenson-Swinburne node (log), subsequent railway access (binary), access to main road (binary), access to navigable water
(binary), elevation (log), water power potential (binary), town privilege (binary), area in km2 (log), and cantonal ﬁxed eﬀects. Additional
controls, a: population in 1800 (log); b: population in 1837 (log); c: population in 1850 (log) and annual population growth 18001850.
Sample: Municipalities for which population data is available for the pre-railway period (four cantons: ZH, BE, SO, AG), excluding nodes
and municipalities strongly aﬀected by railway construction work (source: Rey, 2003, 147-149). The instrument is based on a least-cost
path for railway lines between the 20 largest cities and Stephenson-Swinburne nodes. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. +
p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
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Table B.8: The Impact of Railway Access (184764) on Annual Population Growth Rates,
Cross-Sectional Estimates (Sample: Municipalities with Pre-Railway Data Available and
Mean District Elevation below 1 000 m.a.s.l.)
Pre-Treatment Post-Treatment
180037a 183750b 180050a 18501900c
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS: Annual Population Growth Rates and Railway Access
Rail Access 184764 0.02 =0.13+ =0.02 0.54∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.06)
R2 0.22 0.11 0.27 0.29
Observations 826 826 826 826
IV, Second Stage: Annual Population Growth Rates and Railway Access
Rail Access 184764 0.08 0.28 0.13 0.88∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.32) (0.16) (0.26)
Observations 826 826 826 826
IV, First Stage: Actual Railway Access 184764 and Least-Cost Paths
LCC 184764 0.24∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
R2 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29
Observations 826 826 826 826
Notes: The dependent variable is annual population growth in percent. The controls used are distance to the nearest city (log), distance to
the nearest Stephenson-Swinburne node (log), subsequent railway access (binary), access to main road (binary), access to navigable water
(binary), elevation (log), water power potential (binary), town privilege (binary), area in km2 (log), and cantonal ﬁxed eﬀects. Additional
controls, a: population in 1800 (log); b: population in 1837 (log); c: population in 1850 (log) and annual population growth 18001850.
Sample: Municipalities for which population data is available for the pre-railway period (four cantons: ZH, BE, SO, AG) and with mean
district elevation below 1 000 m.a.s.l., excluding nodes and municipalities strongly aﬀected by railway construction work (source: Rey,
2003, 147-149). The instrument is based on a least-cost path for railway lines between the 20 largest cities and Stephenson-Swinburne
nodes. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
Table B.9: The Impact of Railway Access (184764) on Annual Population Growth Rates,
Cross-Sectional Estimates (Sample: Municipalities with Pre-Railway Data Available)
Long Run 10 Year Periods
180050a 18501900 185060 186070 187080 188090 18901900
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS: Annual Population Growth Rates and Railway Access
Rail Access 184764 0.00 0.56∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.06) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12)
R2 0.26 0.29 0.07 0.11 0.18 0.14 0.17
Observations 903 900 903 903 898 898 900
IV, Second Stage: Annual Population Growth Rates and Railway Access
Rail Access 184764 0.15 0.95∗∗∗ 0.33 0.57∗ 0.70+ 0.68+ 1.28∗∗
(0.15) (0.24) (0.28) (0.26) (0.36) (0.35) (0.49)
Observations 903 900 903 903 898 898 900
IV, First Stage: Actual Railway Access 184764 and Least-Cost Paths
LCC 184764 0.25∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
R2 0.29 0.29 0.21 0.22 0.26 0.27 0.29
Observations 903 900 903 903 898 898 900
Notes: The dependent variable is annual population growth in percent. The controls used are distance to the nearest city (log), distance to the
nearest Stephenson-Swinburne node (log), subsequent railway access (binary), access to main road (binary), access to navigable water (binary),
elevation (log), water power potential (binary), town privilege (binary), population in 1850 (log), area in km2 (log), population in 1850 (log),
annual population growth 18001850, and cantonal ﬁxed eﬀects. Other controls, a : population in 1800 (log) instead of 1850, and without
annual population growth 1800-1850. Sample: Excluding nodes and municipalities strongly aﬀected by railway construction work (source:
Rey, 2003, 147-149). The instrument is based on a least-cost path for railway lines between the 20 largest cities and Stephenson-Swinburne
nodes. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses.. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
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Table B.10: The Impact of Railway Access (184764) on Annual Population Growth
Rates, Cross-Sectional Estimates, (Sample: Municipalities with Pre-Railway Data Avail-
able and Mean District Elevation below 1 000 m.a.s.l.)
Long Run 10 Year Periods
180050a 18501900 185060 186070 187080 188090 18901900
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS: Annual Population Growth Rates and Railway Access
Rail Access 184764 =0.02 0.54∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.06) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12)
R2 0.27 0.29 0.07 0.11 0.19 0.13 0.19
Observations 826 826 826 826 821 821 826
IV, Second Stage: Annual Population Growth Rates and Railway Access
Rail Access 184764 0.13 0.88∗∗∗ 0.47 0.52+ 0.61 0.70+ 1.06∗
(0.16) (0.26) (0.29) (0.27) (0.38) (0.37) (0.51)
Observations 826 826 826 826 821 821 826
IV, First Stage: Actual Railway Access 184764 and Least-Cost Paths
LCC 184764 0.24∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
R2 0.29 0.29 0.20 0.21 0.25 0.26 0.29
Observations 826 826 826 826 821 821 826
Notes: The dependent variable is annual population growth in percent. The controls used are distance to the nearest city (log), distance
to the nearest Stephenson-Swinburne node (log), subsequent railway access (binary), access to main road (binary), access to navigable water
(binary), elevation (log), water power potential (binary), town privilege (binary), population in 1850 (log), area in km2 (log), population in
1850 (log), annual population growth 18001850, and cantonal ﬁxed eﬀects. Other controls, a : population in 1800 (log) instead of 1850, and
without annual population growth 18001850. Sample: Municipalities of districts with a mean elevation below 1 000 m.a.s.l., excluding nodes
and municipalities strongly aﬀected by railway construction work (see Rey, 2003, 147-149). The instrument is based on a least-cost path
for railway lines between the 20 largest cities and Stephenson-Swinburne nodes. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses.. + p<0.10, *
p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
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2.B.3 Additional Results: Displacement Eﬀects and Heterogene-
ity
Table B.11: Distance to Railway (184764) and Annual Population Growth Rates, Cross-
Sectional OLS Estimates at the Municipal Level
Pre-Treatment Samplea Whole Switzerland
180050 185070 18501900 185070 18501900
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Rail Access 184764 0.04 0.12 0.39∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.11) (0.08) (0.06) (0.04)
Distance to Railway 02 km =0.01 =0.05 0.00 0.14+ 0.16∗∗
(0.07) (0.12) (0.10) (0.07) (0.06)
Distance to Railway 24 km 0.00 =0.28∗∗ =0.17∗ =0.11∗ =0.08∗
(0.05) (0.10) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04)
Distance to Railway 46 km 0.07 =0.26∗∗ =0.20∗∗ =0.15∗∗ =0.14∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.10) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04)
Distance to Railway 68 km 0.11∗ =0.31∗∗ =0.26∗∗∗ =0.15∗∗ =0.19∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.10) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04)
Distance to Railway 810 km 0.10∗ =0.13 =0.19∗ 0.02 =0.09∗
(0.05) (0.12) (0.08) (0.06) (0.04)
R2 0.27 0.13 0.30 0.18 0.29
Observations 903 903 903 2810 2790
Notes: The dependent variable is annual population growth in percent. The municipalities with railway access are always
excluded from the groups of distance dummies. The controls used are distance to the nearest town node (log), distance to
the nearest Stephenson-Swinburne node (log), subsequent railway access (binary), access to main road (binary), access to
navigable water (binary), elevation (log), water power potential (binary), town privilege (binary), population in 1850 (log),
area in km2 (log), annual district population growth 18001850, and cantonal ﬁxed eﬀects. Distance dummies are exclusive,
municipalities with direct railway access are not in the group of municipalities with a distance of 02km. The reference group
are municipalities with a distance from the railway line larger than 10 km. Sample: All municipalities of Switzerland, excluding
nodes and municipalities strongly aﬀected by railway construction work (source: Rey, 2003, 147-149). a : pre-railway sample
available for 4 cantons. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
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Figure B.5: Quantile Treatment Eﬀects of Railway Access (184764) on Annual Popula-
tion Growth (18501900), 10th to 90th Percentile.
Controls: Distance to the nearest town node (log), distance to the nearest Stephenson-Swinburne node (log), subsequent railway access
(binary), access to main road (binary), access to navigable water (binary), elevation (log), water power potential (binary), town privilege
(binary), population in 1850 (log), area in km2 (log), annual district population growth 18001850, and cantonal ﬁxed eﬀects.
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2.C Empirical Appendix: District Level
2.C.1 Robustness: Districts with Mean Elevation below 1 000
Meters
Table C.12: The Impact of Railway Access on Annual Population Growth Rates,
Cross-Sectional and Panel Estimates (Sample: Districts with a Mean Elevat. below
1 000 m.a.s.l.)
Cross Section Panel FE Panel IV FE IV FS
180050 18501900 18501900 18501900 18501900
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RASHR 184764 =0.06 0.47∗ Lag RASHR 0.44∗∗ 0.63+
(0.21) (0.18) (0.15) (0.39)
RASHR 186582 =0.10 0.82∗∗∗ LCPSHR 0.48∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.21) (0.09)
RASHR 188399 =0.28 0.41∗
(0.23) (0.21)
R2 0.48 0.58 R2 (within) 0.39  0.77
Observations 80 80 Observations 400 400 400
Districts 80 80 80
Notes: Dependent variable is the annual population growth rate in percent. RASHR is deﬁned as the share of a district's population
that lives in a municipality with direct access to the railway network. The controls used are distance to the nearest node (log, population
weighted), access to main road (population weighted), mean district elevation (log), population in 1850 (log), and population growth
18001850. The sample comprises all districts with a mean elevation below 1 000 m.a.s.l., except for districts including one of the 33 nodes,
and districts strongly aﬀected by railway construction work (source: Rey, 2003, 147-149). The instrument is based on a least-cost path
for railway lines between the 20 largest cities and Stephenson-Swinburne nodes. The ﬁrst stage regression is shown in the last column.
LCPSHR is the population weighted share of municipalities in a district that lie on the least-cost path. Panel estimations include district
ﬁxed eﬀects, year ﬁxed eﬀects and year-cantonal ﬁxed eﬀects. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
*** p<0.001.
2.C.2 Impact of Railway Access on Body Height: Timing
Figure C.6: Impact of Railway Access on Body Height, Timing.
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Table C.13: The Impact of Railway Access on Migration and Birth Surplus, Cross-
Sectional and Panel Estimates (Sample: Districts with a Mean Elevation below
1 000 m.a.s.l.)
Cross Section (18701900) Panel FE (18701900)
Migrationa Birth Surplusb Migrationa Birth Surplusb
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RASHR 184764 16.24+ 1.38 Lag RASHR 4.95∗∗ 1.88+
(9.06) (1.47) (1.85) (0.99)
RASHR 186582 25.63∗∗ 1.51
(9.17) (1.33)
RASHR 188399 17.03+ =3.69
(8.91) (2.93)
R2 0.61 0.70 R2 (within) 0.42 0.36
Observations 72 72 Observations 215 215
Districts 72 72
Notes: RASHR is deﬁned as the share of a district's population that lives in a municipality with direct access to the railway network.
Dependent variable, a : A district's net balance of migration ﬂow, indicates inﬂow - outﬂow. b: A district's birth surplus as a share of
average population. Railway access is measured by the share of the population that has access (municipalities with railway line) to the
railway network. The sample comprises all districts with a mean elevation below 1 000 m.a.s.l., except for districts including one of the
33 main nodes, and districts strongly aﬀected by railway construction work (source: Rey, 2003, 147-149). The controls used in the cross-
section estimation are distance to the nearest city (log, population weighted), access to main road (population weighted), mean district
elevation (log), population in 1850 (log), and population growth 18001850. Cross-section estimations include cantonal ﬁxed eﬀects. Panel
estimations include district ﬁxed eﬀects, year ﬁxed eﬀects and year-cantonal ﬁxed eﬀects. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. +
p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
Table C.14: The Impact of Railway Access on Sectoral Work Shares and Body Height,
Cross-Sectional Estimates (Sample: Districts with a Mean Elevation below 1 000 m.a.s.l.)
Sectoral Shares (18601900)a Body Heightb
Agriculture Manufacturing Services 18901910
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RASHR
184764
=16.87∗∗ 11.80∗ 4.67∗∗
(5.73) (5.31) (1.66)
RASHR
186582
=22.95∗∗∗ 18.96∗∗ 3.91∗ RASHR
184782
0.59
(6.14) (5.53) (1.58) (0.39)
RASHR
188399
=12.04∗ 5.65 6.45∗∗∗ RASHR
188299
1.08∗
(5.02) (4.63) (1.39) (0.53)
R2 0.62 0.65 0.47 R2 0.77
Observations 77 77 77 Observations 79
Notes: RASHR is deﬁned as the share of a district's population that lives in a municipality with direct access to the railway network.
Dependent variable, a: Percentage point change in a district's sectoral work share (agriculture, manufacturing, services). b: Centimeter
change in a district's conscripts average body height between 1884/91 and 1908/12. The controls used are distance to the nearest city
(log, population weighted), access to main road (population weighted), mean district elevation (log), population in 1850 (log), population
growth 18001850, and cantonal ﬁxed eﬀects. Additionally, models in columns a control for the district's sectoral work share in 1860
(agric., indust., services), while column b includes the district's average body height for the 1884/91 conscription. The sample comprises
all districts with a mean elevation below 1 000 m.a.s.l., except for districts including one of the 33 main nodes, and districts strongly
aﬀected by railway construction work (source: Rey, 2003, 147-149). Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, **
p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
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Table C.15: The Impact of Railway Access on Sectoral Work Shares, Panel Estimates
(Sample: Districts with a Mean Elevation below 1 000 m.a.s.l.)
Panel FE (18601900) Panel IV FE (18601900)
Agriculture Manufact. Services Agriculture Manufact. Services
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Lag RASHR =6.74∗∗∗ 7.09∗∗∗ =0.35 =11.10∗ 8.33 2.76+
(1.61) (1.47) (0.50) (5.53) (5.09) (1.52)
R2 (within) 0.62 0.57 0.61   
Districts 77 77 77 77 77 77
Observations 357 357 357 357 357 357
Notes: RASHR is deﬁned as the share of a district's population that lives in a municipality with direct access to the railway network.
Dependent variable: A district's sectoral work share in percent (agriculture, manufacturing, services). The sample comprises all districts
with a mean elevation below 1 000 m.a.s.l., except for districts including one of the 33 main nodes, and districts strongly aﬀected by
railway construction work (source: Rey, 2003, 147-149). The instrument is based on a least-cost path for railway lines between the 20
largest cities and Stephenson-Swinburne nodes. Panel estimations include district ﬁxed eﬀects, year ﬁxed eﬀects and year-cantonal ﬁxed
eﬀects. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
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3 Local Elections, State Capture, and
Development in Nigeria:
Is Manna from Heaven Devilish?
3.1 Introduction
Decentralisation is seen as a key element of development. A decentralised government is
generally believed to be more responsive and accountable to the citizens (Bardhan, 2002;
Faguet, 2014).1 Local elections  under certain conditions  promise better outcomes
for local development both in democratic regimes (e.g. Ahmad et al., 2005; Bardhan and
Mookherjee, 2006a; De Janvry et al., 2012; Khemani, 2001; Seabright, 1996) and autocratic
regimes (e.g. Martinez-Bravo et al., 2011). Yet, the potentially higher accountability of
a decentralised government system may also be susceptible to capture by local elites
(Bardhan, 2002; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000). Dominant special interest groups may
deploy their inﬂuence to control democratic processes according to their preferences. In
such cases, decentralisation might undermine accountability and distort policies (Faguet,
2014). Especially in nascent democracies that operate under the institutional legacy of
the previous nondemocratic regime and exhibit weak checks and balances, decentralised
governments captured by special-interest groups possibly do the citizens a disservice.
Decentralisation is particularly critical in an environment where the lion's share of
government revenues is not internally generated but transferred from the central govern-
ment as in the case of Nigeria  a vast country of now over 170 million inhabitants2.
Control over local governments becomes more attractive as windfalls of resource rev-
enues are simply received without eﬀort of collecting taxes. Even more if the local voting
population is imperfectly informed about revenues, thus, incapable of holding politicians
accountable (Brollo et al., 2013). A number of studies that investigate the nexus between
1The World Bank, an inﬂuential development policy institution, has a whole section on de-
centralisation topics. A summary of the arguments concerning accountability, transparency
and corruption in decentralised governance compiled by the World Bank can be found here:
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/admin.htm#4
2In 2013, the Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics estimated the population of Nigeria to be 174
million (NBS 2013).
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transfers from natural resources, decentralised democratic governance, and government
performance have emerged in recent time. They focus mainly on South-American and
Asian countries, e.g.Ferraz and Finan (2008), Ferraz and Finan (2011), Brollo et al.
(2013), Litschig and Morrison (2013) on Brazil, Maldonado (2014) on Peru, Martínez
(2016) on Columbia, and Olsson and Valsecchi (2014) on Indonesia.
Yet notably little is known concerning this matter with regard to African countries
though local governance is proposed as key to development and natural resources abound
in many African regions. Quantitative evidence on local elections and development which
could yield valuable insights for improving decentralisation policies, is scarce.3 There
are two plausible reasons for this lack of evidence. First, collecting comprehensive data
on local elections or local governance is a cumbersome endeavour, and sometimes hardly
feasible. Second, only few countries are organised as federal states (Burgess, 2012), and
many African states do not hold local elections at all.4
This paper investigates how the conduct or absence of local government council elec-
tions in Nigeria aﬀects development controlling for tax revenue transfers allocated to local
governments from the federation account. Whether local elections are held or unconstitu-
tional caretaker committees appointed instead is contingent upon idiosyncratic decision
power of state governments. I will argue that state capture by governors with its con-
sequential withholding of local elections depends on the amount of tax revenue transfers
that ﬂow into state and local governments. Higher transfers make the control of local
governments more attractive. Tax revenues in turn depend on global oil prices and oil
production, are collected centrally and then distributed to the federal, the state, and the
local governments.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the main line of arguments proposed in this study: Rising global
oil prices lead to an increase of tax revenue allocations to the state and local governments.
This makes state capture and control over local governments more rewarding as larger
rents are for grabs. To exert ﬁrm control over local government funds, state governments
appoint caretaker committees in lieu of holding local elections. The lower accountability
and responsiveness of appointed caretaker committees deprives local government areas of
their development prospects.
Local government councils elections are supposed to be held regularly in the 774
3An exception is Reinikka and Svensson (2004) who look at the capture of school grants by local
oﬃcials, but who neither do include any quantitative analysis of local elections. A study that looks at
local governance and service delivery in Nigeria is Khemani (2006) using a survey of 30 local governments,
252 public primary health facilities and over 700 health care providers in the year 2002.
4Olowu (2003) states that partisan local elections are held in Nigerian, Kenyan, South African local
governments, and Ivorian communes. Ghana has not allowed for the multi-party elections at the local
level, Uganda holds local elections yet in a non-partisan way.
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Figure 3.1: Line of Argument
local government areas of Nigeria stipulated by the 1999 constitution.5 However, they
are under the organisational lead of the state governments and have been conducted
only irregularly since 1999 as depicted in Figure 3.2a.6 In June 2003 the governors even
called for the outright cancellation of all local elections and the abolishment of the local
government councils.7 Furthermore, local government council elections under the aegis of
state independent electoral commissions often were fraudulent, delayed or even outright
cancelled.
State governments have substantial autonomy in their policy decisions. Even though
the constitution stipulates a federalist structure of three tiers of government (Federal
Republic of Nigeria, 1999), owing to the unspeciﬁc phrasing, local government councils
are not a completely independent third tier of government.8 While many government
functions are in the responsibility of decentralised state and local governments, overall,
there exist notable gaps and ambiguities about the scope of duties at diﬀerent levels of
governments (World Bank, 2013, Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999).
To perform the assigned government tasks, centrally collected taxes on oil and value-
added are allocated to the state and local governments on a monthly basis. As displayed
in Figure 3.2b, these allocations strongly correlate with the oil price. Capture and em-
bezzlement of public ﬁnances at the state and local level seems likely in the Nigerian
case. The fact that tax revenue funds are unconditionally disbursed to the state and local
governments, is a downright call for corrupt and fraudulent behaviour, even more so in
a weak political institutional environment with still weak checks and balances, and after
5The constitution was written 15 years ago when Nigeria made the transition from military autocratic
to a civilian democratic regime in 1999. More in the political economy of Nigeria in Section 3.2
6An overview over the conduct or absence of local government elections in the 36 states is displayed
in ﬁgure A.2 in the appendix.
7The newspaper This Day reported on June 18, 2003, about a planned amendment of the constitution
to abolish local elections: The [state] governors are advocating that council chairmen and councillors
should be appointed by them (governors) not elected by the electorate as presently provided by the
constitution. (...) The governors would therefore want section 7 of the constitution to be amended. A
source told This Day that the governors who are in support of the amendment are mostly those elected
on the platform of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP)." (20 out of 36 governors attended the meeting).
8Policy responsibilities and the unclear constitutional arrangement is discussed in further detail in
section 3.2.
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long periods of autocratic rule.9 The term ga naka syndrome in Hausa10 language has
become to be known as gathering of local government principal oﬃcers every month-end
to share whatever comes to the local government councils probably after the deduction
of staﬀ salary and thereafter disappear till the next month-end." (Oladeji, 2014).11
These anecdotal accounts are in line with theoretical arguments of Brollo et al. (2013).
They present a political agency model with career concerns to explain how a windfall of
government revenues can have an adverse eﬀect on the functioning of political institutions.
An incumbent politician competes for re-election while facing a trade of between pleasing
the voters and grabbing rents for himself. Their model predicts that a larger budget size
increases the room for grabbing rents without rationally but imperfectly informed voters.
Oil revenue transfers worsen the moral hazard problem: the electoral punishment of
corruption decreases with the budget size. Furthermore, via a selection eﬀect of politicians
with lower abilities with rising revenues (based on a opportunity cost argument), the re-
election probability increases.
In addition to these mechanisms, in the Nigerian case, the problem of governors' power
to withhold local elections and appoint caretaker committees appears to make the political
resource curse even worse: First, they can grab even more rents by controlling local
budgets. Second, their reelection prospects are also improved as ﬁrm control over local
administrations facilitates rigging their own reelections, but also the general elections.
Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003, 2012) state that the large amounts of oil rev-
enues led to large distortions in the Nigerian growth process. Although they study the
period 1960 to 2000 and do not have detailed decentralised data at hand, they construe
both a waste of resources by corrupt governments and the Dutch disease. Indeed, they
conclude waste of resources by corrupt politicians as the more plausible explanation in
the Nigerian case:
9On March 19, 2001, a journalist for Newswatch reported on the sudden wealth of public oﬃcials:
Poor men and women of yesterday are stupendously rich today because of their election or appointment
into political oﬃces. Even councillors at government councils are swimming in money, riding posh cars
and building mansions." The newspaper This Day on June 18, 2003, gives an account of a deceased local
government chairman, who was discovered to have become wealthy through public oﬃce: [...] In the
said case, a local government chairman who died was found to have N[aira] 150 million in his account.
The same man, however, had no job before he was elected chairman."
10Hausa is one of the main languages in Nigeria. It is spoken by around 18.5 million people in the
northern parts. Source: Ethnologue  Languages of the World, http://www.ethnologue.com
11A journalist for the newspaper Daily Champion articulates his clear-cut opinion on state governors:
While this writer does not intend to hold brief for the Council Chairmen, after all they are no saints, it
remains obvious that the large-scale corruption going on in our local government areas is masterminded
by the state governors who have seen in the local governments, veritable avenues for siphoning public
funds. In fact, in some states, the local governments are extended ministries and parastatals that are
at the mercy of wolves in the garb of governors. To say that the governors see in the local government
councils, veritable goldmines, is not an overstatement."
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[...] the main problem aﬀecting the Nigerian economy is the fact that the
oil revenues that the government gets are regarded as manna from heaven
which tends to corrupt institutions and lower the long-term growth prospects.
[...], the logical conclusion is that the best way to deal with the problem is to
transform Nigeria into a non-oil economy. (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian
2012, p. 601).
While turning Nigeria into a non-oil economy is practically impossible, it is essential
to understand the political economic processes and institutions leading to prosperous
or malign development. This study points out possible mechanisms and provides novel
empirical evidence at the local level.
To investigate the eﬀects of local elections on economic development, and state capture
as its possible cause, I make use of a data set that is unique in two ways. First, by
conducting a media content analysis of Nigerian newspaper articles I gather information
on the conduct and absence of local elections and the terms in oﬃce for each of the 768
local government councils on a monthly basis from June 1999 to December 2013.12 Figure
3.2a displays a ﬁrst clear drop in elected councils after the ﬁrst term ended in May 2002.
Over time there is a high volatility in elected oﬃcials partly on account of legal reasons
but more so because of deliberate decisions of state governors to hold or abstain from
local elections.
Second, I assemble data on monthly allocations from the Federation Account to the
federal, the state, and the local governments that are distributed by the Allocation Com-
mittee (FAAC) of the Federal Ministry of Finance according to a speciﬁc formula that is
adjusted only about every six years.13 The revenues accruing to local government coun-
cils are almost exclusively stemming from the Federation Account sourced by value-added
and oil tax revenues. Figure 3.2b presents the total of monthly allocations to local gov-
ernments. The correlation with the global oil price is striking. A rough pattern that
also emerges is, on the on hand, the steady increase in the oil price and the monthly
allocations, and on the other hand, the fall in the number of elected local government
councils over the long run, though with noticeable swaying. While during the ﬁrst term
of the democratically elected president in 1999 to 2002 all the funds are ﬂowing to elected
councils, in the year 2013 a mere 50 percent of funds are allocated to legitimately elected
councils (see Figure 3.2c)
12The media content analysis is conducted since oﬃcial information on local elections is not available.
Section 3.2.2 gives a detailed account of how the media content analysis was conducted. I exclude the
six local government councils of the Federal Capital Territory (Abuja) throughout the study due to their
special status.
13Section 3.3.2 describes the Nigerian ﬁscal federalism in more detail.
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I use the annual change in nighttime light emissions as main outcome variable to
measure economic development at the local level. It is a consistent and comprehensive
measure of development available for local government areas. The data is provided by
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and used by numerous
other studies for sub-national administrative units, e.g. Michalopoulos and Papaioannou
(2013) or Hodler and Raschky (2014).
The empirical strategy includes three parts. First, I analyse whether elected local gov-
ernment councils are better at promoting development than appointed caretaker commit-
tees. I further assess how this depends on the amount of tax revenue transfers disbursed.
First and foremost, it is important to know whether holding elections at the local level
 even if they are fraudulent and rigged in many cases  has an impact on the local
development prospects. At this point, I assume that the conditions prevailing in the local
government areas have no inﬂuence on the realisation of elections and, hence, local elec-
tions are exogenously determined by the state government. Second, I provide a discussion
of the likelihood and possible reasons of state capture. In particular, I specify the link
between the global oil price, socio-economic conditions in the state, and the consequential
conduct or absence of elections. Third, I attempt to identify the eﬀect of local elections
on development taking into account possible endogeneity in local elections. I now assume
that the conduct of local elections depends on the regional political economic conditions.
State governors have immense inﬂuence on the timing and organisation of elections. A
2-stage least squares instrumental variable approach is applied in order to control for
the endogeneity in local elections. The chosen instrumental variable is an interaction of
pre-colonial political institutions and the global oil price. The pre-colonial political insti-
tutions represent the sophistication of tribal and clan structure prior to the government
structures imposed by the British colonisation. Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013)
show that pre-colonial political institutions are important for local governance. In addi-
tion, they are clearly exogenous to the current state of development. They are interacted
with the Brent Crude oil price that is determined on global commodity markets and hence
exogenous to local governance as well. Local development measured by the annual change
in nighttime light is then regressed on the instrumented local elections interacted with
tax revenue allocations from the federation account. Controlling for the transfers received
by the local government is essential in order to account for the resources available to the
council.
The ﬁndings show that elected local government councils indeed performed better
than appointed caretaker committees. This is an important insight since it shows that
local elections  even when they are fraudulent  lead to increased accountability and
presumably to less rent-seeking of local government councils. Even more interesting, to
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have elected local government councils become more important as oil revenue transfers
increase. The positive eﬀect of local elections becomes even more pronounced if I control
for the factors associated with state capture and the endogeneity in local elections.
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, it relates to a vast lit-
erature on decentralisation of governance, in particular accountability and responsiveness
of local oﬃcials (e.g. Bardhan, 2002; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2005; Besley and Coate,
2003a; Faguet, 2004, 2014; Seabright, 1996; Shah, 1999). Speciﬁcally, quantitative studies
on decentralisation in African countries are still relatively rare. My paper contributes to
this literature by analysing the eﬀect of local elections on economic development a one of
the few African federal states. With a speciﬁc focus on capture at decentralised levels of
government, it also relates to the literature on capture by special-interest groups (Alatas
et al., 2013; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000, 2006a,b; Dal Bó and Di Tella, 2003).
Second, it adds to a recent rapidly growing literature on subnational governance in
resource rich economies, also known as the political resource curse (Brollo et al., 2013;
Ferraz and Finan, 2008, 2011; Litschig and Morrison, 2013; Maldonado, 2014; Martínez,
2016; Olsson and Valsecchi, 2014). The political resource curse is intensively debated in
development economics and many developing countries struggle to ﬁnd useful allocation
mechanisms. I assemble novel data on oil tax revenue allocations and local elections to
assess the association between disbursements, decentralised governance, and economic
development. To the best of my knowledge, it is the ﬁrst study to analyse the political
resource curse for an African country at the local level.
Third, this study is related to the literature on political incentives of elected versus ap-
pointed oﬃcials. Incentives for the provision of public policies markedly diﬀers between
elected oﬃcials that face re-election constraint and appointed public servants that are
accountable only to the person who appointed them (see e.g. Besley and Coate, 2003b;
Martinez-Bravo, 2014; Martinez-Bravo et al., 2011). I provide additional empirical evi-
dence on the relative performance of elected local government councils versus appointed
caretaker committees in Nigerian local government areas.
Finally, it bridges the gap between studies on informal traditional political institutions
and formal local democratic institutions. Recent studies emphasise the role of tribes and
clans as lowest level of government in many sub-Saharan countries. Acemoglu et al.
(2014) point out the importance of the clans for local governance in Sierra Leone. Other
studies analyse the relevance of pre-colonial political institutions for current development
(Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013). Most related to my study, Phillips (2011) shows
that Nigerian traditional and government elites engage in political exchange. I follow up
on these ﬁndings by looking at formal local government institutions.
66 The Local Political Resource Curse in Nigeria
In order to understand the role of local councils and the mechanisms for local devel-
opment outcomes, it is important to assemble new data sets that go beyond the national
level, but measure governance at the local level, where it is closest to the citizens. Or as
Besley and Burgess (2002) describe it:
Understanding what makes government responsive to citizens' needs is a key
issue in political economy. It is particularly poignant in low-income countries
where, in the absence of market opportunities, vulnerable populations rely in
large measure on state action for their survival. (Besley and Burgess, 2002,
p. 1415).
Capture of local and state governments might be a major obstacle to accountable govern-
ments in federal Nigeria. Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) call for a better understanding:
[...] the extent of relative capture at the local level may well turn out to
be context- and system speciﬁc. This creates the need for empirical research
to identify the nature and relative capture in any given setting, in order to
appraise the potential pitfalls of decentralisation. (Bardhan and Mookherjee,
2000, p. 139).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview over
Nigerian political system, the ﬁscal federalism, and more detailed description of the local
elections. Section 3 presents the data used, in particular an account of the media content
analysis conducted. Section 4 lays out the empirical strategy. The main results are shown
in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
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Figure 3.2: Local Elections, Monthly Allocations, and the Global Oil Price.
Notes: Part (a) depicts: the share of local government councils that are elected as percentage of all 768 local government areas (excluding the
Federal Capital Territory, Abuja); the sum of monthly allocations to all local government displayed in current prices; the Brent Crude oil price
depicted in USD on a monthly basis. The right axis is used both for allocations and the oil price, but in diﬀerent units. Part (b) displays the
logarithm of the sum of monthly allocations (deﬂated, 1999 prices) divided into a part that is allocated to elected local government councils
and a part that is allocated to appointed caretaker committees. Allocations in both parts exclude 6 local government areas in the Federal
Capital Territory, Abuja.
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3.2 A Brief Political Economy of Nigeria
Nigeria is one of few African countries organised as a system of federal states and with a
system of ﬁscal federalism.14 Since its independence from Great Britain, the federation
underwent numerous institutional reforms and developed into a system of three levels of
governments, the federal level, the state level, and the local government councils (LGC)
(World Bank, 2013). The country currently comprises 36 states, the Federal Capital
Territory (FCT, Abuja), and 774 local government areas.15 Tax revenues stem mostly from
oil revenues and value-added tax (VAT), are collected centrally in the federation account
and distributed to the three tiers of government by the Federation Account Allocation
Committee (FAAC) according to a speciﬁcally deﬁned formula (World Bank, 2003). A
brief overview of ﬁscal federalism in Nigeria is given in the following section.
Every four years there is a general elections for the presidency, and the bicameral Na-
tional Assembly (legislature) consisting of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
The senate consists of 109 members, three from each state and one from the Federal
Capital Territory. Each state consists of 3 senatorial districts. The House of Represen-
tatives has 360 members that are elected based on states' population numbers in 360
single-member constituencies. Each of the 36 states elects a State Governor and a House
of Assembly, the state legislature (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999).
In general, electoral institutions still seem weak. General elections held in the years
1999, 2003, 2007, and 2011 were not judged as free and fair by international observation
missions.16 Only the recent election in 2015 was regarded as free and fair (European
Commission Observation Mission, 2015).
With the transition from autocratic to democratic rule in 1999, a new constitution was
written that drastically changed the rules of the game and stipulated new entitlements
and responsibilities. The constitution tries to balance the power between the diﬀerent
levels of government, regions, ethnic groups, and religions. The decentralised structure
of the Nigerian Federation gives the lower tiers of government substantial autonomy over
policies. While a limited list of tasks is in the responsibility of the federal government,
many social and economic policy domains are in the joint responsibility of the federal and
14The other two federal states are Ethiopia and South Africa (Burgess, 2012)
15The last changes in the administrative structure were made in 1996, when the number of states was
increased from 31 to 36 (World Bank, 2002). The administrative territory at the local level is usually
referred to as local government area (LGA), while the local governing body is called local government
council (LGC).
16Observation missions were conducted by numerous organisations, e.g by the Carter Center Cen-
ter/National Democratic Institute (1999) or the European Commission Observation Mission (2003, 2007,
2011, 2015).
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state governments (Ekpo and Englama, 2008).17
Important for regional development, the local government councils have the duty to
participate with the state in economic planning and development. The constitution also
instructs local governments to establish an economic planning board. They appear to
be a tier of government that are an executing body for the state governments, but that
have also substantial autonomy over their own policies and how to implement assigned
state policies (World Bank, 2002).18 It is important to note that the average local govern-
ment area has a population of over 250'000 inhabitants. These are large administrative
units and implementation of policies can likely only be achieved through the local govern-
ment administration. Furthermore, jointly with state government, the local government
councils are responsible for (a) the provision and maintenance of primary, adult and vo-
cational education; (b) the development of agriculture and natural resources, other than
the exploitation of materials; and (c) the provision and maintenance of health services
(Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999).19
On the one side, state and local governments have substantial autonomy in imple-
menting social and economic policies as described below. On the other side, the strong
position of states within the federal structure may also have contributed to capture of
state governments by local elites. The federal structure possibly increases the capture of
governments especially in poor, unequal and badly educated areas with strong interest
groups (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000). Furthermore, Nigeria has a complex structure
17The tasks of the federal government are written in the exclusive list and contains items such as
defence, the currency, aviation, police, railways, among others. The concurrent list contains duties in the
joint responsibility of the federal and state governments. Any task that is not assigned to the federal
government is left to the state governments, called the residual list. For a full scheme of the assigned
tasks, see Ekpo and Englama (2008) or the Nigerian Federal Constitution (1999).
18A World Bank report describes in an insightful way how local governments can outperform other
local government areas if the local government council is active and willing to implement progressive
policies (see World Bank, 2002, p. 46). Further anecdotal evidence of the inﬂuence of a local government
on its growth trajectory is presented in the newspaper This Day where it is reported on March 27, 2006,
that President Olusegun Obasanjo has named the Chairman of Kwami Local Government area of Gombe
State Alhaji Abdullahi Taﬁda as the best performing local government chairman in the state: The
president was impressed that the chairman linked 26 villages with the National grid without any ﬁnancial
assistance from the state government. President Obasanjo, while commissioning an electriﬁcation project
at Malam Sidi, the headquarters of Kwami local government, praised the council chairman for doing what
the Federal Government wanted at the grassroots. (...) Taﬁda said he has executed 60 projects at a cost
of about 320 million Naira including the electriﬁcation of the 26 villages at a cost of 113 million Naira that
scattered all over the council." In an interview with the newspaper Daily Champion on August 21, 2006,
the local government chairman of Obot Akara who in 2005 won the Best Performing Local Government
Award instituted by Good Governance Award Committee of the Ethical and Attitudinal Re-Orientation
Commission (EARCOM), gives an account of his projects that include the building of schools, health
facilities, and the purchase of 250 motorcycles to help the farmers get market access. He explicitly states
that the purchase of motorcycles is not to be judged as patronage goods, but a useful mean to integrate
markets.
19A full list of tasks assigned to the local government councils is provided in Ekpo and Englama (2008).
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of ethnic and religious groups that can be inﬂuential in the political decision process
(Phillips, 2011). The northern parts of Nigeria are dominated by the Hausa-Fulani, the
south-western parts by the Yoruba, and the south-eastern parts are mainly inhabited by
the Igbo.
3.2.1 The System of Fiscal Federalism
The system of ﬁscal federalism is deﬁned in the constitution. Most tax revenues are paid
into a centrally managed Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation. This federation
account is to a large extent alimented from tax revenue on oil and value-added tax (VAT).
The funds are then allocated to all three tiers of government according to a speciﬁc alloca-
tion formula by the Federation Account Allocation Committee (FAAC) under the auspices
of the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission according to the Consti-
tution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999). The Revenue Mobilisation Allocation
and Fiscal Commission is comprised of a chairman and one member from each state and
the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. The Federation Account Allocation Committee is
comprised of Federal Minister of Finance, representatives of each state (usually the states'
commissioners of Finance and their accountants-general), and representatives from ﬁscal
and monetary related federal agencies such as the Central Bank, and the Customs and
Federal Inland Revenue Services (Maystadt and Salihu, 2015).
After deduction 13% percent of revenues that directly ﬂow back to the oil-producing
states (called the derivation principle), the collected tax revenues are divided by a verti-
cal and horizontal allocation formula. The vertical allocation formula states that 52.68
percent of revenue allocations is disbursed to the federal government, 26.72 percent is dis-
bursed to the state governments and the FCT (Abuja), and 20.60 percent goes to the local
governments. The horizontal allocation formula which applies to states and local govern-
ment councils allocates the funds according to geographic and socio-economic indicators.
The factors of the formula are (i) equality 40%; (ii) population 30%; (iii) internal revenue
generation Eﬀort 10%; (iv) landmass and terrain 10%; (v) education 4%; (vi) health 3%
(primary school enrolment); (vii) water supply 3% (rainfall).20 While the revenue formula
remains in force for no less than 5 years, the horizontal allocation is adjusted annually to
20The landmass and terrain factor is further equally divided into one constant part for all local gov-
ernment areas according to terrain conditions in the state (50% of 10%), and a second part measuring
the size of the landmass of each local government area (50% of 10%). The internal revenue generation
eﬀort is further divided into one part applying to each local government council in each state equally
(75% of 10%), and one part depending on the individual revenue eﬀort of each local government council
(25% of 10%). The water supply factor is further equally divided into an equality part applying to all
local government councils equally in each state (50% of 3%), and territorial spread of rainfall depending
on each local government area's rainfall (50% of 3%).
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ensure conformity with changing realities by the Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and
Fiscal Commission (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999).
While the state governments also generate their own revenue, the local government
councils have little capacity to raise taxes and, thus, hinge on the transfers from the
central government. The ﬁscal situation in particular for local governments is at the
mercy of global oil prices and the general business cycle in the country (World Bank, 2013).
Almost 90 % of gross revenues comprised disbursements from the federation account in the
period 20012005. Overall they raised less than 5 % of gross revenues through internally
generated means (average 20012005) (Eboh et al., 2006).21 The tax powers available to
local governments are limited to minor subjects, such as property tax and market and
trading licences.22 For state governments, the internally generated revenue accounted on
average for just 11.5 % of total revenues in the period 20012005, while the transfers from
the federation account made up a over 70 % of revenues.
A recurring contentious issue is the regulation on the joint account of states and local
governments. The disbursements of tax revenue from the Federation Account to the
local governments is not directly paid into the local government's account, but through
the so-called `State Joint Local Government Account'. It is then in the responsibility
of state governments to transfer the amount determined by the FAAC to the respective
local governments. The local governments in turn complain that funds at times are
withheld by state governments or that they ﬁnd all sorts of reasons to make deductions.
This undermines the ﬁnancial independence of local councils from the state government
and possibly aggravates the problem of capture as more power is ascribed to the state
administration (Ekpo and Englama, 2008).23
3.2.2 Nigerian Local Government Council Elections
The Nigerian Constitution of 1999 stipulates that local government councils are elected
by the people. Even though the federal structure of governance includes three tiers of
government, the constitution gives the state governments considerable inﬂuence over the
organisation and regulation of local government councils and their elections. The consti-
tution reads:
The system of local government by democratically elected local government
21I could not ﬁnd any comprehensive data on internally generated revenue of local government councils.
22A full list of tax powers is provided in Ekpo and Englama (2008).
23The equivocal issue of the the joint accounts was described by a journalist of the Daily Champion on
August 29, 2003: The so-called state and governments' joint account system serves as the ﬁnal deathblow
on the ﬁnancial independence of the government system."
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councils is under this Constitution guaranteed; and accordingly, the Govern-
ment of every State shall, [...], ensure their existence under a Law which pro-
vides for the establishment, structure, composition, ﬁnance and functions of
such councils. (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999)
This passage deﬁning the constitution of local government councils has been proven most
controversial all the years since Nigeria did the regime switch from military to civil rule.
The main problem is that the constitution guarantees the election of local government
councils. Yet, it gives the state governments all the power to enact laws regarding local
governments instead of treating them rigorously as an independent tier of government.
The fact that the third tier of government is not clearly independent from state gov-
ernments seems to give strong parties and interest groups a lot of power, which makes
capture of local governments by elites all the more likely.
While general elections  which include the elections of state governors and state
house of assemblies  are under the surveillance of the national Independent Electoral
Commission (INEC), local elections are under the jurisdiction of state executive. State
governments constitute State Independent Electoral Commissions, a body to organise,
undertake, and supervise local government elections. It consists of a chairman and no less
than ﬁve but not more than seven other members (Constitution of the Federal Republic
of Nigeria, 1999). Furthermore, the state governor have also to provide the ﬁnancing for
the conduct of local council elections so that local oﬃcials hinge on her intentions and
decisions.
As a preparation for the ﬁrst democratic presidential elections after the military regime
in February 1999, local government council elections were ﬁrst held on December 5-6,
1998. These local elections were successfully conducted in essentially all local government
areas of the federation. The ﬁrst term of councils lasted until the end of May 2002
when transition (caretaker) committees were appointed to temporarily govern the local
governments.24 At that time, new local government elections could not be held because
the national voter register had not been properly updated since the general elections
1999. The legally critical situation subsequently led to a long delay of local elections in
24The newspaper This Day reported on May 9, 2002, on the decisive ruling of the supreme court,
which led to a ﬁrst wave of transition committees to be appointed: In what is widely acclaimed as a
landmark judgment delivered on March 28 this year, the Supreme Court ruled in favour of the 36 states
of the Federation by stating that the National Assembly had no power to extend the tenure of local
councillors beyond 3 years. In the aftermath of that judgment, very few of us (if at all any) realised
that we were merely concluding the beginning of an endless saga between the State Governments and
our Federal legislators in their now all too familiar and desperate quest to control their local councils."
This statement on the endless saga over the control of local councils turned out to have been essentially
true till this day.
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all states.25 The whole controversy over the voter register marked a prejudice to appoint
caretaker committees and the constitution was de facto weakened.
In a countrywide collective eﬀorts to reinstate elected local councils, most states held
local elections in March and April 2004, a remarkable two years after the term for the
former elected councils had ended. Yet, a number of states found all sorts of reasons
not to hold local elections and henceforth appointed caretaker committees to run the
local government area administrations. Depending on the political power structures at
the state level, local elections were held more or less regularly and with varying degrees
of freedom and fairness. Opposition parties often accused elections of being rigged by
the incumbent administration. State Independent Electoral Commission members were
charged of being members of the state governor's leading party, which was the Peoples
Democratic Party in the majority of cases. Only in July 2014, a supreme court ruling
forced state governments to hold local government council elections, but compliance has
been insuﬃcient since.26
The high volatility in elected local government councils between 1999 and 2014 is
clearly resembled in Figure 3.2a. Moreover, Figure A.2 in the appendix provides more
detail by displaying a timeline of elected local councils and appointed caretaker committees
for each state. This is basically the variation that I am exploiting in the empirical analysis.
While elections into the local government councils were frequently not free and fair,
but heavily controlled and manipulated by the party of the state governor, there still
seem to emerge certain democratic credentials around the time of local elections:27 (i)
25On August 8, 2002, Agence France-Presse (AFP) describes the cancellation of the local elections:
Local elections were due to be held on Saturday this week, but were cancelled at the last minute after
the national electoral commission failed to draw up a voter's register and legal wrangling raged over
alleged attempts to exclude parties from the poll." Due to procedural problems, the voter register was
ﬁnally updated only in September 2002 instead of February 2002 as planned (European Union, 2003).
The delay in the update of the voter register at the national level also delayed the conduct of local
government council elections and led to the legally precarious appointment of caretaker committees, that
began already in June 2002 in almost all states. In some states, there was a strong will not to deploy
unelected oﬃcials and subsequently the term of elected councils was extended until August 2002 (Akwa
Ibom, Borno, Kaduna, Taraba).
26In June 2006, Abia state governor Chief Orji Uzor Kalu had sacked 148 duly elected local oﬃcials.
Subsequently, the chairmen and councillors went to court, which led to a legal battle lasting 8 years and
ended at the Supreme court that judged the dissolution of the local government councils illegal. The
newspaper Daily Independent on July 28, 2014, commented on the major decision: Nigeria's democracy
got a legal boost and was further deepened on Friday, July 11, 2014, following a landmark judgment
delivered by the Supreme Court in respect of a titanic legal battle between elected council oﬃcials in Abia
and the state government. [...]. When the judgment was delivered on that fateful Friday, it reverberated
across the 774 local government areas in the country. Lawyers, the umbrella body of elected council
oﬃcials (ALGON) and lovers of democracy and democratic norms hailed the judgment, describing it as
one of the best things that has happened in the attempt to deepen our nascent democracy".
27These preliminary rough ﬁndings on mechanisms characterising local government council elections
are based on the media content analysis conducted and presented in section 3.2.2. Further details on the
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local elections seem to intensify the formation of political parties; (ii) local elections
increase the voter awareness about local elections; (iii) even at the local level, major
parties hold primary elections. Despite of the fact that the incumbent governor's party
usually swipes the elections, there is some form of political competition within the parties;
(iv) most of the times election tribunals are erected where election complaints can be
deposited and where a court has to rule over election results; and (v) losing parties usually
improve their strategies to contest the next elections. The mechanisms listed provide some
provisional answers to the question whether holding fraudulent elections is still superior
than holding no elections at all. Although this evidence is anecdotal and I do not claim
any suﬃciency, it provides some insights on what the democratic competition in the local
government areas can trigger. Opposition parties are generally eager to engage in election
campaigns, though often they are lacking the means to actually stand a chance of winning
against a well organised incumbent party that enjoys the support of the governor. While,
the electoral institutions at the local level are still precarious, strategies to compete the
elections seem to have improved over time. Yet, since the governors have essentially
control over conducting, delaying or even cancelling elections, the local elections usually
have become a tedious undertaking for opposition forces.
The incentives for state governors to hold or not to hold local government elections are
manifold. First, since personal gain is a potential purpose of holding oﬃce, appointing
loyal caretaker committees is one way to secure that a maximal amount of funds is con-
trolled by the state government. Caretaker committees are appointed and can, therefore,
also be replaced any moment with a new set of caretakers without considerable reasons.
This maximises control over the third tier of government. Second, governors have career
concerns. On the one side, appointing caretaker committees can increase the probability
of re-election for the governor since rigging local elections is easier if the administrative
personnel in the local governments are monitored and under the control of the governor.
On the other side, not holding elections could also be judged as a negative signal to the
voters if voters prefer elected local councils instead of appointed caretaker committees.
Conducting elections legitimises their oﬃce when they act accordingly to the constitution
signalling decency to the voters. Nonetheless, if rigging elections is feasible that option
may yield the higher beneﬁts. Even governors with no re-election prospects have incen-
tives not to hold elections since they can secure the election prospects for their successor
of the same party, or improve chances of securing a seat in the House of Representatives
or the Senate.
Third, increasing revenues to the state and local governments further augmented the
media content analysis are available on request.
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incentives to grab political rents. As the increasing oil price lead to higher oil tax revenues,
the amounts disbursed to the state and local governments increased considerably over
time (as shown by Figure 3.2a for LGCs). Following the arguments of Brollo et al.
(2013), a politician faces the trade oﬀ between grabbing rents and pleasing the voters.
A larger budget size increases the room to grab political rents without disappointing the
rational but imperfectly informed voters. The electoral punishment of corrupt behaviour
decreases with the budget size. In the case of Nigeria, this arguments appear plausible,
even more so, as the elections were usually biased towards the incumbent party through
illegal means. The potential control over the transfers disbursed intensiﬁed incentives for
strong political factions to capture sub-national governments in order to embezzle funds
or to determine more palpably its beneﬁciaries. The windfalls in oil revenues seem to be
a factor undermining democratic institutions.
3.3 Data
This study uses four major data sources brieﬂy described in this section. There are two
remarks on the data used. First, this is the ﬁrst study to assemble data on local elections
that determines for each month for the period 1999 to 2014 when local elections were
conducted and how long local government councils were in oﬃce using a media content
analysis. Second, I assembled monthly data on tax revenue allocations to the 36 states and
774 local government councils for the period 1999 to 2014. To the best of my knowledge,
this is the ﬁrst study using detailed monthly allocation data to all the local governments
for analyze the Nigerian ﬁscal federalism.
3.3.1 Information on Local Elections through a Media Content
Analysis
I gather data on local elections by conducting a media content analysis using the FAC-
TIVA media data base.28 From local Nigerian newspaper articles, I extract information
on local government council elections.29 Using a series of keywords, I determine for each
of the 774 local government areas the date when local elections were held, the tenure
28The FACTIVA media data base is a product by Dow Jones and contains news articles and information
from over 9'000 international, national and regional news publications out of 152 countries, including
several Nigerian newspapers.
29Most information is extracted from Nigerian newspapers This Day/All Africa Global Media, Daily
Champion/All Africa Global Media, Vanguard/All Africa Global Media, Daily Trust/All Africa Global
Media, and Daily Independent/All Africa Global Media.
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of elected councils, and the periods when caretaker committees were appointed.30,31 The
media content analysis was conducted for each of the 36 states, excluding the Federal
Capital Territory, which is exempt from in the analysis. Besides information on dates
of local elections and tenure of councils, I also extracted information on the party aﬃl-
iation of elected councils. Most of the time, all elected councils belonged to the same
party, usually the party of the governor. This supports the notion that local elections
were at times rigged and not free and fair. It is however impossible to determine the
degree of fraudulent behaviour for each election. Detailed information on the names of
elected councils or the exact vote count is almost never reported by the State Independent
Electoral Commissions.32
3.3.2 Monthly Allocations by the Federation Account Allocation
Committee
Monthly information on tax revenue allocations from the central government to the 36
state governments and 774 local government councils comes from the Federation Account
Allocation Committee of the Federal Ministry of Finance.33 I assemble data on monthly
disbursements for each month from June 1999 to July 2014. The disbursement data is
timed such as the decision taken by Federation Account Allocation Committee is taken in
one month, and the disbursements shared in the following month. The data is adjusted
for that month of delay in the disbursement. The information on the monthly allocations
is communicated by the Accountant-General of the Federation in Abuja. Since I am
interested in the transfer ﬂowing to the local government council, I use the ﬁnal amount
Total Net Allocation that is set by the Federation Account Allocation Committee.
For each year and local government council, I sum up the allocation to elected gov-
ernment councils and appointed caretaker committees on a monthly basis. The log of the
sum of allocations to elected and appointed councils is displayed in ﬁgure 3.2b. There is a
high volatility in funds that ﬂow to legitimate local government councils and illegitimate
30my research There is no oﬃcial information on local government elections provided by the Nigerian
government nor by the National Bureau of Statistics.
31I used a whole series of key terms to conduct scanning of newspaper articles. The search algorithm
was adjusted for each state in order to detect the right information. The search terms included e.g.
council polls, local government (LG) election, election into local government, local government election,
LG poll, local government poll, LG election, LG vote, LG council, local government council election,
transition committee, transition implementation committee, or caretaker committee.
32Further information on the details of the media content analysis is available on request.
33The data was available on www.faac.gov.ng in April 2015. The website is currently not online (May
2016).
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caretaker committees. I use this exogenous variation in disbursements in the empirical
analysis to determine the government eﬃciency of local governments.
3.3.3 Nighttime Light Data
Nighttime light emissions are used to measure economic activity at the local level and serve
as the main outcome variable of the analysis. The light data is provided by the Earth
Observation Group (Earth Observation Group, 2013) and originates from the Defense
Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) Operational Linescan System (OLS) to detect
cloud cover. The satellites that record the light emissions circle the earth 14 times a day
and measured the light emissions every night at some instant between 8:30 and 10:00 pm
local time. Light intensity is measured approximately on every square kilometre (every
30 arc-second) on a scale from 0 to 63, where higher values imply more intense nighttime
light. The resulting images record stable lights that are intended to capture man-made
activity.
According to Henderson et al. (2012) and Chen and Nordhaus (2011) nighttime light
emissions seem a good proxy for economic activity. It has also been used at a the local level
in several recent studies (see e.g. Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013, Michalopoulos
and Papaioannou, 2014, Hodler and Raschky, 2014).
For each local government area and year in the period 1999 to 2013 (the last available
year) I calculate the logarithm of the mean light intensity. As some LGA take the value
of zero, I follow Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013 to add 0.01 and calculate log(light
density + 0.01). As gas ﬂaring might be a serious problem in the Niger Delta where a lot of
oil extraction is occurring, I exclude all Delta states in the main analysis.34 Furthermore,
all speciﬁcations include time ﬁxed eﬀects to account for diﬀerent groups of satellites for
which light sensor settings are reported to vary (Henderson et al., 2012).
3.3.4 Health Services Measured by Infant Mortality
In order to measure public goods provision at the local level, I use micro-level data from
the Demographic Health Surveys (DHS), a survey implemented by ICF International.35
34The Delta include all states around the Niger Delta, where a lot of oil production is located. The
Niger Delta states are Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, and Rivers.
35More than 300 Demographic Health Surveys have been conducted in over 90 countries to pro-
vide extensive data on health related topics comparable across countries, but also to trace individual
information on education and household characteristics. The surveys are conducted by ICF Interna-
tional and funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). They are available on
https://dhsprogram.com.
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In Nigeria, surveys were undertaken in the years 1999, 2003, 2008, and 2013.36 The DHS
surveys make use of geographic clusters. A cluster is a series of individual interviews
conducted at one particular geo-referenced location. I add up the information available in
each cluster to the level of local government areas to achieve a comprehensive coverage.
As an indicator for health services, I calculate a measure of infant mortality. Each
woman in the DHS survey is asked in which years she gave birth to a child and whether the
child is still alive. If a child didn't survive, the age at death in month is inquired. Using
this information it is possible to calculate a measure of infant mortality that is deﬁned as
the mortality rate of children within their ﬁrst year of life. This yields a complete yearly
time series of infant mortality. The measurement of infant mortality includes survey
responses of the DHS surveys of the years 2008 and 2013.37
3.4 Empirical Strategy
I exploit panel data over 14 years on the conduct or absence of local elections, monthly tax
revenue allocations from the Federation Account, and development indicators, to estimate
a series of econometric models. The empirical strategy consists of three parts. Since the
primary goal of the empirical analysis is to ﬁnd out whether elected councils perform better
in terms of economic development than appointed caretaker committees, in the ﬁrst part,
I start by investigating the eﬀect of elected councils on annual light growth assuming that
the timing of local elections is exogenously determined by the decision of the governor.
The exogeneity assumption is plausible if we consider that each local government has
no decisive inﬂuence on the timing of local elections, as there are on average 10 local
governments per state. The speciﬁcation is discussed in section 3.4.1. In the second part,
I present a discussion of the presumable capture of state governments. I check for various
factors that make capture more likely based on the theoretical arguments provided by
Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) and Brollo et al. (2013). While not claiming causality
in this part of the analysis, it gives the reader a distinct picture of the socio-economic
conditions that lead to the cancellation of local elections. In the third part, I drop the
exogeneity assumption on local elections. I attempt to solve a possible endogeneity in the
conduct or absence of local elections. The endogeneity arises because the local economic
36Another survey with a limited number of respondents was undertaken in the year 2010, which I do
not include in the analysis.
37The sample of local government areas is restricted to years, when enough information on births and
death of children are available. I decided to use a cutoﬀ point of 15 infants per year. This cutoﬀ is
somewhat arbitrary, but the data gets more imprecisely measure if it chosen at a lower level, and the
sample gets very small if the cutoﬀ is chosen at a higher level.
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development may have an inﬂuence on the timing of elections; the decision of the governor
to hold local elections depends on economic progress and on the local political economic
conditions. The 2-stage least squares instrumental variable approach applied is discussed
in section 3.4.3.
3.4.1 Local Council Elections and Economic Development
In the ﬁrst part of the empirical analysis, I present basic patterns in the data on local
elections and allocations to the local government councils in a stylised way. Since the data
has never been used in any other study in this form, it is interesting to see whether local
elections and allocation to the local government area are associated with higher growth
proxied by nighttime light data. It is important to note here that the speciﬁcations in this
section make no compelling claim of causality. Yet, assuming that the timing of elections
is fully determined by the discrete choices of the governor, the estimates based on the
following speciﬁcation can present a rather accurate picture of the eﬀect of elections on
economic development. The exogeneity assumption is later dropped.
In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, I regress annual light growth on a variable that measures
whether a local government council is elected by the people or appointed by the state
government in the following way:
∆Log Lightl,s,t+1 = α + δElected Councill,s,t−1 + ψg + λt + εl,s,t (3.1)
where the dependent variable is annual light growth deﬁned as log(light densityl,s,t+1)−
log(light densityl,s,t), l indicating the local government area (or its council), s indicating
the state, and t indicating year t. The main explanatory variable Elected Councill,s,t is
deﬁned as the number of months in a year a local government had an elected council.
The variable ranges from 0 to 12, being zero when an appointed caretaker committee
governed the local government area, and 12 when an elected council governed the local
government area the whole year. A number in between 0 and 12 indicates the exact
number of months that a local government area had an elected council. The dependent
variable is deﬁned as the change in log light density this year to the log light density in
the next year log(light densityl,s,t+1) − log(light densityl,s,t) in order to account for a
time that implemented policies or public investments by the local council may need some
time to be reﬂected in light emissions. In the estimations I will also vary the time lag to
get more precise picture of the association between election status and local development.
Time ﬁxed eﬀects λt are included to account for changes in the measurement of light
80 The Local Political Resource Curse in Nigeria
emissions, and to absorb general shocks that aﬀect all local government areas. ψg is a
governor ﬁxed eﬀects. Since governor may have an impact on economic and development
policies, but also on the conduct of local elections. εl,s,t is an error term.
The second speciﬁcation establishes the link between monthly tax revenue allocations
to the local government council and annual growth in light density:
∆Log Lightl,s,t = α + ρ∆Log Revenue Allocationl,s,t + ψg + λt + εl,s,t (3.2)
where the main explanatory variable is the annual change in revenue allocation included
as natural logarithm. The allocation variable is measured contemporaneously with light
growth. The argument behind is that additional funds that ﬂow into the local govern-
ment council are likely to be quickly spent by the council. I include diﬀerent lags of the
allocation variable to investigate the possible time lag in spending.
The ﬁrst part concludes with the following speciﬁcation, including the interaction of
the election status variable and the allocation variable from above:
∆Log Lightl,s,t+1 = α + γElected Councill,s,t ×∆Log Revenue Allocationl,s,t+1
+δElected Councill,s,t + ρ∆Log Revenue Allocationl,s,t+1
+ψg + λt + εl,s,t (3.3)
where the Elected Councill,s,t × ∆Log Revenue Allocationl,s,t+1 interacts the two vari-
ables of interest in order to investigate the following argument: if local elections have
a disciplining eﬀect on local governments, this eﬀect should become even stronger when
allocations to the local government increase in the current year to the next year.
3.4.2 Factors of Capture
The aim of the second part of the empirical strategy is to screen the factors that are likely
to make the issue of capture of state governments worse. I base my arguments on the
theoretical models by Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) and Brollo et al. (2013) to assess
whether capture could indeed be the reason for the absence of local government council
elections. I simply regress the indicator variable for capture, the conduct or absence of
local elections, on a number of socio-economic variables the are associated with capture
of governments. This exploratory empirical exercise makes no claim of causality while
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it should provide insights on the political economic conditions at the subnational level.
Variables that are potential confounding factors possibly aﬀecting both the conduct of
local elections and the development prospects are subsequently used in the next step to
identify the eﬀect of local elections on development, discussed in the following section.
3.4.3 Identifying the Eﬀect of Local Elections on Development:
Instrumental-Variable Approach
The objective of the instrumental variable approach is to identify the causal eﬀect of local
council elections on economic development while controlling for the transfers that ﬂow into
a local government. While tax revenue disbursements to the local government councils
are plausibly exogenous since they depend largely on variation in global crude oil prices,
the conduct of local government elections is more likely to be endogenous: Whether local
elections are held depends on regional political economic conditions that inﬂuence the
decisions of the state governor. Hence, there possibly is a reverse of eﬀect of the state of
development on the conduct of elections. Furthermore, confounding variables that both
aﬀect the timing of elections and economic development might bias the estimate.
To address these concerns, I apply an instrumental variable approach in a 2-stage
least squares estimation framework. On the ﬁrst stage, I predict the conduct or absence
of local government council elections using two sources of plausibly exogenous variation
as instruments. In the second stage, I regress local development on the predicted values
of local council elections interacted with tax revenue allocations received by the local
government council, similar to the speciﬁcation in equation 3.3.
I estimate the following ﬁrst stage speciﬁcation to determine the factors inﬂuencing
the conduct or absence of local government council elections:
Elected councill,s,t = α + θIPre-colonial Institutionsl,t ×∆Log Oil Pricet (3.4)
+κIPre-colonial Institutionsl,t
+X ′l,tβl +X
′
s,tβs + ψg + λt + εl,s,t
where Elected councill,s,t, as above, measures the months in a year that a local government
area l had a an elected local government council in local government in state s, and year
t. The instrumental variable is pre-colonial institutionsl,t× oil pricet. The oil price that
might inﬂuence the business cycle or any other variables that have a potential aﬀect on
elections is absorbed by the time ﬁxed eﬀect λt. The time ﬁxed eﬀects λt also control for
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common shocks aﬀecting all local government areas. Xl,t and Xs,t are a time-varying sets
of control variables at the level of local council and state government.
The exogenous variation used for the instrumental variables comes from two sources.
First, I use the variation in the global crude oil price that is exogenous to local political
economic conditions and cannot be inﬂuenced by state governments.38 Second, I use pre-
colonial political institutions as an important indicator for the depth and organisational
character of the civil society. Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013) ﬁnd pre-colonial
political institutions to be a relevant determinant of development in African countries.
In fact there are two endogenous variables that need to be instrumented, that is Elected
Council l,s,t and the interaction term Elected Council l,s,t × ∆Log Revenue Allocation l,s,t.
Therefore, two instruments are so that the estimation is just identiﬁed. While Elected
Council l,s,t is instrumented by Pre-colonial Institutions l,t × ∆Log Oil Pricet, it obviously
follows that Elected Council l,s,t × ∆Log Revenue Allocation l,s,t can be instrumented by
Pre-colonial Institutions l,t × ∆Log Oil Pricet × ∆Log Revenue Allocation l,s,t.
In order for the instruments to be valid, the exclusion restriction needs to hold. The
instrument should aﬀect local development only through the policies enacted by the local
government councils and not directly through other means. While pre-colonial political
institutions are very likely to inﬂuence development through other mechanisms than the
local government, in interaction with tax revenue disbursements they likely aﬀect devel-
opment only through the local government councils. Since these transfers ﬂow through
the local government by deﬁnition, the pre-colonial institutions can have an inﬂuence
on development only through the government institutions. Yet, it is important to sepa-
rately control for pre-colonial institutions as they are likely to have a discrete impact on
development in addition to the one via the local government.
In the second stage speciﬁcation, I employ the ﬁtted values of local council elections
from the ﬁrst stage to estimate its causal eﬀect on development, according to:
∆Log Lightl,s,t = α + γElected Councill,s,t ×∆Log Revenue Allocation
∧
l,s,t (3.5)
+ δElected Councill,s,t + ρ∆Log Revenue Allocationl,s,t
+X ′l,tβl +X
′
s,tβs + ψg + λt + εl,s,t
where the outcome variable is ∆Log Lightl,s,t as before. The coeﬃcient of interest are γ
and δ that capture the eﬃciency of the local government council in promoting growth,
38Throughout, I exclude states of the oil-rich Niger delta that potentially have an inﬂuence on oil
production or disturbance thereof.
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in fact comparing the available funds to the council and the subsequent economic growth
proxied by light. ψg is a governor ﬁxed eﬀects accounting for speciﬁc characteristics of
each individual governor. λt is a year ﬁxed eﬀect. εl,s,t is the error term.
Estimates could be biased if there are any confounding factors that both aﬀect the
election status of local governments and development, for which I do not account. As on
the ﬁrst stage, a series of controls at the local level, Xl,t, as well as the state level, Xs,t,
is included in order to account for any variables aﬀecting both the election variable and
the outcome.
3.5 Results
The results section is structured according to the empirical strategy derived above. Results
on the eﬀect of local elections on public goods provision is discussed in the separate Section
3.6.
3.5.1 Elected Local Government Councils and Local Economic
Growth
In this ﬁrst result section I presents simple OLS regressions. Table 3.1 present the baseline
result for the association between elected local government councils and annual light
growth. It is important to understand the timing of events here. Growth in light proxying
development is measure as log(lightt+1)− log(lightt).39 It is a comparison of the amount
of light emitted this year to the amount emitted in the next year. Assuming that the
performance of the local government council can have an eﬀect on development only after
a certain time lag, I include the variable indicating election status Elected Councill,s,t this
year and the dependent variable with a one year lag. Since a policy change this year can
only have an eﬀect on development in the following year, this timing in the regressions
makes completely sense. Since I have monthly information on the status of local councils,
I can also include lags in election status of several months instead of years to model a
more accurate timing.
Panel A in Table 3.1 shows a simple OLS regression of the variable measuring the
election status of councils this year on light growth in this to the next year. The estimated
coeﬃcients in column (1) to (3) indicate that there is indeed a clearly positive association
between elected local government councils and change in light emitted. An additional
39As measurement of light emissions may vary from year to year because of changing sensing technology
of satellites, it is important to include year ﬁxed eﬀects in the regression.
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month that a local government area has an elected council increases light growth by 0.5
percentage points in the current year, and by 1.3 percentage points after a 6 months lag.
The coeﬃcient with a 6 months time lag is highly signiﬁcant at the 0.1% level.40
Columns (5)(7) presents the results using a simple dummy variable to measure elec-
tion status of local government councils at a yearly level. The dummy is equal to 1 if an
elected council was governing the local government area more than half of the year, thus
at least 7 months. It is zero if a council was appointed by the state government 6 or more
months. The results resemble the pattern of the monthly analysis. The coeﬃcient that is
signiﬁcant in column (6) has a lag of one year. Having an elected council during a year
increased light growth by 8 percentage points compared to local governments that had
an appointed council, which is substantial. Light growth in the current year and after a
two year lag is not signiﬁcant, which is plausible as investments and policy changes need
some time to be reﬂected in light growth. The coeﬃcient including a governor ﬁxed eﬀect
is even larger at almost 10 percentage points increased light growth and highly signiﬁcant
at the 1% level. Overall, the results using the monthly measure of elected councils seem
to capture the eﬀect with more precision.
While the governor has a lot of power over policies within the state, the local gov-
ernments are the administrative unit that ﬁnally execute the policies at the local level.
Deriving from these basic results, local governments seem to be important with regard to
regional development.
3.5.2 Tax Revenue Allocations and Local Economic Growth
Local government areas depend heavily on the tax revenues from the federation account as
described in section 3.2.1. Since tax revenues heavily depend on oil production and global
oil prices, the local governments are more than any other tier of government at mercy of
global oil demand and supply. In this section I provide evidence, that this inﬂows of tax
revenues funds indeed has an eﬀect on the local government areas' prosperity. While the
beneﬁts of large oil revenues are considered and shown to have brought little sustainable
growth prospects (Sala-i Martin and Subramanian, 2012), the results in table 3.2 suggest
that the local business cycle in fact very much depends on these funds ﬂowing in. While
this evidence cannot be assessed as causal due to possible omitted variable bias, the results
40One concern is that the standard errors are correlated at the state level since the conduct or absence
of local government elections is determined at the state level. Table B.3 in the appendix presents the
same set of results with standard errors clustered at the state level. While standard errors indeed get
larger, the main results with a time lag of 6 months is still signiﬁcant at the 1% level, while the other
lags or marginally not signiﬁcant. Clustering with only 27 cluster groups is problematic however (Angrist
and Pischke, 2009). Therefore, I present the main results without clustering at the state level.
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Table 3.1: Elected Local Government Councils and Light Growth
Dep. Var.: Annual Light Growth Monthly Measure Yearly Measure
∆ Log Lightt+1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: OLS Pooled Cross Section
Council Elected 0.005+
(0.002)
Council Elected, 6 months lag 0.013∗∗∗
(0.003)
Council Elected, 12 months lag 0.009∗∗
(0.003)
Council Elected, 24 months lag =0.002
(0.003)
Council Elected Dummy 0.039
(0.024)
Council Elected Dummy, 1 year lag 0.080∗∗
(0.030)
Council Elected Dummy, 2 years lag =0.014
(0.030)
R2 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.22 0.23 0.25
Observations 7995 7418 7414 6837 8162 7579 6996
Panel B: OLS Governor Fixed Eﬀects Estimation
Council Elected 0.004
(0.003)
Council Elected, 6 months lag 0.020∗∗∗
(0.004)
Council Elected, 12 months lag 0.013∗∗∗
(0.004)
Council Elected, 24 months lag =0.003
(0.005)
Council Elected Dummy 0.031
(0.029)
Council Elected Dummy, 1 year lag 0.096∗∗
(0.035)
Council Elected Dummy, 2 years lag =0.012
(0.041)
R2 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.23 0.24 0.27
Observations 7995 7418 7414 6837 8162 7579 6996
Notes: Dependent variable is annual growth in light log(lightt+1) − log(lightt). The explanatory variable measures whether a local
government council was elected or appointed, in two variations: (1) number of months in year with elected councils (columns 14), (2)
dummy variable equal to 1 if the council was elected at least 7 months in year, and 0 otherwise (columns 57). All regressions include year
ﬁxed eﬀects. Panel B also includes state governor ﬁxed eﬀects. The sample excludes local government areas in the 9 Delta states (Abia,
Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, and Rivers). Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05,
** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
strongly indicate the heavy dependence of local governments on the oil windfalls or its
absence.
The ﬁrst column in Table 3.2 presents a strong association between annual growth in
monthly allocations and annual growth in light emissions. An increase in allocations by 1
percent increases light growth by 0.24 percentage points. This elasticity is substantial and
highly signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Looking at the growth rate with a 3 months lag, the
correlation is slightly lower and less signiﬁcant. After a lag of half a year the association
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between growth in allocations and light growth disappears. The results support the
notion that the local government areas heavily depend on the transfers from the federation
account.
Table 3.2: Annual Growth in Monthly Allocations and Light Growth
Dep. Var.: ∆ Log Lightt OLS OLS Governor FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ Log Revenue Allocationt 0.242
∗∗ 0.189∗
(0.075) (0.081)
∆ Log Revenue Allocationt, 3 Months Lag 0.145
+ 0.163+
(0.086) (0.086)
∆ Log Revenue Allocationt, 6 Months Lag =0.051 =0.069
(0.100) (0.100)
R2 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.24
Observations 8162 7579 7579 8162 7579 7579
Governor FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable is the growth in light log(lightt) − log(lightt−1). The explanatory variable is annual growth in monthly
allocations to the local government council. The allocations are measured in constant 1999 prices. All regressions include year ﬁxed eﬀects.
The sample excludes local government areas in the 9 Delta states (Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, and
Rivers). Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
3.5.3 Local Government Eﬃciency for Elected Councils and Ap-
pointed Caretaker Committees
As shown in the last two sections, the local economic growth seems to depend on the
election status of local government councils, but it also on the transfers received from the
federation account. In order to really compare the performance of elected councils and
appointed caretaker committees, the next step is obviously to combine the two important
determinants of local development.
Panel A in Table 3.3 presents a combination of the two explanatory variables. I include
the same set of lags for the elected council variable that were shown to be relevant for local
light growth. Column (1) clearly indicates that even when both variables are included,
they keep being signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient measuring the number of months that an
elected council was in oﬃce provides evidence that there is a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on
local development already in the same year. The eﬀect in the annual growth in monthly
transfers stays exactly the same compared to table 3.2. Again, the inﬂuence of the elected
council variable grows over time. Increasing the time in oﬃce of elected councils by one
month in a year, increases light growth by about 1 percentage point with a time lag of 6
to 12 months. The eﬀect is highly signiﬁcant at least at the 1% level.
Columns (4) to (6) presents the same set of regressions, yet include governor ﬁxed
eﬀects, as the governor might have a lot of inﬂuence over policy. The pattern stays
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Table 3.3: Elected Local Government Councils, Growth in Allocations and Light Growth
Dep. Var.: ∆ Log Lightt+1 OLS OLS Governor FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: without Interactions
Council Elected 0.005+ 0.004
(0.002) (0.003)
Council Elected, 6 Months Lag 0.013∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004)
Council Elected, 12 Months Lag 0.009∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004)
∆ Log Revenue Allocationt+1 0.241
∗∗ 0.119 0.115 0.190∗ 0.158+ 0.150+
(0.075) (0.083) (0.083) (0.081) (0.084) (0.084)
R2 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.25 0.25
Observations 7995 7418 7414 7995 7418 7414
Panel B: Interactions of Election Status and Allocations
∆ Allocationt+1 x Elected 0.032
∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.013)
Council Elected 0.005∗ 0.005
(0.002) (0.003)
∆ Allocationt+1 x Elected 6 Months Lag 0.039
∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.016)
Council Elected, 6 Months Lag 0.011∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004)
∆ Allocationt+1 x Elected 12 Months Lag 0.040
∗ 0.060∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.018)
Council Elected, 12 Months Lag 0.007+ 0.010∗
(0.003) (0.004)
∆ Log Revenue Allocationt+1 =0.127 =0.326
+
=0.345 =0.303+=0.500∗ =0.544∗
(0.152) (0.180) (0.212) (0.163) (0.196) (0.223)
R2 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.25 0.25
Observations 7995 7418 7414 7995 7418 7414
Notes: Dependent variable is the growth in light log(lightt+1)−log(lightt). The variable Council Elected is deﬁned as number of months
in a year in which the local government was elected by the people (0  12 months). A value of zero means that a caretaker committee was
appointed by the state government for the whole year. The explanatory variables in Panel B include an interaction term including election
status of local government councils (in months) and annual growth in allocations to the council. All regressions include year ﬁxed eﬀects.
Panel B also includes state governor ﬁxed eﬀects. The sample excludes local government areas in the 9 Delta states (Abia, Akwa-Ibom,
Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, and Rivers). Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
*** p<0.001.
roughly the same. While the eﬀect of elected local government councils becomes even
more pronounced after 6 to 12 months, the annual growth in allocations is now signiﬁcant
also after a one year lag.
Panel B in Table 3.3 further includes interaction terms of the allocation and the elec-
tion variable. The same set of time lags are presented. Interestingly, the interaction really
seems to matter. The results are remarkable. Controlling for the the transfers that ﬂow
into the local government council, the eﬀect of elected councils becomes even stronger. An
additional month of elected council turns into additional light growth of 3.7 percentage
points. Interestingly, the coeﬃcient of the allocation variable turns negative and insignif-
icant indicating that the allocations become more important for local development with
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elected local government councils.
The eﬀect of the interaction term gets even more pronounced after some time lag.
An additional month with an elected local government council increases light growth by
5 percentage points after 6 months, and by 4.7 percentage points after one year, if we
control for the annual growth in monthly allocations.
Columns (4) to (6) in panel B once more present the same set of regressions including
governor ﬁxed eﬀects. The eﬀects become, again, even more pronounced. Interestingly,
the coeﬃcient on annual growth in monthly allocations turns negative and becomes signif-
icant. Hence, an annual growth in allocations has a negative growth eﬀect for the reference
group, the local governments with full year around appointed caretaker committees. An
additional percent in yearly allocations yields 0.3 percentage points lower growth in light
for local government areas that are controlled by an appointed caretaker committee all
year around. The eﬀect becomes stronger after one year, reaching 0.54 percentage points
after one year. With a lag of one year, an additional month of an elected council yields 7
percentage points increased light growth for the mean amount of allocations.
To illustrate the result, I exemplify the mechanism, again using the last column (6).
Having an appointed council for the whole year yields a lower light growth rate of 0.54
percentage points when allocations increase by one percent. Having an elected council
for just one month still yields a negative growth rate of 0.47 percentage points. A
slightly positive growth rate is only reached when the council is elected at least 8 months.
Having an elected council for the whole year yields an increased growth rate of around 0.3
percentage points when annual allocations from the federation account increase by one
percent.
Table B.5 in the appendix presents the same results with standard errors clustered
at the state level. While standard errors generally become larger, the main results stay
robust.
3.5.4 Capture of State Governments
Capture of state governments possibly has substantial inﬂuence on local development
through the conduct or absence of local government council elections. Besides, with-
holding elections and appointing caretaker committees instead appears to facilitate the
embezzlement of public funds for state governors. Political corruption seems to be espe-
cially problematic since transfers to the state and local governments are unconditionally
made. While measurement of the political economic conditions is exceptionally diﬃcult
due to a lack of comprehensive data, the conceptual arguments shall turn the evidence
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more intuitive. Table 3.4 presents the main results on state capture.
The principal argument I establish is that higher transfers ﬂowing into the local govern-
ments make capture of the state and hence control over large sums of disbursed amounts
more lucrative. Columns 1 and 2 in Table 3.4 present supportive evidence for this argu-
ment. In column 1, a simple regression of the Elected Council variable on the oil price is
presented. An increase of the global oil price of 50 US dollars is associated with elected
local councils serving 20 days less in oﬃce per year. The coeﬃcient is highly signiﬁcant
at the 0.1% level. Column 2 indicates that a 1 percentage point increase in the annual
change in revenue allocations to the local government decreases the time in oﬃce for
elected councils by almost 1.5 months per year, when not controlling for other factors.41
These result supports the patterns already observed in Figure 3.2: a trend of increasing
allocations coincides with less time in oﬃce for elected local government councils.
Brollo et al. (2013) argue that with a larger budget size, the incumbent politician has
more room to grab political rents without disappointing the imperfectly informed voters.
The electoral punishment of corruption decreases with budget size which induces the
politician to misbehave more frequently. In the case of Nigerian state governors, the larger
transfers make it attractive to appoint caretaker committees instead of holding elections.
Appointing loyal caretaker committees improves the control over the funds distributed to
the local governments. Importantly, even if voters prefer elected councils to appointed
caretaker committees, the governor may still please the voters since larger funds are
available to be spent. In such a case, a dollar stolen hence has a smaller impact on voters
perception of the unobserved ability of the governor, and thus punishment in the next
gubernatorial elections becomes relatively less likely. In related studies, Grossman and
Helpman (1996) and Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) emphasise that campaign ﬁnancing
plays a crucial role, because uninformed voters are swayed by campaign spending to vote
in favour of the respective party. Higher tax revenue transfers ﬂowing into a captured
state thus enlarge the political war chest of incumbent governors.
Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) further describe that a lack of eﬀective political com-
petition may increase capture of governments both at the national and the local level. In
general, political competition seems still precarious in Nigeria. The general elections held
every four years include the gubernatorial and House of Assembly (state parliament) elec-
tions. As reported by several elections observations missions, these elections were usually
not free and fair through the years 1999, 2003, 2007, and 2011.42 While conducting a
41The estimations in Table 3.4 exclude the years 1999 to 2002 when local government councils were
elected throughout all local government areas. During this period state governors had no idiosyncratic
decision power to dispose elected councils.
42A non-exhaustive list of organisations that observed the Nigerian General Elections include the
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Table 3.4: State Capture: Determinants of Local Government Council Elections
Dep. Var.: Elected Council
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Oil Price =0.014∗∗∗
(0.003)
∆ Log Monthly Allocations =1.434∗∗∗=0.651∗∗∗ =0.727∗∗
(0.329) (0.140) (0.251)
Senate Capture 0.763∗∗∗ 2.273∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.276)
Senate-Governor Capture =0.935∗∗∗ =2.607∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.285)
Governor First Term 0.078 =0.107
(0.058) (0.103)
Governor's Party is PDP 0.321∗∗∗ 2.826∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.193)
Pre-colonial Pol. Institutions =0.204∗∗
(0.066)
Ethnic Fractionalisation =0.296
(0.191)
Share Households with TV 3.061∗∗∗ 6.217∗∗∗
(0.485) (0.727)
Share Households with Radio 9.498∗∗∗ 4.802∗∗∗
(0.467) (0.986)
Share of People with Primary Education =0.423 =4.148∗∗∗
(0.368) (0.685)
Share of People with Secondary Education =6.693∗∗∗ =5.145∗∗∗
(0.759) (1.067)
Months elapsed since last Elections =0.200∗∗∗ =0.177∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003)
Months elapsed since last Term End 0.138∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004)
Distance State Capital to Abuja =0.129∗ 0.195+
(0.065) (0.101)
Distance LGC Capital to State Capital =0.021 0.112+
(0.034) (0.060)
Distance to Coast =0.167∗∗ =0.205+
(0.056) (0.106)
R2 0.01 0.00 0.82 0.82
Observations 6322 6322 6173 2552
Notes: Dependent variable is Elected Council deﬁned as number of months in a year in which the local govern-
ment was elected by the people (0  12 months). A value of zero means that a caretaker committee was appointed
by the state government for the whole year. The sample excludes local government areas in the 9 Delta states
(Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, and Rivers). Huber-White standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at the LGC level. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001.
detailed analysis of these elections is beyond the scope of this study, there is plenty of
evidence indicating a lack of eﬀective political competition. In column 3 and 4 of Table
3.4, I include two measures of capture for each state, representing the intensity of political
National Democratic Institute and The Carter Center in 1999 (1999), the National Democratic Institute
in 2007, and 2011 (NDI, 2008, 2012), the European Union Elections observation Mission in 1999, 2003,
2007, 2011 and 2015 (EU, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015). Other election observing organisations include the
International Crisis Group, the International Republican Institute, and EISA  Promoting Credible and
Democratic Governance in Africa.
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competition at the state level. The ﬁrst measure Senate Capture is a binary indicator
that equals one if all three senators in a state belong to the same party. I presume that
political competition is low, when one party dominates the senate. The second measure
is Senate-Governor Capture which equals one if the governor and all the senators belong
to the same political party. I suppose that political competition is even further reduced
if all these political functions are controlled by the same party.
The coeﬃcients estimated in column 3 and 4 of Table 3.4 reveal two insights. First,
lower political competition indeed seems to aggravate the problem of state capture. The
time in oﬃce for elected councils is signiﬁcantly reduced in cases where the governor and
all three senators belong to the same party. The variable senate capture, in contrast,
is positive. Although this might be counterintuitive at ﬁrst sight, it indicates that if all
three senators belong to a diﬀerent party than the governor, state capture seems to be
reduced. Senators from diﬀerent parties may put pressure on the governor to hold local
elections.
Two additional measures are included to evaluate the characteristics of state governors.
First, a variable indicating whether the governors serves the ﬁrst term. Career concerns
of the governor could aﬀect whether withholding elections is a viable option in light of
re-election prospects. Second, I also include a variable indicating whether the governor
belongs to the People's Democratic Party, the incumbent party at that national level.43
Belonging to the PDP could yields additional privileges through party ranks.
A further determinant of capture proposed by Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) is elec-
toral uncertainty, i.e. the number of swing voters, interest group cohesiveness, political
awareness and the disparity in political awareness levels across classes or groups. They
propose that especially the last two factors increase with illiteracy, poverty, and inequality,
which are all pervasive in Nigeria. The complex political structure comprising of tradi-
tional rulers, numerous political party platforms and the multi-ethnic and multi-religious
society makes it diﬃcult to provide any clear predictions concerning capture. However,
it is possible to include indicators of socio-economic conditions that proxy for electoral
uncertainty and make capture more or less likely.
Phillips (2011) states that historically strong ethnic groups' characteristics continue
to be of political value in Nigeria. Groups with a long pre-colonial political history are
better able to engage in political exchange, in the sense that traditional leaders exchange
political support of their group for public goods and services. Hence, they have a better
basis to organise political support. Traditional elites remain active political entrepreneurs.
43All presidents of Nigeria throughout my study period 19992013 were members of the PDP.
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Column 4 in Table 3.4 includes a measure of pre-colonial political institutions.44 I ﬁnd that
pre-colonial political institutions in fact are associated with less time in oﬃce for elected
councils. It may well be that the traditional groups are part of the elite capturing the
local and state governments. Hence, they might engage in political exchange in the sense
that traditionally strong groups support the incumbent governor party in exchange for
ﬁnancial payments made to the state and local governments. Furthermore, if traditional
rulers see the local councils as contestants of their local power structure, they would have
additional interests to undermine the local government elections.
Foster and Rosenzweig (2004) provide evidence that democratically elected local gov-
ernments reduce inequality and poverty compared to traditional local governance in
villages in India, as democratic governments produce an outcome that maximises the
weighted average of landed and landless households. This supports my argument that
local democratic institutions decrease the power of strong interest groups represented by
traditional pre-colonial groups which capture state and local governments. In addition,
the presence of strong traditional rulers also support the argument that the cohesiveness
of strong interest groups increase the capture of governments.
To additionally control for group cohesiveness, which might aﬀect capture of gov-
ernment, I also include a measure of ethnic fractionalisation in the regression. Ethnic
fractionalisation might increase cohesiveness of political interest groups. However, I do
not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant association of ethnic fractionalisation and elected councils.
As mentioned above, the theoretical model by Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) pre-
dicts that political awareness and disparity in political awareness increases with illiteracy,
poverty, and inequality. Column 3 and 4 in Table 3.4 include four variables that reﬂect
these socio-economic characteristics. The ﬁrst two proxy for the number of informed vot-
ers: the share of people that have either a radio or a TV. Besley and Burgess (2002)
highlight the importance of the mass media to convey information about government
policies in order to improve responsiveness of governments. They state that mass media
can play an important role by enabling vulnerable citizens to better supervise the actions
of incumbent governments.45 The results in Table 3.4 support these arguments as states
with higher shares in radio and TV possession are associated with a higher number of
months of elected local government councils in oﬃce.
44Data on pre-colonial political institutions measuring the Jurisdictional Hierarchy Beyond Local Com-
munity is unfortunately available only for a limited number of local government areas as show in Figure
A.2 in the appendix. Since the variables pre-colonial political institutions and ethnic fractionalisation
substantially reduce the sample size, they are excluded in column 3.
45Other important studies that emphasise the importance of mass media for decreasing corruption
levels are Brunetti and Weder (2003) and Ahrend (2002).
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Two further variables are included that proxy for the education level in each state: the
share of adults aged 18 to 49 with completed primary or secondary education. Besides
Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) providing theoretical support for literacy to mediate
the problem of capture, Glaeser et al. (2004) show that higher levels of human capital
should improve government institutions. Ahrend (2002) also shows that the capacity of
civil society to oversee government oﬃcials depends on education levels, and also provide
empirical evidence for this prediction. The simple pooled OLS results in Table 3.4, in
contrast to expectations, show that higher levels of both primary and secondary education
is negatively associated with elected councils. This counterintuitive fact is probably owing
to the steadily increasing education levels across states over time. Since the trend in the
number of elected councils steadily decreases over time, this negative correlation follows.
The Nigeria Economic Report (2014) by the World Bank emphasises the enduring high
levels of poverty and inequality among Nigerians. While no direct evidence of poverty and
inequality is included in the estimation in Table 3.4 by reason of missing convincing mea-
surement, it seems likely that they contribute to lower political awareness. A lack of voter
awareness and the disparity of voter awareness among diﬀerent groups might substantially
contribute to the problem of capture of state governments and the consequential absence
of local government council elections. There might even be a vicious cycle of capture and
inequality as strong interest groups that capture the state governments enrich themselves
through the tax revenue allocations, while poorer groups do not have access to public
funds and public goods.
Finally, I also include a number variables that control for the timing of elections and
geographic location of each local government area, not discussed in detail. Overall, this
empirical exercise to analyse the factors that make capture of state governments likely
presented interesting insights into the political economic conditions at the state level. The
conclusion is that capture indeed is a potential issue and probable to cause the withholding
of local council elections.
3.5.5 2SLS: Identifying the Eﬀect of Local Government Elections
on Development
In this section, I attempt to identify the causal eﬀect of tax revenue disbursements ob-
tained by elected or appointed local government councils on indicators of local economic
growth. I employ a 2-stage least squares instrumental variable approach. As described
in section 3.4.3, I use two instrumental variables to account for the endogeneity in local
elections and its interaction with monthly revenue allocations. The endogeneity arises
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because the state of local development may have an inﬂuence on the timing of elections;
the decision of the governor to hold local elections depends on economic progress and on
the local political economic conditions. The exogenous variables to serve as instruments
are the oil price and the indicator of pre-colonial political institutions. As a side eﬀect,
the sample in following regressions is restricted to the local government councils for which
the exogenous instrumental variable pre-colonial political institutions is available.46 Fur-
thermore, the time period is now restricted to the years when governors had idiosyncratic
power over the conduct of elections, thus the years after 2002.
Panel A in Table 3.5 presents the results with no time lag. The growth in light from
this year to the next year is regressed on the variable measuring the number of months
in a year that a local government was elected.47 The coeﬃcient in column (1) on the
instrumented variable Elected Council is substantial and highly signiﬁcant at the 1%
level. An additional months that a council was elected increases light growth from this
to the next year by almost 12 percentage points. The eﬀect gets even slightly larger more
signiﬁcant with a 6 months lag, reaching over 14 percentage points in panel B. The ﬁrst
stage F-statistic for the instruments is 32.97 and aﬃrms that the instrument is valid.
Compared to the results in Table 3.3, the eﬀect of elected council on annual light growth
is now considerably larger. The results suggest a negative selection of local government
elections. It is likely that local government councils that were in fact willing to conduct
elections could not proceed due to a state government unwilling to hold elections.
The second column adds the control variables that take into account the socio-economic
and political characteristics in each state. These control variables absorb any confounding
factors that might aﬀect both the election status of local government councils and local
development proxied by light growth. Section 3.5.4 presented the factors that inﬂuence to
conduct or absence of local government council elections mainly following the arguments
by Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000). Including the controls, the eﬀect of the election
status variable becomes even larger while the change in monthly allocations keeps being
insigniﬁcant.
Columns (3) and (4) add governor ﬁxed eﬀects. Since governors are most inﬂuential
on policies, this could have a relevant inﬂuence on economic growth. The governor ﬁxed
eﬀect does, however, not change the results, no matter whether controls are included or
not. The eﬀects become slightly smaller though. Again, the estimated coeﬃcients are
slightly larger with a 6 months time lag.
46Figure A.2 in the appendix presents a map indicating the sophistication of regional political insti-
tutions using the variable Jurisdictional Hierarchy Beyond Local Community based on Murdock (1967)
and Gray (1998).
47The timing of events is precisely explained in section 3.4.3.
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Table 3.5: 2SLS: Elected Local Government Councils, Growth in Allocations and Light
Growth (2003  2013)
Dep. Var.: ∆ Lightt+1 Elected Council Elected x Allocations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: No Time Lag
Elected Council 0.119∗∗ 0.171∗∗ 0.111∗∗ 0.095∗ 0.180∗∗ 0.216∗∗ 0.121∗∗ 0.107∗
(0.038) (0.061) (0.039) (0.038) (0.062) (0.080) (0.044) (0.044)
∆ Allocations x Elected 0.386∗∗ 0.139 0.048 0.050
(0.141) (0.105) (0.072) (0.072)
∆ Log Revenue Allocations 0.165 0.581 0.238 0.240 =0.923+ 0.357 0.117 0.124
(0.356) (0.496) (0.398) (0.381) (0.478) (0.536) (0.438) (0.424)
FS 1: F-statistic 32.97 32.36 68.30 70.14 21.31 16.54 35.72 37.25
FS 2: F-statistic 28.10 23.65 30.11 30.86
Observations 3005 2921 3005 2921 3005 2921 3005 2921
Panel B: Time Lag 6 Months
Elected Council, Lag 6 Months 0.142∗∗∗0.165∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗0.125∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗0.157∗∗∗0.140∗∗∗0.116∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.051) (0.045) (0.037) (0.044) (0.047) (0.040) (0.033)
∆ Allocations x Elected, Lag 6 M. 0.267∗∗=0.057 =0.093 =0.080
(0.103) (0.077) (0.071) (0.066)
∆ Log Revenue Allocations 0.233 0.456 0.492 0.326 =1.102+ 0.719 0.929 0.724
(0.380) (0.423) (0.431) (0.372) (0.642) (0.617) (0.622) (0.562)
FS 1: F-statistic 39.36 26.53 45.09 60.33 26.75 15.23 28.98 38.13
FS 2: F-statistic 36.85 39.35 52.31 53.21
Observations 3004 2925 3004 2925 3004 2925 3004 2925
Governor FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable is the growth in light log(lightt+1)−log(lightt). The variable Council Elected is deﬁned as number of months
in a year in which the local government was elected by the people (0  12 months). A value of zero means that a caretaker committee
was appointed by the state government for the whole year. The two endogenous variables Elected Council and Elected Council x ∆Log
Revenue Allocations are instrumented by Pre-colonial Political Institutions x ∆Log Oil Price and Pre-colonial Political Institutions
x ∆Log Oil Price x ∆Log Revenue Allocations. The control variables include Pre-colonial Political Institutions, Months Elapsed
since Last Election, Months Elapsed since Last Term End, Governor First Term, Governor Party PDP, Senate Capture, Senate-
Governor Capture, TV Possession, Radio Possession, Secondary Education, Distance to State Capital, and Distance to Coast, and
Distance to Abuja. All regressions include year ﬁxed eﬀects. The sample excludes local government areas in the 9 Delta states (Abia,
Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, and Rivers) and the Federal Capital Territory. The sample is reduced to the
local government areas that have information on pre-colonial political institutions. The time period is restricted to the years 20032013.
Huber-White standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the LGA level. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
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Columns (5) to (8) additionally include the interaction of allocations and election
status. Interestingly, the eﬀect of the conduct of election becomes even stronger when
monthly disbursements increase as already observed in table 3.3. Controlling for the
endogeneity in the conduct of local elections reveals that the interaction of allocations
and election status loses signiﬁcance. The coeﬃcient on the elected council is, however,
stable around 13 percentage points, except for column (6), when the coeﬃcient is even
larger.
Overall, the preferred speciﬁcation is displayed in column (8), where both governor
ﬁxed eﬀects and the controls are included. An additional months with an elected council
increases light growth by 10.7 percentage points in the following year, and by 11.6 per-
centage points with a lag of 6 months. The eﬀect of local elections on light growth is
hence considerable and highly signiﬁcant.
Although the preferred estimation takes the endogeneity in the timing of local elections
into account and controls for possible confounding factors, there are still potential unre-
solved issues in the estimations presented. First, the clustering of standard errors could
be done at the state level instead of the local government level. Since some variables
are measured at the state level, clustering at the state level may be a necessary option.
Therefore, Table B.7 presents the same set of results with standard errors clustered at
the state level. The main results are still signiﬁcant at the 5% level, although the size
in standard errors is generally increased. Second, the estimations do not in any sense
control for population size or movements. Although I use annual light growth, which is a
relative measure, migration of people still might aﬀect the results. As people migrate to
more attractive local governments, the growth in light could arise due to the additional
people living in the area and not due to better living conditions experienced by the native
people. Finally, the exact allocation mechanism of tax revenue allocations is not entirely
transparent. While the vertical allocation formula presented in section 3.2.1 is adjusted
every ﬁve years, the horizontal formula is adjusted annually to ensure conformity with
changing realities. Since I have no detailed information on the changes in indicators that
constitute the horizontal allocation formula, I might not be able to control for all factors
that aﬀect allocations and development prospects in a local government area.
3.6 Local Elections and Public Goods Provision
In order to assess the eﬃciency of local governments in terms of public goods provision,
I present suggestive evidence on how elected local councils aﬀect infant mortality. As
citizens are at mercy of their local government council when it comes to health care and
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education, it is insightful to analyse how local elections determine the service delivery in
these sectors. Infant mortality is deﬁned as the percentage of infants that do not survive
their ﬁrst year. Since health care policies might take some more time to be eﬀective I use
the change in monthly allocations this year to explain infant mortality in the following
year. Table 3.6 presents the results on the eﬀects of elected local councils on infant
mortality in a simple OLS framework.
The estimated eﬀects are quite weak and much less evident than the results on light
growth. In panel B, when controlling for the allocation of revenues, I ﬁnd a weak negative
eﬀect with a time lag of 6 and 12 months. The negative sign of the coeﬃcient makes
sense as elected local council should improve health care services compared to appointed
caretaker committees and thus reduce infant mortality. This suggestive evidence is how-
ever only preliminary. A more in-depth analysis that is beyond the scope of this paper, is
necessary to assess whether the conduct of local government council elections indeed also
has an eﬀect on people access to health care services.
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Table 3.6: Elected Local Government Councils, Growth in Allocations and Infant Mor-
tality
Dep. Var.: Infant Mortalityt+1 OLS OLS Governor FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: without Interactions
Council Elected =0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Council Elected, 6 M L 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Council Elected, 12 M L 0.000 0.002+
(0.001) (0.001)
Council Elected, 24 M L 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
∆ Allocationst =0.054
+
=0.054+=0.054+=0.043 =0.039 =0.036 =0.035 =0.025
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.032)
R2 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.23
Observations 1113 1119 1119 1067 1085 1091 1091 1039
Panel B: Interactions of Election Status and Allocations
∆ Allocationst x Elected 0.000 =0.002
(0.003) (0.004)
Council Elected =0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
∆ Allocationst x Elect. 6 M L =0.006
∗
=0.003
(0.003) (0.003)
Council Elected, 6 Months Lag 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
∆ Allocationst x Elect. 12 M L =0.007
∗∗
=0.003
(0.003) (0.003)
Council Elected, 12 Months Lag 0.000 0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
∆ Allocationst x Elect. 24 M L 0.002 0.000
(0.002) (0.003)
Council Elected, 24 Months Lag =0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
∆ Allocationst =0.053 0.014 0.019 =0.061
+
=0.021 =0.003 =0.002 =0.030
(0.045) (0.040) (0.041) (0.035) (0.046) (0.041) (0.045) (0.042)
R2 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.23
Observations 1113 1119 1119 1067 1085 1091 1091 1039
Notes: Dependent variable is infant mortality in the following year t + 1. Infant mortality is deﬁned as the percentage of infants that
do not survive the ﬁrst year. The variable Council Elected is deﬁned as number of months in a year in which the local government was
elected by the people (0  12 months). A value of zero means that a caretaker committee was appointed by the state government for the
whole year. The explanatory variables in Panel B include an interaction term including election status of local government councils (in
months) and annual change in allocations to the council in year t. All regressions include year ﬁxed eﬀects. Panel B also includes state
governor ﬁxed eﬀects. The sample only includes local government areas with suﬃcient reliable data on infant mortality and excludes local
government areas in the 9 Delta states (Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, and Rivers). The regression
includes observations of the years 2001  2013. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
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3.7 Conclusion
Local government elections could be an essential element of a successful Nigerian federal
state. Yet, capture of state governments by strong political groups indeed seems to be a
big obstacle to development as state governments increase their grip on political power
by withholding the constitutionally guaranteed local elections and undermining the third
tier of government. The large and increasing inﬂows of tax revenue allocations makes it
more attractive for state governments to appoint obedient caretaker committees in order
to have tighter control over the public funds.
In this paper, I provide evidence for the political resource curse at the local level and
the crucial role of local government council elections for regional economic development
in Nigeria. First, I demonstrate that elected local governments indeed have a positive
impact on development measured by the annual growth in nighttime light emissions.
In the second part, I discuss possible factors that render capture of state governments
by strong interest groups more likely. Most importantly, vast amounts of tax revenues
disbursed to state and local governments make the tight control over these governments
more lucrative as more public funds are up for grabs. In addition, the high poverty,
inequality, and illiteracy rates, combined with still weak democratic institutions further
increase the probability of capture at state and local governments. The absence of local
elections based on idiosyncratic decisions of state governments is an obvious consequence
thereof. Third, by applying a 2-stage least squares instrumental variable approach, I
identify the eﬀect of local council elections on annual light growth while controlling for
possible confounding factors. The robust evidence supports the notion that local elections
indeed improve the development prospects of local government areas and that withholding
elections is detrimental.
The political resource curse at the local level seems to be a major obstacle to economic
prospects in Nigeria. Enforcing the conduct of local government council elections and
ensuring the independence of the third tier of government has the potential to increase
accountability at the local level and unleash a more prosperous development path.
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3.A Data Appendix
3.A.1 Variable Description and Descriptive Statistics
Table A.1: Variable Description & Data Sources
Variable Description Source
Dependent Variables
Annual Light Growth log(lightt)− log(lightt−1)
Annual growth in the logarithm of light density in a local gov-
ernment area.
Earth Observation Group
(2013), National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration
of the National Geophysical
Data Center of the United
States.
Infant Mortality Infant Mortalityl,s,t
Infant mortality deﬁned as percent of infant deaths within the
ﬁrst year of life in a local government area.
Demographic Health Surveys,
2003, 2008, 2013.
Main Explanatory Variables
Elected Local Government Coun-
cil
Binary indicator that equals one if the local government council
was elected by popular vote. The indicator is zero if the local
government council was appointed by the state governor (care-
taker committee).
Media Content Analysis us-
ing FACTIVA, a newswire
database by Dow Jones.
Annual Change in Revenue Allo-
cations
log(Revenue Allocationl,s,t)− log(Revenue Alloctionl,s,t−1)
The revenue allocations are measured on a monthly basis and
added up to each year. Revenue Allocations are deﬂated using
the consumer price index.
Federation Account Allo-
cation Committee (FAAC)
of the Federal Ministry
of Finance, online source:
www.faac.gov.ng on April
2015.
Control Variables
Pre-colonial Political Institutions The classiﬁcation of Jurisdictional Hierarchy Beyond Local
Community is as follows: (i) No levels (no political author-
ity beyond community); (ii) One level (e.g., petty chiefdoms);
(iii) Two levels (e.g., larger chiefdoms); (iv) Three levels (e.g.,
states), population weighted
Murdock (1967), Gray (1998),
http://worldmap.harvard.edu/
(Murdock HRAF 1959 v2)
Oil price Brent Crude Oil price in USD, yearly average Thomson Reuters Datas-
tream.
Months elapsed since last elections Counts the months since the last local government council elec-
tion took place.
Own calculations based on
media content analysis.
Months elapsed since last term
end
Counts the months since the last elected local government coun-
cils left oﬃce.
Own calculations based on
media content analysis.
Governor First Term Indicates whether the incumbent governor serves his/her ﬁrst
term in oﬃce (re-election is possible).
Independent National Elec-
toral Commission (INEC) and
various online sources.
Governor's Party is PDP The incumbent governor's party is the People's Democratic
Party (PDP)
Independent National Elec-
toral Commission (INEC) and
various online sources.
Senate Capture Binary indicator of capture of the senate at the state level. The
indicator equals one if all three senators are members of the same
political party.
Independent National Elec-
toral Commission (INEC),
Adam Carr's Election Archive
(http://psephos.adam-
carr.net), and various online
sources.
Senate-Governor Capture Binary indicator of capture of the senate and state government.
The indicator equals one if the three senators and the governor
of a state are members of the same political party.
Independent National Elec-
toral Commission (INEC),
Adam Carr's Election Archive
(http://psephos.adam-
carr.net), and various online
sources.
Share Households with TV Share of households that possess at least one TV at home, mea-
sured at the state level.
Own calculations based on
Demographic Health Surveys
2003, 2008, 2013.
Share Households with Radio Share of households that possess at least one radio at home,
measured at the state level.
Own calculations based on
Demographic Health Surveys
2003, 2008, 2013.
Share of People with Primary Ed-
ucation
Share of the adult population that completed at least a primary
education, measured at the state level.
Own calculations based on
Demographic Health Surveys
2003, 2008, 2013.
Share of People with Secondary
Education
Share of the adult population that completed at least a sec-
ondary education, measured at the state level.
Own calculations based on
Demographic Health Surveys
2003, 2008, 2013.
Ethnic Fractionalisation Measures the probability that two randomly people from a na-
tional population are from diﬀerent linguistic groups based.
Demographic Health Surveys
2003, 2008, 2010.
Distance State Capital to Abuja Logarithm of distance from state capital to Nigeria's capital
Abuja in kilometres.
Own calculations using GIS,
coordinates of state capitals
from Google Maps.
Distance LGA to State Capital Logarithm of distance from local government area geographic
centroid to the state's capital in kilometres.
Own calculations using GIS,
coordinates of capitals from
Google Maps.
Distance to Coast Logarithm of distance from local government area geographic
centroid to nearest coastal point in kilometres.
Own calculations using GIS,
coordinates of LGC capitals
from Google Maps.
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Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics
Dependent Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
∆ Log Light 8162 0.063 0.808 =5.238 5.474
Infant Mortality 1272 0.097 0.073 0 0.41
Main Explanatory Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Elected Local Government Council 8079 7.569 5.098 0 12
∆ Log Monthly Allocations 8246 0.153 0.386 =0.593 1.953
Control Variables Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Oil Price (Brent Crude) 8246 64.885 32.137 24.503 111.813
Pre-colonial Pol. Institutions 4018 1.821 0.942 0 3
Months elapsed since last Elections 8142 31.513 22.101 4.5 173.5
Months elapsed since last Term End 6971 28.451 20.978 1.5 133.5
Governor First Term 8162 0.628 0 1
Share Households with TV 8246 0.376 0.230 0 0.921
Share Households with Radio 8246 0.772 0.103 0.468 0.981
Share of People with Secondary Education 8246 0.274 0.166 0.000 0.741
Governor's Party is PDP 8162 0.638 0 1
Senate Capture 8162 0.639 0 1
Senate-Governor Capture 8098 0.526 0 1
Log Distance State Capital to Abuja 8162 5.814 0.460 4.774 6.539
Log Distance LGA to State Capital 8162 3.932 0.972 0.108 5.620
Log Distance to Coast 8162 5.909 0.994 1.066 7.016
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3.A.2 Appendix Local Government Council Elections
Figure A.1: Timeline of Elected Local Government Councils (dark blue) and Appointed
Caretaker Committees (light blue) in Each State of Nigeria, including the Month of Elec-
tions (red)
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Notes: The ﬁgure shows a timeline of elected local government councils and appointed caretaker committees for each state
and month in Nigeria between 1999 and 2014. The month of elections is colored red. Years are coded as Elected Council if
there were more than 50 percent of local government areas with elected local government councils. The ﬁrst local government
elections were held on December 5-6 1998, but are displayed as January 1999. When the date of the inauguration of local
government councils is known, then this date serves as date of election. In most cases local government councils are sworn-
in shortly after the election. The timeline is left blank if no reliable information on the constitution of local government
councils was found in a month.
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3.A.3 Pre-Colonial Political Institutions
Figure A.2: Levels of Pre-Colonial Political Institutions in Nigeria
No level
One level
Two levels
Three levels
Local Government AreaÜ 0 70 140 210 28035 Kilometers
Notes: The map shows Nigerian territories and their pre-colonial political institutions according to Murdock (1959, 1967).
The classiﬁcation of Jurisdictional Hierarchy Beyond Local Community is as follows: (i) No levels (no political authority
beyond community); (ii) One level (e.g., petty chiefdoms); (iii) Two levels (e.g., larger chiefdoms); (iv) Three levels (e.g.,
states); for white areas there is no data available. Sources: Murdock (1967), Gray (1998), http://worldmap.harvard.edu/
(Murdock HRAF 1959 v2), and Global Administrative Areas (GADM).
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3.B Empirical Appendix
Table B.3: Elected Local Government Councils and Light Growth
Dep. Var.: ∆ Log Lightt+1 Monthly Measure Yearly Measure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: OLS Pooled Cross Section
Council Elected 0.005
(0.004)
Council Elected, 6 months lag 0.013∗∗
(0.004)
Council Elected, 12 months lag 0.009
(0.006)
Council Elected, 24 months lag =0.002
(0.008)
Council Elected Dummy 0.039
(0.041)
Council Elected Dummy, 1 year lag 0.080
(0.053)
Council Elected Dummy, 2 years lag =0.014
(0.072)
R2 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.22 0.23 0.25
Observations 7995 7418 7414 6837 8162 7579 6996
Panel B: OLS Governor Fixed Eﬀects Estimation
Council Elected 0.004
(0.006)
Council Elected, 6 months lag 0.020∗∗
(0.007)
Council Elected, 12 months lag 0.013
(0.009)
Council Elected, 24 months lag =0.003
(0.013)
Council Elected Dummy 0.031
(0.055)
Council Elected Dummy, 1 year lag 0.096
(0.070)
Council Elected Dummy, 2 years lag =0.012
(0.106)
R2 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.23 0.24 0.27
Observations 7995 7418 7414 6837 8162 7579 6996
Notes: Dependent variable is the growth in light log(lightt−log(lightt−1). The explanatory variable measures whether a local government
council was elected or appointed, in two variations: (1) number of months in year with elected councils (columns 14), (2) dummy variable
equal to 1 if the council was elected at least 7 months in year, and 0 otherwise (columns 57). All regressions include year ﬁxed eﬀects.
Panel B also includes state governor ﬁxed eﬀects. The sample excludes local government areas in the 9 Delta states (Abia, Akwa-Ibom,
Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, and Rivers). Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
*** p<0.001.
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Table B.4: Annual Growth in Monthly Allocations and Light Growth; clustering at state
level
Dep. Var.: ∆ Log Lightt OLS OLS Governor FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Annual Growth Allocations 0.242+ 0.189
(0.118) (0.131)
Annual Growth Allocations, 3 Months Lag 0.145 0.163
(0.106) (0.109)
Annual Growth Allocations, 6 Months Lag =0.051 =0.069
(0.148) (0.148)
R2 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.24
Observations 8162 7579 7579 8162 7579 7579
Governor FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable is the growth in light log(lightt) − log(lightt−1). The explanatory variable is annual growth in monthly
allocations to the local government council. The allocations are measured in constant 1999 prices. All regressions include year ﬁxed eﬀects.
The sample excludes local government areas in the 9 Delta states (Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, and
Rivers). Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
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Table B.5: Elected Local Government Councils, Growth in Allocations and Light Growth
Dep. Var.: ∆ Log Lightt+1 OLS OLS Governor FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: without Interactions
Council Elected 0.005 0.004
(0.004) (0.006)
Council Elected, 6 Months Lag 0.013∗∗ 0.020∗∗
(0.004) (0.007)
Council Elected, 12 Months Lag 0.009 0.013
(0.006) (0.009)
∆ Revenue Allocationt+1 0.241
+ 0.119 0.115 0.190 0.158 0.150
(0.120) (0.120) (0.119) (0.135) (0.124) (0.122)
R2 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.25 0.25
Observations 7995 7418 7414 7995 7418 7414
Panel B: Interactions of Election Status and Allocations
∆ Allocationt+1 x Elected 0.032 0.044
(0.028) (0.032)
Council Elected 0.005 0.005
(0.004) (0.007)
∆ Allocationt+1 x Elected 6m Lag 0.039
∗ 0.058∗
(0.017) (0.021)
Council Elected, 6 Months Lag 0.011∗ 0.018∗
(0.004) (0.007)
∆ Allocationt+1 x Elected 12m Lag 0.040 0.060
(0.036) (0.040)
Council Elected, 12 Months Lag 0.007 0.010
(0.007) (0.009)
∆ Revenue Allocationt+1 =0.127 =0.326 =0.345 =0.303 =0.500
+
=0.544
(0.320) (0.230) (0.463) (0.362) (0.286) (0.513)
R2 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.25 0.25
Observations 7995 7418 7414 7995 7418 7414
Notes: Dependent variable is the growth in light log(lightt+1)−log(lightt). The variable Council Elected is deﬁned as number of months
in a year in which the local government was elected by the people (0  12 months). A value of zero means that a caretaker committee was
appointed by the state government for the whole year. The explanatory variables in Panel B include an interaction term including election
status of local government councils (in months) and annual growth in allocations to the council. All regressions include year ﬁxed eﬀects.
Panel B also includes state governor ﬁxed eﬀects. The sample excludes local government areas in the 9 Delta states (Abia, Akwa-Ibom,
Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, and Rivers). Huber-White standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level. +
p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
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Table B.6: Elected Local Government Councils, Growth in Allocations and Light Growth;
including Controls
Dep. Var.: Annual Light Growth OLS OLS Governor FE
log(lightt+1)− log(lightt) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: without Interactions
Council Elected 0.008+ 0.003
(0.004) (0.005)
Council Elected, 6 Months Lag 0.019∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
Council Elected, 12 Months Lag 0.010∗ 0.008
(0.005) (0.005)
Annual Growth Allocations =0.116 =0.110 =0.123 =0.445∗=0.424∗ =0.443∗
(0.142) (0.142) (0.142) (0.186) (0.187) (0.187)
R2 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.24 0.24 0.24
Observations 3199 3203 3200 3199 3203 3200
Panel B: Interactions of Election Status and Allocations
Growth Allocations x Elected 0.040∗∗ 0.042∗
(0.015) (0.017)
Council Elected 0.010∗ 0.006
(0.004) (0.005)
Growth Allocations x Elected 6 M. Lag 0.051∗∗ 0.064∗∗
(0.018) (0.020)
Council Elected, 6 Months Lag 0.016∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
Growth Allocations x Elect. 12 M. Lag 0.061∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.023)
Council Elected, 12 M. Lag 0.004 =0.002
(0.005) (0.006)
Annual Growth Allocations =0.549∗=0.682∗∗=0.826∗∗ =0.891∗∗∗=1.130∗∗∗=1.449∗∗∗
(0.214) (0.241) (0.271) (0.244) (0.278) (0.312)
R2 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.24 0.24 0.24
Observations 3199 3203 3200 3199 3203 3200
Notes: Dependent variable is the growth in light log(lightt+1)−log(lightt). The variable Council Elected is deﬁned as number of months
in a year in which the local government was elected by the people (0  12 months). A value of zero means that a caretaker committee
was appointed by the state government for the whole year. The explanatory variables in Panel B include an interaction term including
election status of local government councils (in months) and annual growth in allocations to the council. All regressions include year
ﬁxed eﬀects. Panel B also includes state governor ﬁxed eﬀects. The control variables include Pre-colonial Political Institutions, Months
Elapsed since Last Election, Months Elapsed since Last Term End, Governor First Term, Governor Party PDP, Senate Capture,
State Capture, Television Possession, Radio Possession, Secondary Education, Distance to State Capital, Distance to Coast, and
Distance to Abuja. The sample excludes local government areas in the 9 Delta states (Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta,
Edo, Imo, Ondo, and Rivers). Huber-White standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the LGC level. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
*** p<0.001.
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Table B.7: 2SLS: Elected Local Government Councils, Growth in Allocations and Light
Growth (2003  2013); SE clustered at State Level
Dep. Var.: ∆ Lightt+1 Elected Council Elected x Allocations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: No Time Lag
Elected Council 0.119 0.141 0.111 0.104 0.180 0.192 0.121∗ 0.116+
(0.114) (0.122) (0.069) (0.071) (0.185) (0.160) (0.057) (0.059)
∆ Allocations x Elected 0.386 0.139 0.048 0.047
(0.332) (0.222) (0.117) (0.137)
∆ Log Revenue Allocations 0.165 0.426 0.238 0.292 =0.923 0.230 0.117 0.182
(0.595) (0.933) (0.614) (0.606) (0.695) (1.080) (0.761) (0.782)
FS 1: F-statistic 1.98 3.07 10.56 10.70 1.33 1.55 5.49 5.59
FS 2: F-statistic 2.74 1.66 2.13 2.03
Observations 3005 2921 3005 2921 3005 2921 3005 2921
Panel B: Time Lag 6 Months
Elected Council, Lag 6 M. 0.142 0.135 0.152+ 0.134∗ 0.134 0.132 0.140∗ 0.122∗
(0.105) (0.083) (0.075) (0.062) (0.096) (0.081) (0.065) (0.056)
∆ Allocations x Elected, Lag 6 M. =0.124 =0.018 =0.093 =0.092
(0.165) (0.174) (0.171) (0.158)
∆ Log Revenue Allocations 0.233 0.322 0.492 0.371 0.855 0.407 0.929 0.826
(0.527) (0.639) (0.625) (0.531) (1.227) (1.150) (1.174) (1.135)
FS 1: F-statistic 2.33 3.04 3.27 3.64 1.20 1.70 1.65 1.81
FS 2: F-statistic 3.87 3.69 3.68 4.17
Observations 3004 2925 3004 2925 3004 2925 3004 2925
Governor FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable is the growth in light log(lightt+1)−log(lightt). The variable Council Elected is deﬁned as number of months
in a year in which the local government was elected by the people (0  12 months). A value of zero means that a caretaker committee
was appointed by the state government for the whole year. The two endogenous variables Elected Council and Elected Council x ∆Log
Revenue Allocations are instrumented by Pre-colonial Political Institutions x ∆Log Oil Price and Pre-colonial Political Institutions
x ∆Log Oil Price x ∆Log Revenue Allocations. The control variables include Pre-colonial Political Institutions, Months Elapsed
since Last Election, Months Elapsed since Last Term End, Governor First Term, Governor Party PDP, Senate Capture, Senate-
Governor Capture, TV Possession, Radio Possession, Secondary Education, Distance to State Capital, and Distance to Coast, and
Distance to Abuja. All regressions include year ﬁxed eﬀects. The sample excludes local government areas in the 9 Delta states (Abia,
Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, and Rivers) and the Federal Capital Territory. The sample is reduced to the
local government areas that have information on pre-colonial political institutions. The time period is restricted to the years 20032013.
Huber-White standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
4 Does Proximity to Foreign Invested
Firms Stimulate Productivity Growth
of Domestic Firms?
Firm-level Evidence from Vietnam
Joint with Huong Quynh Nguyen
4.1 Introduction
Foreign direct investment is seen as an important driver of technological progress in par-
ticular for developing countries due to spillover eﬀects from foreign ﬁrms on the domestic
industry. Spillovers may foster technological change and thus reduce the productivity gap
between advanced multinational ﬁrms and incumbent establishments. As technologically
superior foreign ﬁrms enter a developing country, local manufacturers start imitating prod-
ucts and production processes. People working for foreign ﬁrms switch jobs and join local
ﬁrms transferring valuable know-how on production processes and organisational struc-
tures. Entry of foreign ﬁrms may also intensify competition in upstream local industries
or improve the quality of intermediate goods for downstream industries. Since spillover
eﬀects from foreign invested ﬁrms are potentially beneﬁcial for technological progress of
domestic industries and conducive for economic growth particularly in emerging markets,
it is crucial to understand the geographical scope and magnitude of spillover eﬀects.
At least since Marshall (1920) we are aware of the importance of localisation of in-
dustries, for which he identiﬁes three sources: labor market pooling, intermediate inputs
and technological spillovers. Krugman (1991) further elaborated that geography, hence
localisation of industry, clearly matters and that spillovers are much a local phenomenon.
Firms beneﬁt from being near other ﬁrms. Porter (1990, 2011) points out the importance
of geographic concentration in industry clusters. Research on agglomeration economies
emphasises the existence of information-based spillovers: The presence of knowledgeable
neighbouring people or ﬁrms lead to signiﬁcant learning processes (Glaeser, 2010). The
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importance of geographical proximity is emphasized e.g. by Orlando (2004) and Ly-
chagin et al. (2010) in the context of R&D activity, Rosenthal and Strange (2003) on
agglomerative externalities, Aharonson et al. (2007) on knowledge spillovers, Duranton
and Overman (2005) on localization patterns, Rosenthal and Strange (2008) on human
capital spillovers, and Greenstone et al. (2010) for openings of large plants in the US.
This paper contributes to the literature by shedding more light on the relevance of
spatial proximity with regard to spillover eﬀects from foreign invested ﬁrms on the local
industries' productivity growth. Essentially, we want to answer the question whether a
domestic ﬁrm can absorb foreign know-how and increase its productivity from having
foreign ﬁrms in its close surroundings. We complement the existing literature on FDI
spillovers in one important way: we analyse the relevance of geographic proximity for FDI
spillovers using exceptionally detailed geo-referenced information on location of domestic
and foreign invested ﬁrms comprising an almost exhaustive register of Vietnamese ﬁrm
data. The bulk of studies in this vast literature looks at the presence of foreign ﬁrms
within a certain industry and/or region yet are not able to analyse the spatial scope of
spillovers due to existing data limitations  exact location information is usually not
extractable from ﬁrm level survey data. Studies with a speciﬁc focus on localisation of
FDI spillovers are scarce. Comparable examples in terms of accuracy of location data are
Halpern and Muraközy (2007) who present a similar study setup while employing a much
smaller sample of Hungarian ﬁrms. Barrios et al. (2012) utilise an Irish plant level survey
with detailed information on ﬁrms' location, but the sample comprises just 1790 ﬁrms.
In an inﬂuential study, though with less geographic detail, Aitken and Harrison (1999)
analyse the presence of foreign invested ﬁrms in 220 districts in Venezuela, but ﬁnd no
localised spillovers.1
Adoption of advanced technologies from the technology frontier is seen as one of the
main drivers of growth in developing countries (Acemoglu et al., 2006). In this respect,
it is essential for domestic ﬁrms to make use of technology imitation opportunities and
copy know-how from foreign direct invested companies. Productivity diﬀerences stem
from disparities in technological knowledge. These diﬀerences may originate either from
diﬀerences in R&D investment or the ability of adaptation to new technologies (see e.g.
König et al., 2012). The intensity of knowledge diﬀusion and the absorptive capacities of
ﬁrms is seen as crucial channel for ﬁrms to catch up with technologically more advanced
ﬁrms.
Knowledge diﬀusion conveyed by spillovers occurs through various channels. First, im-
itation or demonstration eﬀects are an obvious source of knowledge transmission. Reverse-
1A detailed overview of related literature is provided in the next section.
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engineering of production processes by local ﬁrms seems a useful way to improve tech-
nical know-how (Görg and Greenaway, 2004; Smeets, 2008). Second, skill acquisition of
local ﬁrms through the labor market improves their human capital. Proximity between
ﬁrms increases the likelihood of physical contact between workers or product developers.
Knowledge transition may work through a direct spillover from complementary workers
or people switching jobs from a foreign invested ﬁrm to a domestic ﬁrm (Görg and Green-
away, 2004). This spillover channel that works through the labor market is seen as an
important mechanism (Fosfuri et al., 2001) and is supported by empirical work (Görg and
Strobl, 2005; Markusen and Troﬁmenko, 2009). Third, competition from foreign ﬁrms in
the same industry may put pressure on the local ﬁrm to use existing technologies more
eﬃciently, when imitation of the foreign company's technology is hardly possible. Com-
petition may also increase the speed of adoption of new technology (Görg and Greenaway,
2004). Fourth, spillover eﬀects may materialise through vertical linkages (Smeets, 2008).
Javorcik (2004) and Lin and Saggi (2007) emphasise the importance of direct technol-
ogy transfers through backward linkages. Foreign invested ﬁrms are willing to transfer
know-how to their suppliers in order to improve the quality and lower the prices of in-
termediate goods. Blalock and Gertler (2008) argue that a foreign ﬁrm even must make
the technology widely available to several suppliers in order to avoid hold-up. Domestic
ﬁrms may also become more productive through forward linkages in case they can buy
technologically more advanced, qualitatively better, or less costly intermediate goods pro-
duced by multinationals in upstream sectors. Francois and Hoekman (2010) and Arnold
et al. (2011) emphasise the crucial linkages between production in goods and services, as
services are often direct inputs into economic activities, determining the productivity of
the fundamental factors of production, labor and capital.
Our proposition is that proximity between foreign invested and domestic ﬁrms crucially
facilitates the know-how and technology transmission channels, and hence that geography
and the localisation of industry matters for spillover eﬀects. The entry of almost 2000
foreign invested ﬁrms to Vietnam in the period 2005 to 2010 presents a unique and
suitable natural experiment to assess possible technology spillovers from foreign ﬁrms on
the incumbent industries. We presume that the nearer a foreign investment shock occurs,
the more intense potential spillover eﬀects must be and the larger the productivity gains
are for domestic ﬁrms. Spillover eﬀects decay with increasing distance, as demonstrated
by Orlando (2004), Halpern and Muraközy (2007), Greenstone et al. (2010), Lychagin
et al. (2010), or Barrios et al. (2012). Our research setup lets us more precisely estimate
how localised these spillovers are in the context of foreign direct investment, beneﬁting
from enhanced spatial accuracy over existing studies.
Our data set includes around 67'000 manufacturing ﬁrms in Vietnam over the period
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Figure 4.1: Circles with diﬀerent radii and foreign invested ﬁrms in 2010 in the Hanoi
area
Radii 2km, 5 km, 10km, 20km, 50km
District
no foreign invested firms
1 foreign invested firm
2 - 5 foreign invested firms
6 - 10 foreign invested firms
11 - 250 foreign invested firms
Notes: The map shows a representative example of circles around a ﬁrm with radii of 2km, 5km, 10km, 20km, and 50km. For each ward
the number of foreign invested ﬁrms is indicated. Calculations of ﬁrms are based on the Vietnam Enterprise Survey 2010.
2005 to 2010. Most importantly, we can determine the location of all ﬁrms by using
information on the ward, the smallest administrative unit of Vietnam.2 Since we know
the location of all ﬁrms in Vietnam, we are able to observe the presence of foreign invested
ﬁrms in close proximity to each domestic establishment over time. Figure 4.1 resembles
the main idea of our paper for the case of Hanoi metropolitan area: we virtually draw
circles of various radii around each domestic ﬁrm and measure the presence of foreign
ﬁrms within its surroundings.
Our empirical strategy to estimate localised spillover eﬀects consists of two stages. The
ﬁrst stage computes total factor productivity of ﬁrms from the parameters estimated by an
industry speciﬁc production function method introduced by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).3
2Vietnam comprises more than 11'000 wards. The median size of a ward with manufacturing activity
is 8 km2, representing the size of a circle with a radius of about 1.6 km. Measuring the size of wards
weighted by the number of ﬁrms within a ward, the median size of wards is 4 km2, a circle with a radius
of just 1.12 km. The mean size of wards is then 8.2 km2. More information on the spatial dimensions of
our data and how we geo-reference ﬁrms is provided in section 4.4.2.
3The method of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) is an extension of the framework initiated by Olley and
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The second stage causally identiﬁes localised spillover eﬀects from foreign invested ﬁrms on
the local manufacturing ﬁrms using an estimation procedure ﬁrst proposed by Anderson
and Hsiao (1981), and controlling for possible confounding factors that may both inﬂuence
location choice of foreign ﬁrms and domestic ﬁrm productivity. Additionally to absorbing
the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect by ﬁrst diﬀerencing, we include industry ﬁxed eﬀects, province-time
ﬁxed eﬀects, and time ﬁxed eﬀects. We rigorously examine diﬀerent aspects relevant to
the FDI spillover literature, yet with speciﬁc focus on the spatial scope of spillover eﬀects,
looking at horizontal  within industry  and vertical linkages working through the supply
chain.
Our results aﬃrm that spillover eﬀects are indeed localised and quickly fade with
increasing distance. Spillover eﬀects seem to be strongest between 2 and 10 kilometres
and attenuate rapidly across geographic space. Due to the great coverage of the data set
including a large number of ﬁrms with less than 20 employees, we are able to analyse
whether the local small and medium enterprises (SME) also beneﬁt from foreign direct
investments. Results indeed show strong support in favour of relevant spillover eﬀects
from foreign investments on the local SME sector, which is a stark results in terms of
business development policy. Relatively unproductive ﬁrms also experience large produc-
tivity gains through foreign investment in their vicinity, yet there appears to be no within
industry absolute convergence in productivity levels. With regard to vertical linkages
operating through the supply chain among manufacturing ﬁrms, the results suggest that
ﬁrms beneﬁt from closely located foreign suppliers, but seem to be negatively aﬀected by
foreign backward linkages to downstream foreign ﬁrms.4 Furthermore, spillovers occurring
through vertical links to service industries seem to be much less geographically limited.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the
existing literature on spillovers from foreign direct investment with a speciﬁc look at
the studies that scrutinise the localisation of such eﬀects. In addition, we present an
overview of studies that look at the case of Vietnam. Section 3 elaborates the trends and
patterns of foreign direct investment in Vietnam. In section 4 we present the data used.
Section 5 describes the method applied to estimate ﬁrm level total factor productivity and
presents the corresponding TFP estimates. Section 6 explains the identiﬁcation strategy
Pakes (1996). Olley and Pakes (1996) decompose the residuals of the production into unobserved ﬁrm
level productivity and zero-mean measurement errors. They calculate the unobserved productivity of an
individual ﬁrm by using parameters estimated from the industry's production function. Other researchers
such as Halpern and Muraközy (2007), Van Beveren (2012), and De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) deﬁne
the unobserved ﬁrm level productivity (Olley and Pakes, 1996) as the total factor productivity. For
consistency of the terminology, we also refer to the ﬁrm-productivity as total factor productivity.
4We use the same deﬁnition of forward and backward linkages as Newman et al. (2015): forward
linkages are upstream foreign suppliers; backward linkages are downstream foreign customers. This
deﬁnition of forward and backward is implicitly referring to the perspective of the foreign ﬁrm.
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to estimate FDI spillover eﬀects within the spatial framework and subsequently discusses
the results, including the relevance of horizontal and vertical linkages for spillover eﬀects.
Finally, section 7 concludes.
4.2 Related Literature
Our paper contributes to a large international literature on spillover eﬀects of foreign
investment on the domestic economy. We present a short overview of the most related
studies in two parts. The ﬁrst part looks at the relevance of horizontal and vertical
linkages, and the heterogeneity in eﬀects. The second part sums up the contributions for
the case of Vietnam.
4.2.1 Literature on FDI Spillovers
General results: A growing number of theoretical and empirical studies has shown
that FDI is a crucial driver stimulating economic growth of the host country through the
transfer of knowledge and technologies from advanced multinational enterprises (MNEs)
to the domestic ﬁrms.5 Several comprehensive surveys of the literature come to mixed
conclusions concerning the importance of FDI for the local economy. Görg and Greenaway
(2004) investigate results of 40 studies on FDI spillover eﬀects and attempt to draw general
conclusions from the early literature. Their overall corollary is, ﬁrst of all, that FDI is
likely to be a key driver of economic growth by boosting capital formation and the quality
of the capital stock in host countries. Multinational companies seem to bring best practice
technology and management with them. They deduce that absorptive capacity of domestic
ﬁrms and geographic proximity to multinationals are important determinants of spillover
eﬀects from foreign invested to domestic ﬁrms. Governments are hoping to stimulate
these external beneﬁts of FDI by oﬀering incentives to foreign companies, suggesting that
policy improvements should target the general conditions for doing business instead of
particular industries or ﬁrms.
Smeets (2008) summarises the literature by concluding that the evidence on the magni-
tude, direction, and even existence of knowledge spillovers from foreign direct investment
is ambiguous. Nonetheless, knowledge spillovers through channels like worker mobility,
demonstration eﬀects, and vertical linkages all seem to matter. Yet, the literature seems
to agree on missing evidence for spillovers working through forward linkages, i.e. when
5See e.g. Lim (2001), Borensztein et al. (1998), and Carkovic and Levine (2002) for an account of FDI
and economic growth; Girma et al. (2001) and Blomström and Kokko (2003) on FDI spillovers.
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foreign ﬁrms supply goods to domestic ﬁrms. Smeets (2008) emphasises the importance of
distinguishing and speciﬁcally analysing diﬀerent channels through which spillovers may
occur.
Horizontal spillovers: Horizontal spillovers occur within an industry. Results are
mixed. There are two main arguments. On the one hand, ﬁrms of the same industry
may beneﬁt from each other through face-to-face contacts and imitation of products or
processes. On the other hand, ﬁrms in the same industry compete with each other.
Competitive pressure may lead to more eﬃcient use and quicker adoption of technologies,
but it may also drive up the average cost curve due to fewer sales. Using a panel of
4'000 Venezuelan plants between 1976 and 1989, Aitken and Harrison (1999) ﬁnd that
foreign equity participation increases productivity of recipient plants with less than 50
employees, suggesting that plants beneﬁt from productive advantages of foreign owners.
Crucially, they also ﬁnd a negative impact of foreign ownership on wholly domestically
owned ﬁrms in the same industry. These large signiﬁcant negative eﬀects are brought
by competitive pressures. Overall they conclude that there is no clear evidence of the
existence of technology spillovers from foreign ﬁrms to domestically owned ﬁrms. In
contrast to this early inﬂuential enquiry, Abraham et al. (2010) is one of the few studies
that ﬁnd positive within industry spillovers. They ﬁnd that it was beneﬁcial for total factor
productivity of domestic ﬁrms when there was a certain presence of foreign competitors
in analysis of more than 15'000 manufacturing ﬁrms in China in the years 2002 to 2004.
Vertical spillovers: Much attention has also been paid to the role of FDI spillovers
to domestic ﬁrms through vertical linkages in the supply chain. Either a foreign ﬁrm
supplies intermediate goods to a domestic ﬁrm or vice versa. A review of studies on the
relevance of vertical linkages is conducted by Smeets (2008). Most studies ﬁnd positive
spillovers through backward linkages, but negative eﬀects in the case of forward linkages.
Javorcik (2004) analyses spillovers eﬀects of FDI on productivity through backward and
forward linkages using a ﬁrm level panel dataset from Lithuania. The author shows that
spillovers are associated with projects that are shared between domestic and foreign ﬁrms,
and not with fully foreign owned projects. Robust evidence for spillovers working through
backward linkages is found, while intra-sectoral spillovers are absent in her study. Blalock
and Gertler (2008) demonstrate the gain in productivity of Indonesian local suppliers
through spillovers from foreign ﬁrms in downstream industries over the period of 1988 to
1996. In addition, the signiﬁcance of inter-industry beneﬁts to upstream domestic ﬁrms
also seems to depend on the origin of the foreign investment in the downstream industry
(Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2011).
Geographic Proximity: Spatial proximity between economic agents has become
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an important explanation of economies in production since the early stages of economic
research and was already investigated by Marshall (1920) in terms of specialised clusters of
inputs (e.g. labor, materials, services), and technology spillovers. Halpern and Muraközy
(2007) speciﬁcally investigate geographical distance as a determinant of FDI spillovers.
The novelty in their study is the link between the TFP level (estimated by Levinsohn
and Petrin, 2003) and the FDI spillovers in light of the distance from foreign ﬁrms to
domestic ﬁrms in Hungary (19962003). They conﬁrm that distance indeed matters for
horizontal spillovers and emphasise the local nature of those. In addition, the authors
extend the vertical and horizontal linkages proposed by Javorcik (2004) by weighting
these variables with a function of distance between a foreign invested ﬁrm and a domestic
ﬁrm. Though, a drawback of Halpern and Muraközy's (2007) approach is the assumption
on the functional form of the distance.6 A priori, using a functional form assumption for
the distance f(d) to weight foreign ﬁrms, it is unclear whether the eﬀect of a foreign ﬁrm
which has low output but is close to a domestic ﬁrm is similar in magnitude to an other
foreign ﬁrm with a large output but which is far away. Besides not using a functional
form assumption, our study also provides a higher degree of accuracy of ﬁrms' locations.
Furthermore, they are neither able to control for agglomeration eﬀects such as the size of
the labor market in the vicinity of each ﬁrm. Girma and Wakelin (2007) emphasise the
strong intra-regional dimension of spillover eﬀects in a study on the electronics industry
in the UK. However, their study stays at a spatially rather crude level by dividing the UK
into 10 regions, ﬁnding that horizontal spillovers occur within a region, but not outside
(or across) the region.
In an investigation of spillovers from local and global R&D activities of domestic and
foreign plants, Barrios et al. (2012) estimate distance decay eﬀects by using the sample
of Irish plant-level survey data from 1986 to 1996. Most relevant for our study, they also
analyse local spillovers within circular areas around each plant. Considering all plants,
they estimate signiﬁcant local spillovers of R&D activity conducted in Ireland. Eﬀects
are strongest and signiﬁcant within a radius of 10 km around a plant, but decay quickly
beyond. Interestingly, domestic ﬁrms seem to beneﬁt more from local R&D activities
conducted by other domestic ﬁrms than those by foreign ﬁrms. Compared to Barrios
et al. (2012), we employ a much larger data set and our geo-referenced ﬁrm location
information is also more precise.7
6Halpern and Muraközy (2007) use a variety of functional form assumption to weight the horizontal and
vertical linkages. Speciﬁcally, they use the following weighting functions of distance: f1(d) = 1/(1+d/100)
(the linkage to a foreign ﬁrm that is 100 km away from the domestic ﬁrm, is weighted by 0.5); furthermore,
they also use two other functions with more pronounced decay patterns: f2(d) = 1/(1 + d/100)
2 and
f3(d) = 1/ln(1 + d/100) as weighting functions.
7We employ a sample of 67'000 Vietnamese manufacturing ﬁrms, while Barrios et al. (2012) have a
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4.2.2 Literature on FDI Spillover Eﬀects for the Case study of
Vietnam
With a fast growing trend of foreign investment into Vietnam, extensive research has been
conducted to study the role of FDI inﬂows for the local economy, whereof we specify the
most relevant works.8
One of the early studies investigating FDI spillovers eﬀects in Vietnam, Nguyen et al.
(2008) use a large ﬁrm-level data set for the period 2000 to 2005 to study both horizontal
and vertical spillover eﬀects. They ﬁnd evidence of positive backward spillover eﬀects for
the manufacturing sector and positive horizontal spillovers for the service sectors. They
do not discover any evidence of backward and forward spillovers for the service sector.
The study does not consider any spatial dimension in FDI spillovers. Instead the baseline
empirical model merely uses the presence of foreign ﬁrms within an industry, incorporated
in a Cobb-Douglas production function approach, as applied by most spillover studies.
Tran and Pham (2013) are the ﬁrst to use a spatial econometric model for the case
of Vietnam to investigate the importance of proximity for spillovers. Their study is
much related to ours in the sense that they speciﬁcally examine geographical distance
in the context of spillovers. Although they employ a spatial econometric model, they
merely use the provinces as geographic unit of analysis. The spatial accuracy is hence
considerably lower compared to our study. Tran and Pham (2013) ﬁnd inter-regional
spillovers to be four times larger than intra-regional spillovers. Conﬁrming some ﬁndings in
the literature, they estimate negative horizontal spillovers, positive backward and negative
forward spillovers eﬀects. Since their data set is limited to the period 2000 to 2005, the
paper cannot provide results for the important period after the ﬁrst Investment Law
(2005) allowed more ﬂexible types of foreign investment and investment license controls
were decentralised to the provincial level.
Anwar and Nguyen (2014) analyse the performance of manufacturing ﬁrms in the eight
regions9 of Vietnam aﬀected by varying intensity of foreign investment. By applying 2SLS
estimations and using manufacturing ﬁrm-level data for the period 2000 to 2005, Anwar
sample of just 1790 plants. In order to geo-reference ﬁrms, Barrios et al. (2012) use Irish district electoral
divisions (DED) that have a mean size of 21 km2. The Vietnamese wards that we use in the analysis
have a mean size of 17.55 km2; when weighted by the number of ﬁrms within each ward, the mean size
is even smaller at 8.21 km2.
8See e.g. Anwar (2011) for the analysis of FDI linkages and local ﬁrms' export activities. Another
study for FDI in Vietnam (2001-2008) by Kokko and Thang (2014) indicate that the presence of foreign
counterparts and foreign suppliers would increase the exit ratio of domestic ﬁrms.
9The government of Vietnam groups the provinces into eight large regions: Northwest, Northeast,
Red River Delta, North Central Coast, South Central Coast, Central Highlands, Southeast, and Mekong
River Delta.
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and Nguyen (2014) suggest that through backward linkages, FDI spillovers positively
inﬂuence only four of eight regions (i.e. Red River Delta, South Central Coast, South
East and Mekong Delta River). They conclude that the impacts of FDI on the domestic
economy varies considerably across regions.
Howard et al. (2014) investigate agglomeration eﬀects of manufacturing clusters in
Vietnam by using detailed information about the administrative units in the Vietnam
Enterprise Survey (20022007).10 The study ﬁnds strong evidence of signiﬁcant agglom-
eration economies in Vietnam. Unlike many other studies, they do not ﬁnd negative
competition eﬀects. Interestingly, foreign ﬁrms seem to beneﬁt the most from ﬁrm clus-
tering. While remarkably being one study that uses the ward (commune) as unit of
analysis (other studies only analyse within province spillovers), they limit the analysis
to clusters of ﬁrms within those communes, but not across. The spatial dimension of
clusters (restricted to each ward) is hence captured in a non-continuous and very limited
way. In contrast, we measure distances between wards and hence can model the whole
agglomeration of ﬁrms to detect spillover eﬀects to achieve a more thorough picture.
Newman et al. (2015) separate out productivity gains along the supply chain through
direct transfers of knowledge and technology between linked ﬁrms. Importantly, they
disentangle the spillovers through direct linkages, real technology transfers and other
indirect eﬀects. Their results conﬁrm the importance of vertical linkages versus horizontal
linkages with regard to spillover eﬀects. More speciﬁcally, considering only direct linkages,
they ﬁnd that domestic ﬁrms experience positive productivity spillovers through their
direct linkages with upstream FDI suppliers of inputs.
Complementing the existing literature, this paper proposes a simple though intriguing
approach to evaluate localised spillover eﬀects. We use the available detailed information
on the location of foreign and domestic ﬁrms to evaluate how foreign investment in the
surrounding area of domestic ﬁrms impacts on their performance.
4.3 Foreign Direct Investment in Vietnam
Since the Doi Moi (Renovation) in 1986, Vietnam's development policy has sought to
promote high economic growth, macroeconomic stability and international integration
(Nguyen et al., 2006; UNIDO, 2011). Since the introduction of a new Law on Foreign
Investment in 1987 with amendments in 1990, 1992, 1996, 2000, and 2005, Vietnam was
10Their paper only considers the sample of ﬁrms in Vietnam (2002-2007) that includes registered ﬁrms
with more than 30 employees. The data records information on ﬁrms in 4'325 wards (communes) and
631 districts in 2007.
Chapter 4 119
constantly expediting foreign direct investment in order to strengthen capital formation
and know-how transfer from more advanced economies through foreign ﬁrms.11 In the
earlier periods of opening up the country between 1988 and 2001, foreign investors were
compelled to form joint-ventures with domestic ﬁrms, while after 2001 investments in the
form of wholly foreign owned enterprises became more important (UNIDO, 2011). In
2005, the Law on Foreign Investment and the Law on Domestic Investment were uniﬁed
into one common Investment Law that in combination with the uniﬁed Enterprise Law
balanced the rights and treatment between domestic and foreign investors. Importantly,
the 2005 Investment Law and 2005 Enterprise Law decentralised the control of investment
license and business registration to provincial-level authorities.
Subsequently, in January 2007, Vietnam made another important step towards re-
markable international economic integration by acceding the World Trade Organization
(WTO) that brought a further push to foreign investment and eventually resulted in
registered USD 198 billion in foreign capital in 2011 (UNIDO, 2011). Foreign direct in-
vestment is concentrated mostly in the manufacturing and real estate sectors, accounting
for 77 percent of total registered capital in foreign invested projects in 2011 (UNIDO,
2011). Manufacturing alone accounts for 58 % of all projects. The share of exports car-
ried out by foreign invested ﬁrms jumped from 47 % to 57.2 % in 2007, then slightly
decreasing to 54.2 % in 2010.
Table 4.1: Description of Foreign Firms in Process Manufacturing Sec-
tors, Vietnam (20052010)
Year Number ∆ (%)
Share of foreign invested ﬁrms (%)
Total output Total labor Total ﬁrms
2005 2654 14.10 43.51 36.35 11.05
2006 3032 14.24 46.01 39.38 11.29
2007 3516 15.96 45.23 41.41 11.32
2008 3958 12.57 44.42 42.77 10.31
2009 4353 9.98 41.66 42.64 9.74
2010 4587 5.38 44.47 44.73 9.80
Notes: Authors' compilation using the data drawn from the Vietnamese Enterprise Survey (20042010).
The column Number" is the number of foreign invested ﬁrms. The column ∆(%) is the percentage change
in number of FIEs. The column "Share" is the Share of FIEs in Total Manufacturing ﬁrms' Total out,
Total labor, and Total number.
From 2005 to 2010, Vietnam attracted almost 2000 foreign invested ﬁrms (net increase)
in the process manufacturing sectors. The international ﬁnancial and economic crisis in
2007 and 2008 probably led many foreign companies to leave the country resulting in a
very dynamic pattern of foreign investment during these years. Table 4.1 indicates that
11For a detailed discussion see e.g. Nguyen et al. (2006).
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the increase in percent of number of foreign ﬁrms was 12.57% in 2008, then went down
to merely 5.38% in 2010 while the number ranged from 14 to 16% in years before 2008.
Nevertheless, the crucial role of foreign invested ﬁrms in the process manufacturing
sectors of Vietnam were still maintained with their signiﬁcant shares in total output and
job creation (table 4.1). From 2005 to 2010, the output share of foreign ﬁrms was in the
range of 41 to 46%, and hence rather stable over time. The number of workers employed
by foreign manufacturers augmented from 36% in the year 2005 to almost 45% percent
in the year 2010. This highlights the growing foreign presence in the labor market, where
potential spillover channels are at play.
Figure 4.2 presents two maps with the regional allocation of foreign invested ﬁrms in
the years 2005 and 2010 at the district level. It gives a clear indication of the dispersion
of foreign presence across provinces. While in the year 2005 most of the foreign ﬁrms were
located in the economic core areas around Hanoi Capital and Ho Chi Minh City, foreign
activity moved more into suburban and rural areas over time up to 2010. This change in
the regional distribution is possibly due to the more favourable investment environment
mentioned above, for instance, the simpler licensing process and the more decentralised
authority control at provincial level. Figure B.1 in the appendix presents two similar
maps using the share of revenue accruing to foreign ﬁrms in each district in the years
2005 and 2010. Figure B.2 in the appendix shows the same pattern for the labor force
working for foreign invested ﬁrms.
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Figure 4.2: Shares in Number of Foreign Invested Firms by District in Vietnam 2005
& 2010
(a) 2005
0 70 140 210 28035 KilometersÜ
0.01 - 1 %
1.01 - 2 %
2.01 - 5 %
> 5 %
Provincial Border
(b) 2010
0 70 140 210 28035 KilometersÜ
0.01 - 1 %
1.01 - 2 %
2.01 - 5 %
> 5 %Provincial Border
Notes: Share of foreign invested ﬁrms per province is equal to the number of foreign invested ﬁrms in the province over the total number
of ﬁrms. The maps are based on authors' calculations using the Vietnam Enterprise Survey 2005 & 2010. Administrative boundaries
are based on Global Administrative Areas data (www.gadm.org). Several Vietnamese islands (e.g. Hoang Sa and Truong Sa) are not
displayed due to the limitation of the GADM administrative boundaries data.
4.4 Data Description
This section gives a brief overview over the Vietnamese ﬁrm level data used (section
4.4.1) and explains in more detail the process of geo-referencing ﬁrms using the lowest
Vietnamese administrative units (section 4.4.2).12
4.4.1 Firm Level Data
To investigate the relevance of proximity for FDI spillovers in Vietnam, we use ﬁrm level
data of process manufacturing industries in Vietnam drawn from the Vietnam Enterprise
12See Nguyen (2016) for a detailed description of the Vietnamese manufacturing ﬁrm-level dataset
from 20002010. See also Ha and Kiyota (2014) and Newman et al. (2015) for the descriptions of similar
datasets respectively in the time frames from 20002009 and from 20092012.
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Survey for six consecutive years (20052010).13 The survey is a rich ﬁrm level database
reporting yearly information on the legally registered enterprises that were in operation on
the 31st of December each year. The data provides information about the establishment
year, the location (at province, district, and ward level), the revenue, the proﬁt before
taxes, the total cost, the total wages, the number of workers, and the value of net ﬁxed
assets of each ﬁrm. The information on foreign investment is a dummy variable that is
0 for ﬁrms with no foreign investment and 1 for ﬁrms that are partly or fully foreign
invested. Every ﬁrm in the data features a unique identiﬁcation number and is compiled
in an unbalanced panel over six years.
In order to exploit the location speciﬁc information of ﬁrms in the survey to examine
spillovers at the local level, the ﬁrm level data is merged with the ward level administra-
tive boundary data retrieved from the Global Administrative Areas database (GADM)14,
and combined with the national input-output table of Vietnam (2007) assembled by the
Vietnam General Statistics Oﬃce.15 Industry codes in the ﬁrm level data are speciﬁed by
the 2-digit and 4-digit Vietnamese Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation 1993 (VSIC 1993)16.
To merge the ﬁrm-level data with the input-output table, we convert the 4-digit VSIC
1993 in the ﬁrm-level data to the 2-digit industrial classiﬁcations of the input-output table
using the concordance table provided by the GSO. After merging the ﬁrm-level data with
the input-output table, only ﬁrms in industries considered in the input-output data are
included. It is assumed that the cost coeﬃcients in the input-output table do not change
over the studied periods.17
The yearly number of ﬁrms in each industry is presented in Table B.2. The resulting
panel is unbalanced including 67'275 ﬁrms. Table B.2 in the appendix shows the number
of ﬁrms in each industry.
13The census is annually conducted by the Vietnam General Statistics Oﬃce (GSO; www.gso.gov.vn)
since 2000 till the current year. The data is published at an aggregated level in the Statistical Yearbook
of Vietnam. We restrict our analysis to the years 2005 to 2010 because the new Law on Investment was
introduced in Vietnam in 2005, and came into eﬀects in 2006. Dataset after 2010 is not available to us.
We would like to thank Pham Hanh at the Middlesex University (UK) for sharing the raw data with us,
and Doan Thi Thanh Ha and Doan Hung at the Foreign Trade University (Vietnam) for discussing and
sharing related documents.
14GIS shapeﬁles of administrative boundaries for Vietnam are available at www.gadm.org.
15The input-output table is available at:
http://www.gso.gov.vn/default.aspx?tabid=512&idmid=5&ItemID=10752.
16VSIC 1993 is provided by the GSO, and is similar to the International Standard Industrial Classi-
ﬁcation (ISIC Rev.3) provided by the United Nations. We use only the sample of industries for which
2-digits industry classiﬁcation ranges from 15 to 37.
17This assumption follows Javorcik (2004).
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4.4.2 Information on Firms' Location
To the best of our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to geo-reference the lowest administrative
unit of the Vietnamese governing system in the Vietnam Enterprise Survey.18 Vietnam
comprises more than 11'000 wards (communes). Since the Vietnam Enterprise Survey
provides information on the province, the district, and the ward for each ﬁrm since 2005,
we are able to geo-locate all of the 67'000 ﬁrms in our data set to their respective wards.19
The geographical scope of Vietnamese wards is remarkably small-scale. If we sum-
marise the spatial dimensions of wards with at least one manufacturing ﬁrm domiciled,
the median size is 7.94 km2, while the mean size is 17.55 km2 with a standard deviation
of 34.78. Looking at the whole sample of ﬁrms and weighting the extent of wards by the
number of ﬁrms based within, we receive a median size of just 3.99 km2, and a mean of
8.21 km2 with a standard deviation of 16.79. This is equal to a circle of radius 1.12 km2.
These numbers convey the geographic speciﬁcs at which we can perform the analysis and
highlight the exceptionally small spatial scale used.
For each ward we determine the dyad wards within a certain radius and are thus able
to calculate distances between ﬁrms with high accuracy.20 This enables us to model the
entire agglomeration of ﬁrms and to calculate industry speciﬁc statistics at various spatial
dimensions for each ﬁrm in the data set.
4.5 Total Factor Productivity Estimation
Our empirical strategy consists of two steps that are prevalently applied in the spillover
literature (see e.g. Combes and Gobillon, 2015, Newman et al., 2015, Anwar and Nguyen,
2014, and Barrios et al., 2012). In the ﬁrst step discussed in this section, we estimate
a production function within each industry and use the parameters estimated to impute
18In order to map the ward information in the Vietnam Enterprise Survey on the Global Administrative
Areas boundary shapeﬁles, we used the geocode command in Stata and mapped the wards according to
the information on province, district, and ward. We then manually checked all 11'043 wards in ArcGIS
for the correct geolocation. As the position of a ward we use the geographic centroid. For wards that
were not located automatically by the geocode command, we extracted the coordinates by the use of
Google Maps (http://maps.google.com).
19The survey data of manufacturing sectors records 5'662 unique codes of wards, 664 unique codes of
districts, and 63 unique codes of provinces. These administrative units incorporate at least one observa-
tion, resulting in about 5'300 wards with no registered manufacturing ﬁrm in operation.
20Since we cannot determine the exact location of ﬁrms within wards, we assume that they are all
located at the geographical centroid of each ward. For ﬁrm dyads within wards we determine a minimal
distance below 2km. Some studies randomly allocate ﬁrms within an administrative unit (e.g. Barrios
et al., 2012). We abstain from this procedure since Vietnamese wards are suﬃciently small units, and
due to limited computing power.
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ﬁrm level productivity. We then proceed to the second step of estimating spillover eﬀects
with a pronounced focus on spatial proximity between ﬁrms in the subsequent section.
4.5.1 TFP Estimation Methodology
We compute the ﬁrm-level productivity from the estimation of parameters in industry
speciﬁc production functions as proposed and documented by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)
and Petrin et al. (2004), which are extensions of the Olley and Pakes (1996) methodology.
More technical details on the methodological framework are explained in the Appendix
4.A.
One important problem with ﬁrm-level productivity estimation is data related. Miss-
ing or non-positive values of investment ﬂow reported in or imputed from micro data is a
prevalent challenge in manufacturing ﬁrm data (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003). The issue
of lumpy investments is simply due to the typical high ﬁxed cost in manufacturing sectors
(i.e. start-up expenditures for machines and infrastructure) and does not allow for the
inversion of the investment demand as the function of unobserved productivity. Firms in
these sectors tend to invest large amounts of capital for expensive ﬁxed assets when start-
ing their business, but then delay the investment in the next year while the capital stock
continues to depreciate. A feasible solution is to use intermediate inputs (materials and
services) instead, which are demanded yearly, and can be observed or calculated from the
information available in our data (see the description in Table A.1). Modifying the model
of Olley and Pakes (1996) that uses investment as the proxy for unobserved productivity,
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) suggest to use the observed yearly smooth demand of the
intermediate inputs as an alternative proxy.
We apply the method of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and Petrin et al. (2004) to
estimate the coeﬃcients of the production function and impute them to calculate ﬁrm
level productivity, as it provides several advantages over ordinary least square, ﬁxed eﬀects
and instrumental variables estimation (Van Beveren, 2012). First, the framework solves
for simultaneity issues, and produces a consistent estimator.21 Second, the data required
for intermediate input used as the proxy for unobserved productivity ﬁts well with our
data set, as discussed above.22 Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) apply the approximation
21Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) show in detail the advantages of the method over OLS and FE methods.
22The method of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and Petrin et al. (2004) has been widely applied in
the literature. For a review of applications in international trade, see e.g. Feenstra (2015); a review of
applications in research of agglomeration eﬀects is provided in Combes and Gobillon (2015); Caliendo
et al. (2015) shows the similarity of TFP calculations by the method of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003),
Olley and Pakes (1996) and others; a very recent application of the method is conducted by Poczter
(2016) who uses electricity consumption as a proxy for unobserved productivity.
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in the third order polynomials for the unknown form of productivity shocks. Olley and
Pakes (1996) note that either third or fourth polynomials show identical result in their
estimations. Assumptions about the timing of the intermediate input choice may be
applied to prevent the multi-collinearity of inputs (Ackerberg et al., 2006). We check the
multicollinearity among inputs and non-parametric productivity in the actual data and
the results reject the hypothesis of Ackerberg et al. (2006).
4.5.2 Results of TFP Estimation
The estimation results of total factor productivity are shown in Table 4.2 in logarithmic
form. The results reveal that the mean value of log(TFP) is higher in foreign ﬁrms
than domestic ﬁrms, hence foreign ﬁrms feature higher productivity than domestic ﬁrms.
Additionally, annual growth in TFP diﬀers between foreign and domestic ﬁrms: while
domestic ﬁrms' productivity grew by just 1.4 percent, it was 3.3 percent among foreign
ﬁrms.
Table 4.2: Summary of Covariates and Estimated Total Factor Productivity
Variables Domestics Firms Foreign Invested Firms All Observations Unit
N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD
Value Added 156922 4815 64628 20035 35271 172258 176957 8264 84596 Million VND
Capital Stock 158145 8842 183939 20127 71070 341877 178272 15868 208799 Million VND
No. of Workers 163214 71 285 20255 452 1596 183469 113 606 Workers
Material Inputs 150924 25104 364197 18904 159615 779192 169828 40077 432717 Million VND
Log(TFP) 150301 8.344 2.017 19541 9.369 2.054 169842 8.462 2.048
Growth in TFP 88,150 .014 .803 14398 .033 .822 102548 .017 .806 %
Notes: Authors' compilation and estimation using data drawn the Vietnam Enterprise Survey 20052010. Variables (except
for estimated log(TFP)) are in nominal values.
For further investigation of the diﬀerence between foreign and domestic ﬁrms' total
factor productivity distributions, Kernel densities of log(TFP) by year and by ﬁrms'
ownership are presented in Figure 4.3. The ﬁgure reveals that for all the years from 2005
through 2010 foreign ﬁrms' productivity distribution was consistently shifted towards the
right tail, hence higher productivity levels, compared to their domestic counterparts. The
mean in log(TFP) (average over all years in Table 4.2) was also consistently higher in all
years for foreign ﬁrms compared to domestic ﬁrms. While the mean of domestic ﬁrm's
log(TFP) is steadily increasing over time from 8.1 to 8.3, the foreign ﬁrms' productivity
does not show a steady increase over time (not shown in the ﬁgure). This trend might
indicate a TFP catch-up of domestic ﬁrm towards foreign ﬁrms in our study period.
Figure 4.3 supports the notion that foreign ﬁrms are more productive so that technology
and knowledge are more likely to spill over from foreign to domestic ﬁrms. In the following
part, we explore the causal link between the temporal variation of the presence of foreign
ﬁrms in proximity of domestic ﬁrms and domestic ﬁrms' subsequent TFP growth.
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4.6 Localised FDI Spillover Eﬀects: Identiﬁcation Strat-
egy and Results
In this section, we present our identiﬁcation strategy for FDI spillover eﬀects and the
main results. The identiﬁcation strategy isolates spillover eﬀects of foreign investment on
the local manufacturing ﬁrms. We apply a 2-stage-least-squares regression at the ﬁrm
level utilising time variation in the presence of foreign investment in the near surrounding
of each domestic ﬁrm, and control for possible confounders that may inﬂuence both the
location of foreign investment and domestic ﬁrms' productivity growth. In section 4.6.2 we
present a series of results focusing on within industry spillovers. We then disentangle the
heterogeneity in eﬀects according to ﬁrm size, productivity levels and the productivity gap
of local ﬁrms to the foreign ﬁrms. Spillover eﬀects working through the supply chain, called
vertical linkages, are discussed in a separate section 4.6.6. Robustness checks conﬁrm the
main results.
4.6.1 Baseline Speciﬁcation
Our baseline speciﬁcation presents a causal estimation of the eﬀect of foreign direct in-
vestment on total factor productivity growth of domestic ﬁrms in Vietnam. We presume
that the inﬂuence of a foreign ﬁrm on a domestic ﬁrm is constraint to a geographic space
around each local ﬁrm. We assess whether the change in presence of foreign invested
ﬁrms within a speciﬁc perimeter of a domestic ﬁrm i in year t has a positive (or negative)
spillover eﬀect on the local ﬁrm's productivity. By varying the spatial extent of the radius
around each ﬁrm  2km, 5km, 10km, 20km, and 50km , we investigate the intensity of
spillovers with regard to geographical proximity. The inquiry of location speciﬁc spillovers
eﬀects restricted to a given radius around each ﬁrm i is similarly applied by e.g. Rosen-
thal and Strange (2008) on human capital spillovers in the US, Halpern and Muraközy
(2007) on horizontal and vertical spillovers in Hungary, and Barrios et al. (2012) on R&D
spillovers in Ireland.23
The most simple assessment of within industry FDI spillover eﬀects on productivity
of domestic ﬁrms is to estimate the following speciﬁcation by ordinary least squares:
23Classiﬁcations of radii by Barrios et al. (2012) are 10km, 20km, 50km, 100km, 200km, and 300 km,
respectively. In our study, the maximum radius for which we present results is 50km. Due to the peculiar
shape of Vietnam, the support of the data gets unreliable beyond 50km.
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log(TFPik,t) = αi + δlog(FDI
RD
ik,t ) + βlog(X
RD
ik,t ) + ϕHHIk,t + εik,t (4.1)
where the dependent variable is the logarithm of TFPik,t of domestic ﬁrm i in industry k
at time t. The variable of interest is measuring the presence of foreign ﬁrms of the same
industry k in a circle of radius RD around each domestic ﬁrm i, denominated FDIRDik,t . We
measure the presence of foreign invested ﬁrms either by the number or the total output
of ﬁrms within a circle. In order to interpret the estimated coeﬃcient as elasticity of
foreign direct investment on a local ﬁrm's productivity, we use the logarithm of FDIik,t.
ai is a ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect. X
RD
ik,t is a vector of time varying control variables in logarithms
measured for each ﬁrm within a circle of radius RD. It includes the local presence of
domestic ﬁrms in the same industry k, the presence of foreign ﬁrms in all other industries,
and the presence of domestic ﬁrms in all other industries. We hence control for all possible
agglomeration economies and spillovers that are not attributable to foreign ﬁrms of the
same industry. Furthermore, it also contains a variable that measures the size of the labor
market, summing up the number of employees within the circle of radius RD. HHIk,t is
an indicator for the concentration of an industry, the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index. εik,t
is a an error term.
The above speciﬁcation has one important caveat. According to Olley and Pakes
(1996), total factor productivity follows the Markov rule: its current value depends on its
past and hence forms an autocorrelation process. Therefore, a simple OLS estimation of
the coeﬃcients in the speciﬁcation above omits one crucial variable, the lagged dependent
variable (LDV) of total factor productivity.24 In the existing literature on spillovers from
foreign investment, this Markov process in total factor productivity is often ignored, as e.g.
in Barrios et al. (2012) or Anwar and Nguyen (2014). Incorporating the LDV accounts for
the AR(1) structure in the data generating process of dynamic total factor productivity
at the ﬁrm level.
Including the LDV log(TFPik,t−1) in a panel ﬁxed eﬀect estimation with a short time
dimension yields, however, a downward bias (Nickell, 1981). By construction, the LDV
correlates with the error term. In order to solve this estimation issue, we propose two
steps following Anderson and Hsiao (1981). First, we estimate the speciﬁcation in ﬁrst
diﬀerences, which eliminates the unobserved ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect. Moreover we can get rid of
the persistent characteristic of the log(TFP) and reduce the problem of serial correlation.
Second, we use ln(TFPik,t−2) as an internal instrument for 4ln(TFPik,t−1) and estimate
24E.g. Khandelwal and Topalova (2011) also raise similar concerns when estimating the impact of trade
liberalisation on ﬁrm productivity.
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the speciﬁcation by 2-stage-least-squares. Obviously, the following conditions need to
hold to consistently estimate this instrumental variable approach:
E[4ln(TFPik,t−1)|ln(TFPik,t−2)] 6= 0 (4.2)
and
E[4εik,t|ln(TFPik,t−2)] = 0 (4.3)
The enhanced speciﬁcation in ﬁrst diﬀerences, our baseline speciﬁcation, hence is:
4log(TFPik,t) = ρ4log(TFPik,t−1) + δ4log(FDIRDik,t ) (4.4)
+β4log(XRDik,t ) + ϕ4HHIk,t
+4φt +4ηp × φt +4εik,t
where we added time ﬁxed eﬀects, province ﬁxed eﬀects and time-province ﬁxed eﬀects. In-
dustrial policy regulations are mostly determined at the national or provincial government
level. By including province-time ﬁxed eﬀects ρ × φt, we take account of the regulatory
environment that may change year on year, and regional business cycles. General annual
shocks are absorbed by the time ﬁxed eﬀect φt. Naturally, to obtain a consistent estima-
tion in equation 4.4, the control variables from the equation also need to be orthogonal
to the error term 4εik,t.
Our identiﬁcation assumption with regard to the main regressor of interest4log(FDIRDik,t )
is that a single domestic ﬁrm is not decisive for the location choice of foreign invested
ﬁrms. In other words, we assume that the yearly change of a single domestic ﬁrm's TFP
is not aﬀecting the change in foreign presence in the surrounding area of a ﬁrm. We
argue that the problem of endogeneity is unlikely, since it is not possible for a foreign ﬁrm
to observe the yearly change in a domestic ﬁrm's productivity (our dependent variable),
and for that reason to select a speciﬁc location. Speciﬁcally, our assumption is that the
change in productivity is only observed by the ﬁrm itself but not by other ﬁrms. When
making investment decisions, foreign ﬁrms can investigate the general conditions of the
location. The location choice ﬁrst of all depends on local production conditions such as
the local labour market, access to transportation infrastructure, and proximity to forward
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and backward linked industries. Further discussion about this issue is presented in Section
4.6.3.
Since there is no possibility to run a random experiment by assigning location choices
to foreign ﬁrms and see how it aﬀects TFP of domestic incumbent ﬁrms, we need to
determine the factors that are correlated with the location choice of foreign ﬁrms and
at the same time inﬂuence TFP of the domestic ﬁrms. By including likely confounding
variables, we address these concerns. We control for the change in the presence of other
domestic ﬁrms, foreign ﬁrms of all other industries, and the size of labor market. We are
thus able to adjust our coeﬃcient estimates for the attractiveness of a speciﬁc location
for foreign investment. Furthermore, we present a placebo test in our baseline speciﬁca-
tion by including the lead of our variable measuring foreign investment within the close
surrounding of domestic ﬁrms. If there was a selection problem in our speciﬁcation, then
change in productivity should already be higher before foreign ﬁrms enter the location,
hence show up in the lead, the year before foreign investment takes place. An additional
potential confounding factor could be the development of local infrastructure that may
both attract foreign investment and improve a local ﬁrm's productivity. One may think of
new roads or improved internet access that makes an area more attractive for investment.
While the province time ﬁxed eﬀect should absorb large scale changes in accessibility,
changes in local infrastructure is hard to capture. In order to dispel such concerns, we
provide a variant of the basic speciﬁcation using ward time ﬁxed eﬀects.
4.6.2 Baseline Results
This section presents the results of our estimation of local spillover eﬀects of foreign direct
investment on domestic ﬁrms' productivity. The section is organised so as to cover various
aspects of spillover eﬀects discussed in the literature.
Table 4.3 presents our baseline estimations, by building up step by step our preferred
speciﬁcation. In these ﬁrst series of regressions we consistently use the number of foreign
ﬁrms in the vicinity of a domestic ﬁrm as underlying measure for our main explanatory
variable. To construct it, we simply count the number of foreign ﬁrms of the same
industry as the domestic ﬁrm within a circle of radius RD. Since we are estimating our
speciﬁcation in log diﬀerences, we can interpret this variable as growth rate in the presence
of foreign ﬁrms within a certain area. We are convinced that the number of ﬁrms, while
not containing any information on the size of ﬁrms, is a good indicator of the presence of
foreign ﬁrms, because it is a rather neutral measure. A priori, one does not really know
whether a few large ﬁrms convey more spillovers than a large number of small ﬁrms.
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Panel A presents an ordinary least squares regression of the log of total factor pro-
ductivity of domestic ﬁrms on the log of the number of foreign invested ﬁrms in the same
industry in ﬁrst diﬀerences, leaving aside any controls. Two important points are revealed.
First, these raw results  while by ﬁrst diﬀerencing is corrected for the unobserved ﬁrm
ﬁxed eﬀect  show that there is a signiﬁcant positive correlation between TFP growth of
domestic ﬁrms and the change in the presence of foreign ﬁrms in the close surroundings
of these domestic ﬁrms. Second, the relationship is strongest for circles with radii of 2
to 10 kilometres, and there seems also to be a clear decaying pattern of spillovers with
increasing distance beyond 5 kilometres.
In panel B we add the control variables, accounting for agglomeration forces and factors
inﬂuencing the location choice of foreign ﬁrms. The estimated coeﬃcients slightly decrease
in size, while keeping the decaying pattern and their signiﬁcance. Panel C instruments the
lagged dependent variable by the internal instrument ln(TFPik,t−2). Estimated with a 2-
stage-least-squares procedure it corresponds to the Anderson-Hsiao estimator (Anderson
and Hsiao, 1981) and is our preferred speciﬁcation.25 The estimated coeﬃcients are, again,
highly signiﬁcant and still show the pattern of strong within industry localised spillover
eﬀects, and the weakening of spillovers beyond 5 to 10 kilometres. The coeﬃcients are
only signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero up to a circle with a radius 20 kilometres. While the
eﬀect within a circle of 5 kilometres is substantial at almost 0.3 percentage points higher
growth in TFP by an additional percent in the number of foreign ﬁrms.
Panel C additionally presents the results for the four most relevant control variables.
Remarkably, foreign invested ﬁrms other than those of the same industry do not have
positive impact on the local economy. In contrast, having more foreign ﬁrms close by
does have a signiﬁcantly negative impact on TFP growth of domestic ﬁrms. Yet the eﬀect
is much smaller and is more than compensated by the positive eﬀect of within industry
foreign investment. This interesting results proposes that foreign ﬁrms absorb resources
when settling into an area. In case the foreign ﬁrm is from a diﬀerent industry there are no
positive spillovers and only the negative impact on domestic ﬁrms' TFP remains. Other
domestic ﬁrms do not show spillover eﬀects, both within and across industries. Although
we should be able to detect agglomeration spillovers, this restrictive estimation seems to
absorb them.
The lagged dependent variable 4Log(TFPi,t−1) is strongly aﬀecting current TFP
25Adding further lags as instruments for the lagged dependent variable in diﬀerences in a GMM frame-
work would increase eﬃciency. However, due to the unbalanced structure of our data, adding further
lags results in losing numerous observations. Since our ﬁrst stage estimation conﬁrms the strength of
the instrument, we stick with the simple version with only one lag. We checked the results using GMM,
but the loss in observations due to using additional lags is actually worse than the increase in eﬃciency.
Results are available on request.
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Table 4.3: Number of FDI Firms and TFP Growth of Domestic Firms, Baseline Results
Dep. Var.: 4Log(TFPik,t) Circle Radius
2km 5km 10km 20km 50km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Ordinary Least Squares without controls
4 Log No. of FDI ﬁrms within industry 0.276∗ 0.296∗∗ 0.267∗ 0.234∗ 0.188+
(0.106) (0.100) (0.102) (0.101) (0.098)
R2 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07
Observations 88150 88150 88150 88150 88150
Panel B: Ordinary Least Squares with controls
4 Log No. of FDI ﬁrms within industry 0.246∗∗ 0.273∗∗ 0.247∗∗ 0.217∗ 0.165+
(0.089) (0.085) (0.087) (0.090) (0.086)
R2 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07
Observations 88150 88150 88150 88150 88150
Panel C: 2SLS, Instrumented Lagged Dependent Variable
4 Log No. of FDI ﬁrms within industry 0.248∗ 0.297∗∗ 0.287∗ 0.215+ 0.154
(0.101) (0.101) (0.108) (0.108) (0.100)
4 Log No. of FDI ﬁrms in other industries =0.101∗∗=0.079∗ =0.032 =0.041 =0.072∗
(0.031) (0.036) (0.036) (0.031) (0.032)
4 Log No. of dom. ﬁrms within industry 0.037 0.002 =0.018 =0.005 =0.003
(0.051) (0.052) (0.060) (0.076) (0.101)
4 Log No. of dom. ﬁrms in other industries 0.000 0.026 0.013 0.042 0.041
(0.021) (0.019) (0.027) (0.037) (0.044)
4Log(TFPi,t−1) 0.531∗∗∗ 0.523∗∗∗ 0.523∗∗∗ 0.529∗∗∗ 0.533∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Observations 52461 52461 52461 52461 52461
First Stage F-statistic 965.82 916.38 879.93 891.04 903.15
Panel D: Placebo Test, Lead of Change in Foreign Firms
Lead 4 Log No. of FDI ﬁrms 0.003 0.002 =0.011 0.002 0.024
(0.024) (0.030) (0.027) (0.024) (0.022)
4Log(TFPi,t−1) 0.443∗∗∗ 0.442∗∗∗ 0.441∗∗∗ 0.442∗∗∗ 0.443∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055)
Observations 31162 31162 31162 31162 31162
First Stage F-statistic 474.91 473.66 470.79 470.97 473.01
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province-Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent Variable is annual TFP growth, deﬁned as log(TFPik,t)− log(TFPik,t−1). Our main explanatory variable is 4 Log
No. of FDI ﬁrms, deﬁned as the annual change of the log of number of foreign invested ﬁrms within a circle of radius RD. Estimations
include a lagged dependent variable 4log(TFPi,t−1) that is instrumented with its lagged value in levels log(TFPik,t−2). The control
variables (Panels B, C, and D) are measured for each ﬁrm within a circle of radius RD over time, and calculated as annual change in
logarithms. They include the number of domestic ﬁrms in the same industry k, the number of foreign ﬁrms in all other manufacturing
industries, the number of domestic ﬁrms in all other manufacturing industries, and the labor force (total number of workers) of all
manufacturing industries. Further included is the annual change of the Herﬁndahl-Index at the industry level. All estimations include
time ﬁxed eﬀects, province-time ﬁxed eﬀects, and industry ﬁxed eﬀects. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the
industry level. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001.
growth, supporting our concern of a dynamic autocorrelation process in our dependent
variable. The high value of the ﬁrst stage F-test suggests that the internal instrument is
working well.
Panel D presents a placebo test. Instead of the contemporaneous value of FDI, its
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lead 4log(NOF TFPik,t+1) is included as main regressor. There seems to be no selection
problem in the sense that foreign ﬁrms move to places where TFP growth of domestic
ﬁrms is high in the previous year. This placebo test aﬃrms our well speciﬁed estimation
procedure.
To illustrate the pattern of spillover eﬀects, Figure 4.4 depicts a local polynomial re-
gression of the residual in TFP growth of domestic ﬁrms on their distance to entering
foreign invested ﬁrms. The residual is based on a regression of TFP growth on industry
ﬁxed eﬀects, interaction between time and province dummies, and time ﬁxed eﬀects in
order to account for the location speciﬁc factors that inﬂuence TFP growth. The ﬁg-
ure impressively depicts the spillover eﬀects that attenuate with increasing distance. It
resembles our baseline results in Table 4.3. The decay in spillovers is very regular and
approaches zero at larger distances beyond 30 kilometres.
Figure 4.4: Entering Foreign Invested Firms and Domestic TFP Growth
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Notes: The ﬁgure presents a kernel-weighted local polynomial regression of domestic ﬁrm level TFP growth on the distance to entering
foreign invested ﬁrms. In gray is a 95% level conﬁdence band. Each observation in the regression is a domestic ﬁrmforeign ﬁrm dyad.
The residual is based on a regression of TFP growth on industry ﬁxed eﬀects, time-province ﬁxed eﬀects, and time ﬁxed eﬀects. The local
polynomial uses an Epanechnikov kernel of degree 0, a bandwidth of 2.96, and pilot bandwidth for calculating the standard errors of 4.44.
Table 4.4 presents the exactly same series of regressions, though using total revenue
of foreign ﬁrms as the underlying measurement of foreign direct investment. The overall
pattern in the results is highly similar. However, estimated spillover eﬀects are weaker
and limited to a circle size of radius 5 kilometres. A one percent increase in the change of
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presence of foreign ﬁrms measured by their revenue within a 5 kilometre radius translates
into an increase in TFP growth of 0.015 percentage points.
Drawing a preliminary conclusion from our main results, within industry or horizontal
spillover eﬀects of foreign direct invested ﬁrms seem to be a distinctly local phenomenon.
They only occur within limited spatial scope, quickly fading out beyond 5 to 10 kilome-
tres. These results may suggest why most studies that analyse within industry foreign
investment spillovers do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant results, as e.g. Newman et al., 2015 for the
case of Vietnam: their data simply does not allow them to detect such localised horizontal
spillover eﬀects.
4.6.3 Does Domestic Firm Size Matter for Spillover Eﬀects?
In this subsection we provide more evidence on the heterogeneity of eﬀects with respect
to ﬁrm size of local establishments. Table 4.5 presents the results with regard to size
of domestic ﬁrms measured by the number of workers. The regressions are also based
on our baseline speciﬁcation in ﬁrst diﬀerences and instrumenting the lagged dependent
variable. The whole sample of domestic ﬁrms is divided into three brackets according to
the deﬁnition of ﬁrm size by the Vietnamese Statistical Oﬃce: micro ﬁrms with up to 10
workers, small ﬁrms have between 10 and 200 workers, and medium and large ﬁrms have
more than 200 workers.26
Remarkably, micro ﬁrms seem to especially beneﬁt from the presence of foreign ﬁrms
in close proximity: Firms with less than 10 employees exhibit the largest coeﬃcients at
0.4 percentage points additional growth in TFP as they are exposed to an additional one
percent of foreign ﬁrms within 5 kilometres (panel A). Again, one observes a distinct decay
of spillovers beyond a 5 kilometre radius. In panel B, the eﬀects are similar although
somewhat smaller for ﬁrms with 11 to 200 workers employed. For this group of small
ﬁrms, spillover eﬀects are strongest within 10 kilometres, restricted to a circle radius of
20 kilometres, and they fade out with increasing distance.
The group of medium and large ﬁrms is the smallest bracket as there are about 6'000
such ﬁrms in our sample. Also for the medium and large ﬁrms, the pattern of spillover
eﬀects is localised, aﬃrming the robustness in spillover pattern. The eﬀects are slightly
increasing up to 10 kilometres, and fading out thereafter. Yet, the eﬀect is only signiﬁcant
within a distance of 5 kilometres, at the 10 percent level. The estimated size of the spillover
eﬀect appears to be smaller for these large ﬁrms than for the small ﬁrms.27
26Spillover eﬀects for medium and large ﬁrms are jointly estimated since the sample becomes small.
27A direct comparison of eﬀects is not possible based on these results since the table presents an
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Table 4.4: Total Revenue of FDI Firms and TFP Growth of Domestic Firms, Baseline
Results
Dep. Var.: 4Log(TFPik,t) Circle Radius
2km 5km 10km 20km 50km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Ordinary Least Squares without controls
4 Log Tot. Rev. of FDI ﬁrms within industry 0.018∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.014+ 0.009 0.002
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009)
R2 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Observations 88150 88150 88150 88150 88150
Panel B: Ordinary Least Squares with controls
4 Log Tot. Rev. of FDI ﬁrms within industry 0.017∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.012 0.008 0.003
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
R2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06
Observations 88150 88150 88150 88150 88150
Panel C: 2SLS, Instrumented Lagged Dependent Variable
4 Log Tot. Rev. of FDI ﬁrms within industry 0.015+ 0.017∗ 0.012 0.004 0.001
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008)
4 Log Tot. Rev. of FDI ﬁrms in other industries =0.007∗∗=0.003 0.002 =0.006+ =0.008∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
4 Log Tot. Rev. of dom. ﬁrms within industry =0.004 =0.005 0.000 =0.002 =0.023
(0.004) (0.007) (0.010) (0.013) (0.024)
4 Log Tot. Rev. of dom. ﬁrms in other industries =0.004 =0.002 =0.001 0.004 0.024
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.021)
4Log(TFPi,t−1) 0.536∗∗∗ 0.535∗∗∗ 0.537∗∗∗ 0.538∗∗∗ 0.537∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Observations 52461 52461 52461 52461 52461
First Stage F-statistic 992.34 985.62 984.51 992.89 1005.53
Panel D: Placebo Test, Lead of Change in Foreign Firms
Lead 4 Log Tot. Rev. of FDI ﬁrms within industry 0.002 0.005+ 0.003 0.000 0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
4Log(TFPi,t−1) 0.444∗∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗ 0.443∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055)
Observations 31162 31162 31162 31162 31162
First Stage F-statistic 476.74 476.47 475.40 474.97 477.90
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent Variable is annual TFP growth, deﬁned as log(TFPik,t) − log(TFPik,t−1) . Our main explanatory variable is 4 Log
Tot. Rev. of FDI ﬁrms, deﬁned as the annual change of the log of the total revenue of foreign invested ﬁrms within a circle of radius RD .
Estimations include a lagged dependent variable 4log(TFPi,t−1) that is instrumented with its lagged value in levels log(TFPik,t−2) . The
control variables (Panels B, C, and D) are measured for each ﬁrm within a circle of radius RD over time, and calculated as annual change in
logarithms. They include the sum of total revenue of all other domestic ﬁrms in the same industry k , the sum of total revenue of foreign ﬁrms
in all other manufacturing industries, the sum of total revenue of domestic ﬁrms in all other manufacturing industries, and the labor force
(total number of workers) of all manufacturing industries. Further included is the annual change of the Herﬁndahl-Index at the industry level.
All estimations include year ﬁxed eﬀects, province-year ﬁxed eﬀects, and industry ﬁxed eﬀects. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses
are clustered at the industry level. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001.
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Table 4.5: Number of FDI ﬁrms and TFP growth of Domestic Firms, Hetero-
geneity in Firm Size
Dep. Var.: 4Log(TFPik,t) Circle Radius
2km 5km 10km 20km 50km
Panel A: Micro ﬁrms: Labor force up to 10 workers
4 Log No. of FDI ﬁrms within industry 0.386∗∗ 0.410∗∗ 0.374∗∗ 0.251+ 0.165
(0.139) (0.127) (0.134) (0.141) (0.133)
Observations 14071 14071 14071 14071 14071
First Stage F-statistic 580.33 586.14 556.05 545.06 524.58
Panel B: Small ﬁrms: Labor force 11-200 workers
4 Log No. of FDI ﬁrms within industry 0.198∗ 0.255∗ 0.262∗ 0.206+ 0.147
(0.097) (0.099) (0.102) (0.105) (0.104)
Observations 32362 32362 32362 32362 32362
First Stage F-statistic 1486.18 1408.13 1351.90 1356.09 1348.06
Panel C: Medium/large ﬁrms: Labor force more than 200 workers
4 Log No. of FDI ﬁrms within industry 0.155 0.193+ 0.212 0.184 0.184
(0.101) (0.106) (0.151) (0.134) (0.120)
Observations 6004 6004 6004 6004 6004
First Stage F-statistic 210.40 209.26 209.68 208.25 209.35
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent Variable is annual TFP growth, deﬁned as log(TFP_ik, t) − log(TFP_ik, t− 1). Our main explanatory
variable is 4 Log No. of FDI ﬁrms within industry, deﬁned as the annual change of the log of number of foreign invested
ﬁrms in the same industry within a circle of radius RD . Estimations include a lagged dependent variable 4log(TFP_i, t− 1)
that is instrumented with its lagged value in levels log(TFP_ik, t− 2) . The control variables are measured for each ﬁrm within
a circle of radius RD over time, and calculated as annual change in logarithms. They include the local number of domestic ﬁrms
in the same industry k , the number of foreign ﬁrms in all other manufacturing industries, the number of domestic ﬁrms in all
other manufacturing industries, and the labor force (total number of workers) of all manufacturing industries. Further included
is the annual change of the Herﬁndahl-Index at the industry level. All estimations include time ﬁxed eﬀects, province-time ﬁxed
eﬀects, and industry ﬁxed eﬀects. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the industry level. + p<0.10, *
p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
To ﬁgure out whether this larger eﬀects for small ﬁrms actually leads to an absolute
convergence in productivity of small and large ﬁrms, it is insightful to have a closer look
at the size of eﬀects over time. The average TFP level for micro ﬁrms is around 2'600
in the year 2006, while the average for small ﬁrms with 11 to 200 workers is 4'300. The
average TFP of medium and large ﬁrms was 15'700 in 2006. An additional 10 percent in
the presence of foreign ﬁrms would increase TFP growth for micro ﬁrms by 4.1 percentage
points, which would yield a TFP level of 3'183 after ﬁve years, and hence an absolute gain
of 580. For a small ﬁrm, the same increase in the presence of foreign ﬁrms would yield
a TFP level of 5'345. The gain in TFP is 632 and slightly larger in absolute terms after
5 years. We hence cannot expect a closing gap in productivity between micro and small
ﬁrms due to the presence of foreign ﬁrms within 5 kilometres in the medium term. For
medium and large ﬁrms, a 10 percent increase in the presence of foreign ﬁrms would lead
separate estimation for each subsample.
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to an additional TFP of 1'578, an absolute increase higher than the gain for micro and
small ﬁrms. We hence conclude that the presence of foreign ﬁrms in the close surroundings
of domestic ﬁrms does not lead to an absolute convergence process in TFP levels between
micro, small and large ﬁrms in the medium run of 5 years
Overall, the analysis of spillover eﬀects for diﬀerent domestic ﬁrm sizes reveals that
micro and small ﬁrms appear to beneﬁt from foreign investment even more than medium
and large ﬁrms in relative terms. The within industry spillover eﬀects are restricted to a
small distances, both for large and small ﬁrms.
4.6.4 Does the Productivity Level of Domestic Firms Matter for
Spillovers Eﬀects?
In this section we look at the heterogeneity in eﬀects with respect to productivity levels
of domestic ﬁrms within each industry. For each industry, we divide the sample of ﬁrms
into three groups: below median productivity, third quartile of productivity, and fourth
quartile of productivity.28
The results in Table 4.6 are astounding. Relatively unproductive ﬁrms within each
industry seem to speciﬁcally beneﬁt from the presence of foreign ﬁrms in their vicinity
(panel A). Firms at the upper end of the productivity distribution, in contrast, show
less pronounced signs of spillover eﬀects. Yet the pattern of decaying spillovers is still
detectable (panel C). Domestic ﬁrms in the third quartile of the TFP distribution also
experience large and signiﬁcant spillover eﬀects, which are yet somewhat smaller (panel
B). These results indicate a convergence process in productivity levels between low and
high productivity ﬁrms. Unproductive ﬁrms indeed seem to be able to absorb know-how
from their foreign counterparts, but only if they are suﬃciently close-by.29
While one would need to look at each industry individually to see if there is absolute
convergence in productivity levels, we can still make some calculation at the average of
each group of ﬁrms. A 10 percent increase in the presence of foreign ﬁrms would lead to
an absolute growth of TFP of 604 for low productivity ﬁrms, 610 for medium productive
ﬁrms, and 812 for the productive ﬁrms over a 5 year period. While, at ﬁrst glance, these
back of the envelope calculations do not point to a quick convergence of productivity
levels, unproductive and medium productive ﬁrms may increase their productivity almost
28Instead of dividing the group into three equally large groups, we decided to separate the unproductive
lower half of ﬁrms from the third and fourth quartile. It seems more interesting to have a more pronounced
picture in the upper half of the productivity distribution.
29A direct comparison of eﬀects is not possible based on these results since the table presents an
separate estimation for each subsample.
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Table 4.6: Spillover Eﬀects for Unproductive and Productive Domestic
Firms, 2SLS estimation
Dep. Var.: 4Log(TFPik,t) Circle Radius
2km 5km 10km 20km 50km
Panel A: Unproductive Firms (below median productivity)
4 Log No. of FDI ﬁrms within
industry
0.376∗∗ 0.380∗∗ 0.323∗∗ 0.250∗ 0.172+
(0.132) (0.117) (0.115) (0.112) (0.096)
Observations 23818 23818 23818 23818 23818
First Stage F-statistic 673.31 668.06 650.32 650.39 643.13
Panel B: Medium productive ﬁrms (third quartile)
4 Log No. of FDI ﬁrms within
industry
0.216∗ 0.291∗ 0.348∗∗ 0.265∗ 0.224+
(0.098) (0.110) (0.124) (0.120) (0.113)
Observations 14232 14232 14232 14232 14232
First Stage F-statistic 498.40 493.79 499.14 497.48 503.31
Panel C: Productive ﬁrms (fourth quartile)
4 Log No. of FDI ﬁrms within
industry
0.116 0.205+ 0.198 0.134 0.077
(0.091) (0.111) (0.123) (0.132) (0.149)
Observations 14398 14398 14398 14398 14398
First Stage F-statistic 430.80 433.84 424.49 420.36 423.06
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent Variable is annual TFP growth, deﬁned as log(TFPik,t) − log(TFPik,t−1). Our main explanatory
variable is 4 Log No. of FDI ﬁrms, deﬁned as the annual change of the log of number of foreign invested ﬁrms within
a circle of radius RD. Estimations include a lagged dependent variable 4log(TFPi,t−1) that is instrumented with its
lagged value in levels log(TFPik,t−2). The control variables are measured for each ﬁrm within a circle of radius RD
over time, and calculated as annual change in logarithms. They include the local number of domestic ﬁrms in the same
industry k, the number of foreign ﬁrms in all other manufacturing industries, the number of domestic ﬁrms in all other
manufacturing industries, and the labor force (total number of workers) of all manufacturing industries. Further included
is the annual change of the Herﬁndahl-Index at the industry level. All estimations include year ﬁxed eﬀects, province-year
ﬁxed eﬀects, and industry ﬁxed eﬀects. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the industry level.
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001.
at the same rate. Furthermore, while the eﬀects for the productive quartile of ﬁrms is
large in absolute terms, the eﬀects are only marginally signiﬁcant.
4.6.5 Does the Productivity Gap between Domestic and Foreign
Firms Matter?
In this section, we speciﬁcally look at how the productivity level of foreign ﬁrms is aﬀect-
ing domestic ﬁrms' productivity of diverse productivity levels. Do domestic ﬁrms beneﬁt
more from foreign ﬁrms of similar productivity levels or from foreign ﬁrms of much higher
productivity? To answer this question, we divide the sample into groups of ﬁrms accord-
ing to their TFP level for each industry. We deﬁne three groups: below median (low
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productivity), third quartile (medium productivity), and fourth quartile (high productiv-
ity). Both domestic ﬁrms and foreign ﬁrms are divided under the same TFP distribution
for each industry. Since we want to look at the productivity gap within a certain circle
of radius RD, we cannot directly calculate a TFP gap to the foreign productivity leader
since in many cases, there are no foreign ﬁrms within a certain radius at all. The objective
of this analysis is to ﬁgure out whether the technology gap is important in determining
the size of spillover eﬀects.
We perform a series of our baseline regression while including only certain subsamples
with speciﬁc TFP levels. Figure 4.5 depicts 3x3 graphs with combinations of TFP levels
of foreign and domestic ﬁrms. The top row shows low productivity domestic ﬁrms, while
the TFP level of foreign ﬁrms increases from left to right: lower half, third quartile, and
fourth quartile. The middle row shows domestic ﬁrms with medium level (third quartile)
TFP, while, again, varying the level of foreign ﬁrms' level of TFP. And logically, the
third row shows high productivity domestic ﬁrms, with increasing levels of foreign ﬁrms'
productivity level from left to right.
Two results stand out. First, unproductive local ﬁrms (row 1) seem to beneﬁt both
from rather unproductive foreign ﬁrms, but also from very productive ﬁrms. Firms are
able to learn both from other ﬁrms in the same industry that are similar in technology
levels, but even more so from ﬁrms that are at a advanced technology level. The size in
spillover eﬀects is smallest for foreign ﬁrms with intermediate productivity levels (middle
column). The patterns is similar for medium (row 2) and highly productive (row 3)
domestic ﬁrms, although with reduced clarity. The productive domestic ﬁrms absorb the
smallest spillover eﬀects overall, and less signiﬁcantly so. Second, and more importantly,
a small productivity gap leads to a relatively lower learning ability of domestic ﬁrms,
compared to a large productivity gap. A larger productivity gap between foreign and
domestic ﬁrms within the same industry appears to facilitate the learning aptitude of
domestic ﬁrms.
What is common to all combinations of productivity levels of domestic and foreign
ﬁrms is the diminishing pattern of spillover eﬀects with increasing distance. This, again,
supports the robustness of the pattern in our baseline results. A further investigation of
the productivity gap could reveal a more clear picture of eﬀects, yet this is beyond the
scope of this paper.
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4.6.6 Localised Spillover Eﬀects Through Vertical Linkages (Man-
ufacturing and Services): Speciﬁcation and Results
Vertical linkages between foreign and domestic ﬁrms to upstream (forward linked) and
downstream (backward linked) industries are another important channel through which
spillover eﬀects may work. With regard to FDI presence in vertical linkages, spillover
eﬀects have been extensively studied by various scholars (see e.g. Javorcik, 2004, Halpern
and Muraközy, 2007, Anwar, 2011, and Newman et al., 2015). In the following, we assess
the relevance of foreign presence in forward and backward linkages, yet in our established
spatial framework, by adding these linkages to our baseline regression. Instead of just
considering vertical linkages within an industry as done in most existing studies, we
investigate vertical linkages to FDI ﬁrms in the vicinity of each domestic ﬁrms. Due
to the decentralised structure of our data, we calculate the absolute value of deﬂated
revenue produced by foreign ﬁrms in forward and backward linked industries instead of
the output share (Javorcik, 2004) or value added share (Francois and Woerz, 2008). We
enhance our baseline speciﬁcation with the vertical forward and backward linkages as
follows:
4log(TFPik,t) = ρ4log(TFPik,t−1) + δ4log(FDIRDik,t ) (4.5)
+κ14log(FWL ManuRDi,fk,t) + κ24log(BWL ManuRDi,kb,t)
+κ34log(FWL ServRDi,fk,t) + κ44log(BWL ServRDi,kb,t)
+λ4log(DOM LinksRDik,t) + β4log(XRDik,t ) + ϕ4HHIk,t
+4φt +4ηp ∗ φt +4εik,t
where we construct the four variables measuring vertical linkages to foreign ﬁrms as fol-
lows. The ﬁrst diﬀerenced vertical linkage to foreign invested manufacturing ﬁrms in
forward linked industries is deﬁned as
4log(FWL ManuRDi,fk,t) = log(
N∑
j=1
αfkTR
RD
jf,t)− log(
N∑
j=1
αfkTR
RD
jf,t−1) (4.6)
reﬂecting the annual change in the forward linked foreign manufacturing ﬁrms in industries
f within a circle of radius RD around each domestic ﬁrm i. Each dyad foreign ﬁrm j's total
revenue TR is weighted by αfk, the coeﬃcient measuring the forward link in the input-
output table. αfk measures the amount of goods supplied by forward linked industries f
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(upstream) to downstream industries k.30
The ﬁrst diﬀerenced vertical linkage to foreign invested manufacturing ﬁrms in back-
ward linked industries is deﬁned as
4log(BWL ManuRDi,kb,t) = log(
N∑
i=1
βkbTR
RD
jb,t)− log(
N∑
i=1
βkbTR
RD
jb,t−1) (4.7)
where total revenue TRjb,t of each downstream foreign ﬁrms j is weighted by βkb, mea-
suring the amount of goods supplied by upstream industry k to downstream industry
b.
The remaining two linkages to forward and backward linked service ﬁrms are calculated
identically as:
4log(FWL ServRDi,fk,t) = log(
N∑
i=1
αfkTR
RD
jf,t)− log(
N∑
i=1
αfkTR
RD
jf,t−1) (4.8)
4log(BWL ServRDi,kb,t) = log(
N∑
i=1
βkbTR
RD
jb,t)− log(
N∑
i=1
βkbTR
RD
jb,t−1) (4.9)
Speciﬁcation 4.5 also includes a set of control variables 4log(DOM LinksRDik,t), mea-
suring the presence of forward and backward linked domestic ﬁrms. Identically as for the
vertical links, we calculate these four types of vertical links for domestic ﬁrms.
Table 4.7 presents the results of our baseline speciﬁcation, but now including the four
variables measuring the vertical linkages to forward and backward linked foreign ﬁrms,
as described above. In general, spillover eﬀects, whether positive or negative, seem to be
much more locally restricted in the manufacturing sector compared to the service sector.
The coeﬃcients on the measures of linkages to foreign ﬁrms in manufacturing sectors
are only signiﬁcant within 10 kilometres. This result conﬁrms the spatially bounded
spillover eﬀects among manufacturing industries and is robust for horizontal and vertical
linkages. Besides, spillover eﬀects from foreign service ﬁrms are quite stable across space
and signiﬁcant also across larger distances.
30The indices reﬂect three types of industries: k is the industry of domestic ﬁrm i itself. Industries f
are forward linked industries (upstream), and industries b are backward linked industries. The index fk
represents goods or services supplied by industry f to industry k; kb represents goods or services supplied
by industry k to industry b. As mentioned before, we use the same deﬁnition of forward and backward
linkages as Newman et al. (2015): forward linkages are upstream foreign suppliers; backward linkages
are downstream foreign customers. This deﬁnition of forward and backward is implicitly referring to the
perspective of the foreign ﬁrm.
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Our preferred 2SLS estimates are presented in panel C in Table 4.7, including the hor-
izontal linkages from our baseline regression and all control variables. Regarding vertical
linkages from FDI manufacturers, our estimations show positive spillover eﬀects from for-
ward linked industries (i.e. foreign manufacturing ﬁrms are suppliers to domestic ﬁrms).
The spillover eﬀects are spatially restricted to within 10 kilometres. This ﬁnding is partly
in line with the results of Newman et al. (2015) who also ﬁnd positive spillovers from FDI
forward linkages for Vietnamese manufacturing during the period 2006 to 2012 (the re-
search period is comparable to ours), but only when they consider direct forward linkages
of upstream foreign to downstream domestic producers.31 The positive spillovers from
upstream foreign ﬁrms may be explained by the know-how transfer through the products
supplied to domestic downstream ﬁrms.
Spillover eﬀects from backward linked foreign ﬁrms are negative (foreign manufacturing
ﬁrms as customers of domestic ﬁrms). The foreign ﬁrms in downstream industries might
have substantial bargaining power and drive down sale prices for domestic ﬁrms. As
foreign ﬁrms in downstream sectors enter the market and choose locations close to the
domestic ﬁrms, they also potentially absorb a lot of resources, as e.g high skilled employees
join technologically more advanced foreign ﬁrms in downstream industries. This result is,
however, in contrast to the literature: Tran and Pham (2013), for instance, ﬁnd positive
backward and negative forward spillovers in their case study of FDI spillovers in the
Vietnamese manufacturing sectors for the period 2000 to 2005. Our results are, however,
not fully comparable to other studies as we analyse the vertical linkages in our spatial
framework, where diﬀerent mechanisms are supposably at play.
Interestingly, spillovers through vertical linkages of foreign service companies seem
much less spatially constraint.32 Our results record negative spillover eﬀects from forward
service linkages, and positive spillover eﬀects for backward linked foreign service ﬁrms.
Both eﬀects do not provide evidence that spillover eﬀects through vertical service linkages
do fade out with increasing distance. This ﬁnding is not in line with results in the
literature which indicate evidence of positive impacts from foreign service suppliers on the
performance of downstream manufacturing (e.g. Francois and Hoekman, 2010). Arnold
et al. (2011) ﬁnd a positive correlation between liberalisation in the service sector and the
31Newman et al. (2015) distinguish between direct and indirect vertical linkages. As they have infor-
mation on direct supplier-customer relationships, they are able to measure direct links between ﬁrms,
although for a much smaller sample. We construct the vertical linkages by the input-output table and
cannot distinguish between direct and indirect linkages. As we look at vertical linkages in close proximity
of domestic ﬁrms, the probability that a vertical linkage is actually a supplier-customer relationship is
increasing, if we assume that closer ﬁrms are more likely to trade.
32This is in contrast to the ﬁndings of Hilber and Voicu (2010) who state service agglomeration
economies to be localised. However, Hilber and Voicu (2010) include both domestic and foreign ser-
vice suppliers.
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productivity of downstream manufacturing ﬁrms.
Again, our results are not easily comparable to the results in the literature as we look
speciﬁcally at the presence of foreign ﬁrms in vertical linkages within a certain area. The
interpretation of our results is, therefore, diﬀerent from most studies. Most importantly,
however, is the fact that the horizontal spillovers are stable and keep being signiﬁcant after
controlling for vertical linkages in panel C of Table 4.7. This supports the robustness of our
results on the spatially restricted horizontal spillover eﬀects of foreign direct investment.
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Table 4.7: Vertical Linkages, Total Revenue (nom.) of FDI Firms and TFP Growth of
Domestic Firms
Dep. Var.: 4Log(TFPik,t) Circle Radius
2km 5km 10km 20km 50km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Ordinary Least Squares without controls
4 Log FWL Manufacturing 0.042∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗ 0.017 0.007
(0.009) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.020)
4 Log FWL Services =0.082∗∗ =0.100∗ =0.116∗ =0.120∗ =0.103+
(0.025) (0.038) (0.046) (0.054) (0.057)
4 Log BWL Manufacturing =0.032∗∗∗=0.033∗ =0.025 =0.006 0.003
(0.009) (0.013) (0.016) (0.020) (0.027)
4 Log BWL Services 0.101∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗ 0.165∗∗ 0.163∗ 0.173∗
(0.029) (0.047) (0.060) (0.066) (0.072)
R2 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09
Observations 83907 86939 87809 88095 88150
Panel B: Ordinary Least Squares with Horizontal Linkage and Control Variables
4 Log FWL Manufacturing 0.032∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗ 0.017 0.022
(0.008) (0.012) (0.013) (0.016) (0.018)
4 Log FWL Services =0.053∗∗∗=0.064∗∗ =0.081∗∗∗=0.080∗∗∗ =0.073∗∗
(0.012) (0.019) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022)
4 Log BWL Manufacturing =0.040∗∗∗=0.039∗∗ =0.030∗ =0.010 =0.012
(0.009) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.019)
4 Log BWL Services 0.064∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.024) (0.029) (0.028) (0.027)
4 Log TR of FDI ﬁrms (horiz.) 0.013∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.005 0.003 0.000
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
R2 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10
Observations 83907 86939 87809 88095 88150
Panel C: 2SLS, Vertical and Horizontal Linkages
4 Log FWL Manufacturing 0.030∗∗ 0.045∗∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.022 0.036
(0.009) (0.014) (0.015) (0.020) (0.025)
4 Log FWL Services =0.061∗∗∗=0.077∗∗ =0.094∗∗ =0.077∗∗ =0.078∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.024) (0.027) (0.027) (0.022)
4 Log BWL Manufacturing =0.043∗∗∗=0.039∗∗ =0.031∗ =0.015 =0.020
(0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.021)
4 Log BWL Services 0.071∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.031) (0.036) (0.033) (0.029)
4 Log TR of FDI ﬁrms (horiz.) 0.013+ 0.012∗ 0.005 =0.001 =0.001
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009)
Observations 50059 51800 52273 52436 52461
First Stage F-statistic 1012.91 1016.88 1021.97 1064.57 1065.70
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent Variable is annual TFP growth, deﬁned as log(TFPik,t) − log(TFPik,t−1). Our main explanatory variables are
measuring the presence of foreign ﬁrms in forward and backward linked manufacturing and service sectors within a circle of radius RD
around a domestic ﬁrm. The linkages are calculated as the weighted sum of total revenue of foreign ﬁrms in forward and backward linked
industries within a circle of radius RD, and are calculated as annual changes in logarithms. The weights are αjk, measuring the supply
goods of forward linked industry j to industry k of the domestic ﬁrm i, and βkj measuring the supply of goods of industry k of domestic
ﬁrm i to backward linked industry j. Also included is the horizontal linkage 4Log Tot. Rev. of FDI ﬁrms, deﬁned as the annual
change of the log of the total revenue of foreign invested ﬁrms in industry k within a circle of radius RD. 2SLS estimations include a
lagged dependent variable 4log(TFPi,t−1) that is instrumented with its lagged value in levels log(TFPik,t−2). The control variables
are measured for each ﬁrm within a circle of radius RD over time, and calculated as annual change in logarithms. They include the sum
of total revenue of all other domestic ﬁrms in the same industry k, the sum of total revenue of foreign ﬁrms in all other manufacturing
industries, the sum of total revenue of domestic ﬁrms in all other manufacturing industries, and the labor force (total number of workers) of
all manufacturing industries. Further included is the annual change of the Herﬁndahl-Index at the industry level. All estimations include
year ﬁxed eﬀects, province-year ﬁxed eﬀects, and industry ﬁxed eﬀects. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the
industry level. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001.
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4.7 Conclusion
This paper investigates spillover eﬀects of foreign direct investment on the local economy
with speciﬁc focus on the role of proximity between foreign and local ﬁrms. A unique
data set with detailed geo-referenced ﬁrm data allows us go one step beyond existing
studies conducted at the regional level. We provide a spatially precise analysis of FDI
spillover eﬀects using a large sample of Vietnamese manufacturing ﬁrms over the period
2005 to 2010. Exploiting variation in the presence of foreign ﬁrms in the vicinity of local
establishments, we contribute interesting new evidence of remarkably localised foreign
investment spillover eﬀects to the literature.
We ﬁnd positive and highly signiﬁcant within industry (horizontal) spillover eﬀects
of a highly localised type. Spillovers are strongest within distances of 2 to 10 kilometres
and fade out beyond. Our 2-stage least squares estimations, accounting for the dynamics
in TFP, estimate elasticities of 0.250.4 in TFP growth with respect to changes in FDI
presence in the surrounding of domestic ﬁrms within a distance of 10 kilometres. Analysing
the presence of foreign ﬁrms in terms of revenue, elasticities of TFP growth with respect
to foreign investment is about 0.017 within a ﬁve kilometre radius. These results reﬂect
studies in the agglomeration literature that emphasise the very localised characteristics
of agglomeration externalities (e.g. Rosenthal and Strange, 2003). This main result is
robust to a variety of concerns. Placebo tests show that our speciﬁcation is able to control
for possible local selection eﬀects of foreign investment. Results are also stable both in
the northern and southern regions of Vietnam, and even when ward-time ﬁxed eﬀects are
included.
Furthermore, our results indicate that spillover eﬀects are in fact largest for small and
relatively unproductive ﬁrms. Estimated elasticities are larger and more signiﬁcant for
micro and small ﬁrms with a labor force of up to 200 workers. The lower half of ﬁrms in
terms of industry productivity beneﬁt more than the more productive half. Notably, our
results also show that vertical spillovers from foreign manufacturing ﬁrms are localised
while the spillovers from foreign service ﬁrms are not spatially constraint.
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4.A Total Factor Productivity Estimation Appendix
As noted by Olley and Pakes (1996), coeﬃcients of capital stocks estimated in the Cobb-
Douglas production function by simply using OLS are biased upwards due to the corre-
lation between capital stock and unobserved productivity shocks (TFP). In addition, the
authors also indicate that using balanced panel data to estimate TFP, which ignores the
entry and exit of ﬁrms in the industries, causes a selection bias problem. They argue
that the eﬃcient ﬁrm, which maximises its expected discounted value of future net cash
ﬂow in a framework of the Bellman equation, stays in the industry and invests more if
its TFP level exceeds a certain threshold. A less eﬃcient ﬁrm that has a TFP level below
the threshold in contrast, exits the market (Olley and Pakes, 1996).
Olley and Pakes (1996) solve for the selection bias and simultaneity issues in dynamic
TFP estimation by using unbalanced panel data and including the survival ratio of a ﬁrm
in the industry in their estimation. Importantly, they use investment as the proxy for
unobserved productivity. They argue that there is a correlation between the choice of the
capital stock, investment demand and TFP. Capital stocks are determined at period t−1
such that:
Ki,t = (1− δ)(Ki,t−1) + Ii,t−1 (4.10)
Where δ is the depreciation ratio, Ki,t and Ki,t−1 are respectively the capital stocks in
year t and year t− 1, and Ii,t−1 is the investment of ﬁrm i in year t− 1.
The investment demand is assumed to be monotonically increasing in TFP. Thus, the
demand function of investment can be inverted and investment can be used as proxy for
the productivity shock ω. The investment demand is deﬁned as
It = ft(Kt, ωt) (4.11)
With the assumption that It > 0, after being inverted, we get
ωt = f
−1
t (It, Kt) (4.12)
Due to the possibility of non-availability or negative values of investment reported in
many data sets, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) develop a theoretical framework based on
Olley and Pakes (1996) and suggest to use intermediate inputs as alternative proxies for
unobserved productivity shocks instead of investment. Important assumptions made by
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Olley and Pakes (1996) are kept in Levinsohn's (2003) model. Moreover, the demand of
intermediate inputs chosen needs to be strictly increasing in productivity.
The Cobb-Douglas production function is assumed to be similar among ﬁrms in the
same industry.
V Ait = AitK
βk
it L
βl
it (4.13)
Taking logarithms of both sides we have
log(V Ait) = β0 + βklog(Kit) + βllog(Lit) + ωit + εit (4.14)
In equation (4.14), log(V Ait) is the logarithm of deﬂated value added, while log(Lit)
is the logarithm of number of labourers, and log(Kit) is the logarithm of the real capital
stock.33 ωit is the productivity shock (TFP) we need to estimate. εit is the error term
that is unknown to the ﬁrm and the econometrician. ωit is known by the ﬁrm when it
makes the choice on intermediate inputs and the capital stock, but it is also unobserved
by the econometricians.
Rewriting equation (4.14) in lower case, we have
vait = β0 + βkkit + βllit + ωit + εit (4.15)
The assumptions implied in equation (4.15) follow Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and Petrin
et al. (2004), such that
(i) The choice of intermediate input mit response to kit and ωit:
mit =m(kit,ωit)
When a ﬁrm gains higher productivity than the threshold and stays in the market, it
expands the demand for intermediate inputs, somit > 0, which allows formit(kit,ωit)
to be inverted. Therefore ωit =ω(kit,mit).
(ii) Labour is not a state variable which means it is demanded when the productivity
is realised. In this case, we choose the number of employees as labor input, as we
33The Value added production function is popularly utilised in the literature, for instance in Petrin
and Levinsohn (2012), De Loecker and Warzynski (2012), and Newman et al. (2015).Petrin et al. (2004)
introduce two cases that apply the method by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003): a production function using
value added and a production function using gross output.
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do not have information on the wage or working hours.34
(iii) The ﬁrst-order Markov process is applied to productivity shocks:
ωit = E[ωi,t|ωi,t−1] + ξi,t (4.16)
where ξi,t is the innovation to productivity.
(iv) Firms are assumed to face the same input and output prices. Hence, in our paper,
we estimate TFP by each industry, and assume that within the same industry this
assumption holds.
Following Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), we estimate equation (4.15) in two steps by
using levpet which is a Stata command written by Petrin et al. (2004). The explanation
of the algorithm is as follows:
In the ﬁrst step, making the assumption that
ωit = ω(kit,mit) (4.17)
We have
φ(kit,mit) = β0 + βkkit + ω(kit,mit) (4.18)
Since the form of φit(kit,mit) is unknown, φit(kit,mit) is estimated by using a third order
polynomial approximation in kit and mit: φ(kit,mit) = Σ
3
n=0Σ
3−n
j=0σnjk
n
tm
j
t .
We rewrite equation (4.15)
vait = βllit + φit(kit,mt) + εit (4.19)
This ﬁrst step aims to estimate the consistent coeﬃcient of it in the no-intercept OLS
(equation 4.19). It is assumed that E[εit|lit, kit,mit] = 0.35
In the second step, coeﬃcients estimated in the ﬁrst step are used to identify βk.
From equation (4.18), we see that ω̂it can also be expressed as
34We also check for collinearity of labour with material and capital stock bv using the STATA user-
written command collin. The results of the variance inﬂation factor (V IF =
1
1−R2 ) which is less than
3 in our case does not indicate a problem of multicollinearity).
35Being diﬀerent from Olley and Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) accumulate capital stock
by using current investment value Ki,t = (1− δ)(Ki,t−1) + Ii,t.
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ω̂it = φ̂it − β∗kkit (4.20)
With the grid search, for each β∗k we can deﬁne the appropriate ω̂it. Using the value ω̂it
from equation 4.20, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approximate E[ ̂ωit|ωi,t−1] with a third-
degree polynomial. With β̂l derived in the ﬁrst step, E[ ̂ωit|ωi,t−1] and β∗k , rearranging
equation 4.13 and combining it with the ﬁrst-order Markov process, the sample residual
of the production function is equal to
̂εit + ξit = vait − β̂llit − β∗kkit − E[ ̂ωit|ωi,t−1] (4.21)
The solution to ﬁnd β̂k is
minβ∗kΣit(vait − β̂llit − β∗kkit − E[ ̂ωit|ωi,t−1])2 (4.22)
This yields a consistent estimate of βk since E[(εit + ξit)|kit] = 0, and because kit was
chosen at time t− 1 by the accumulation of ki,t−1 and ii,t (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003).
After obtaining consistent coeﬃcients βk and βl, the log(TFP), ω̂it can be computed
as follows (Newman et al., 2015; Olley and Pakes, 1996; Van Beveren, 2012)
ω̂it = vait − β̂kkit − β̂llit (4.23)
Table A.1 speciﬁes how the main variables are constructed using available ﬁrm level
information from the Vietnamese Enterprise Survey. Value added is calculated by the
addition method using ﬁrm-level records on proﬁt, wage bills, and indirect tax36 and
depreciation (see Ha and Kiyota, 2014). The depreciation ratio is assumed to be 10%. In
addition, diﬀerent deﬂators are used to convert the nominal values in the current prices
to the base year price which is the year 2000.37
36The indirect tax is the diﬀerence between the total tax paid by the ﬁrm and its income tax. See Ha
and Kiyota (2014).
37Speciﬁcally, the producer price index of each industry is the deﬂator for output and value added.
We calculate the index by using the annual producer price index (PPI) by industry provided by the
General Statistic Oﬃces of Vietnam (GSO; www.gso.gov.vn). Capital stocks are converted to the base
year price by the gross ﬁxed capital formation deﬂators which are calculated using the annual nominal
gross ﬁxed capital formation values of Vietnam provided by the World Bank country database available
at www.worldbank.org. Nominal values of materials and services are deﬂated using the annual GDP
deﬂators downloaded from the World Economic Outlook database available at www.imf.org.
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Table A.1: Measurement of Main Variables
Variables Measurement
Total output (Yit) Total revenue (TRit) at the end of year t
Wage(Wit) Total wage paid to employees at the end of year t
Labor (Lit) Total employees at the end of year t
Capital Stocks (Kt) Net booked values of ﬁxed assets at the end of year t,
Proﬁt (Πit) Total proﬁt before taxes at the end of year t
Value Added (V Ait) Πit +Wit + indirecttaxit + depreciationit
Materials and Services (MSit) TRit-Πit −Wit − (Kit −Ki,t−1)
Total Cost(TCit) TRit −Πit
Depreciation (Depreit) Kit ∗ depreciationratio1−depreciationratio
Notes: Authors' compilation using data drawn from the Vietnamese Enterprise Survey 20052010.
4.B Data Appendix
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Figure B.1: Shares of Total Revenue of Foreign Invested Firms by District in Vietnam
2005 & 2010
(a) 2005
0 70 140 210 28035 KilometersÜ
0.01 - 5 %
5.01 - 20 %
20.01 - 70 %
> 70 %
Provincial Border
(b) 2010
0 70 140 210 28035 KilometersÜ
0.01 - 5 %
5.01 - 20 %
20.01 - 70 %
> 70 %
Provincial Border
Notes: The share of total revenue of foreign invested ﬁrms per district is equal to the revenue of foreign invested ﬁrms in the district
over the total revenue of all ﬁrms. The maps are based on authors' calculations using the Vietnam Enterprise Survey 2005 & 2010.
Administrative boundaries are based on Global Administrative Areas data (www.gadm.org). Several Vietnamese islands (e.g. Hoang Sa and
Truong Sa) are not displayed due to the limitation of the GADM administrative boundaries data.
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Figure B.2: Shares of Total Labor Force of Foreign Invested Firms by District in Vietnam
2005 & 2010
(a) 2005
0 70 140 210 28035 KilometersÜ
0.01 - 20 %
20.01 - 50 %
50.01 - 80 %
> 80 %
Provincial Border
(b) 2010
0 70 140 210 28035 KilometersÜ
0.01 - 20 %
20.01 - 50 %
50.01 - 80 %
> 80 %
Provincial Border
Notes: The share of total labor force of foreign invested ﬁrms per district is equal to the number of workers of foreign invested ﬁrms in the
district over the total number of workers of all ﬁrms. The maps are based on authors' calculations using the Vietnam Enterprise Survey
2005 & 2010. Administrative boundaries are based on Global Administrative Areas data (www.gadm.org). Several Vietnamese islands (e.g.
Hoang Sa and Truong Sa) are not displayed due to the limitation of the GADM administrative boundaries data.
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Table B.3: Variable Description & Data Sources
Variable Description Source
Dependent Variable
4log(TFPik,t) log(TFPik,t)− log(TFPik,t−1)
Annual growth in total factor productivity
Own calculations based on
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)
and Petrin et al. (2004).
Source: Vietnamese Enter-
prise Survey 20052010.
Main Explanatory Variables
Horizonal Linkages:
4Log No. of FDI Firms log(∑Nj=1 firmRDjk,t)− log(∑Nj=1 firmRDjk,t−1)
Annual change in the number of foreign ﬁrms j in industry k within
radius RD around each ﬁrm i
Own calculations based on
sample of geo-referenced
ﬁrms. Source: Vietnamese
Enterprise Survey 20052010.
4Log Tot. Rev. of FDI Firms log(∑Ni=1 TRRDjk,t)− log(∑Ni=1 TRRDjk,t−1)
Annual change in the sum of total revenue of foreign ﬁrms j in the same
industry k within circle of radius RD around each domestic ﬁrm i
Own calculations based on
sample of geo-referenced
ﬁrms. Source: Vietnamese
Enterprise Survey 20052010.
Vertical Linkages:
4Log FWL Manufacturing log(∑Ni=1 αfkTRRDjf,t)− log(∑Ni=1 αfkTRRDjf,t−1)
Annual change in the forward linked foreign manufacturing ﬁrms in in-
dustries f within circle of radius RD around each domestic ﬁrm i; αfk
is the coeﬃcient measuring the link in the input-output table.
Own calculations based on
geo-referenced ﬁrms of the
Vietnamese Enterprise Sur-
vey 20052010 and the GSO
input-output table (2007).
4Log BWL Manufacturing log(∑Ni=1 βkbTRRDjb,t)− log(∑Ni=1 βkbTRRDjb,t−1)
Annual change in the forward linked foreign manufacturing ﬁrms in in-
dustries b within circle of radius RD around each domestic ﬁrm i; βfk
is the coeﬃcient measuring the backward link from upstream industry k
to downstream industry b in the input-output table.
Own calculations based on
geo-referenced ﬁrms of the
Vietnamese Enterprise Sur-
vey 20052010 and the GSO
input-output table (2007).
4Log FWL Services log(∑Ni=1 αfkTRRDjf,t)− log(∑Ni=1 αfkTRRDjf,t−1)
Annual change in the forward linked foreign service ﬁrms in industries f
within circle of radius RD around each domestic ﬁrm i; αfk is the co-
eﬃcient measuring the forward link from upstream industry f to down-
stream industry k in the input-output table.
Own calculations based on
geo-referenced ﬁrms of the
Vietnamese Enterprise Sur-
vey 20052010 and the GSO
input-output table (2007).
4Log BWL Services log(∑Ni=1 βkbTRRDjb,t)− log(∑Ni=1 βkbTRRDjb,t−1)
Annual change in the forward linked foreign service ﬁrms in industries
b within circle of radius RD around each domestic ﬁrm i; βkb is the
coeﬃcient measuring the backward link from upstream industry k to
downstream industry b in the input-output table.
Own calculations based on
geo-referenced ﬁrms of the
Vietnamese Enterprise Sur-
vey 20052010 and the GSO
input-output table (2007).
Control Variables
4Log No. of Dom. Firms log(∑Dd=1 firmRDdk,t)− log(∑Dd=1 firmRDdk,t−1)
Annual change in the number of domestic ﬁrms d in the same industry
k within radius RD around each ﬁrm i
Own calculations based on
sample of geo-referenced
ﬁrms. Source: Vietnamese
Enterprise Survey 20052010.
4Log No. of FDI Firms in Oth.
Ind.
log(
∑J
j=1 firm
RD
j,−k,t)− log(
∑J
j=1 firm
RD
j,−k,t−1)
Annual change in the number of foreign ﬁrms j in all other industries −k
within radius RD around each ﬁrm i
Own calculations based on
sample of geo-referenced
ﬁrms. Source: Vietnamese
Enterprise Survey 20052010.
4Log No. of Dom. Firms in Oth.
Ind.
log(
∑D
d=1 firm
RD
d,−k,t)− log(
∑D
d=1 firm
RD
d,−k,t−1)
Annual change in the number of domestic ﬁrms d in all other industries
−k within radius RD around each ﬁrm i
Own calculations based on
sample of geo-referenced
ﬁrms. Source: Vietnamese
Enterprise Survey 20052010.
4Log Labor Force log(∑Ni=1 LRDi,t )− log(∑Ni=1 LRDi,t−1)
Annual change in the labor force measured as number of employees of all
ﬁrms i in all industries within radius RD around each ﬁrm i
Own calculations based on
sample of geo-referenced
ﬁrms. Source: Vietnamese
Enterprise Survey 20052010.
4HHI ∑Ni=1 RS2ik,t −∑Ni=1 RS2ik,t−1
Annual change the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman-Index, measuring the concen-
tration in industry k; RS is the revenue share of ﬁrm i in industry k
Own calculations. Source:
Vietnamese Enterprise Survey
20052010.
Notes: Additional control variables not shown in the table are forward and backward linkages to domestic ﬁrms. They are constructed
identically as the forward and backward links to foreign ﬁrms.
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Table B.4: Descriptive Statistics, Variables 2nd Stage
Variable Mean SD Min Max
Log TFP 8.50 2.04 -12.73 18.70
No. of FDI Firms same industry within 2km 1.04 3.13 0 41
No. of FDI Firms same industry within 5km 4.19 9.53 0 71
No. of FDI Firms same industry within 10km 12.29 24.58 0 151
No. of FDI Firms same industry within 20km 33.31 60.89 0 307
No. of FDI Firms same industry within 50km 66.74 104.26 0 400
No. of FDI Firms in other industries w. 2km 13.40 29.32 0 250
No. of FDI Firms in other industries w. 5km 57.90 88.00 0 549
No. of FDI Firms in other industries w. 10km 174.93 202.93 0 895
No. of FDI Firms in other industries w. 20km 511.98 540.11 0 1792
No. of FDI Firms in other industries w. 50km 1162.10 1078.68 0 2824
No. of Dom. Firms same industry w. 2km 19.32 39.88 0 374
No. of Dom. Firms same industry w. 5km 82.09 163.78 0 1083
No. of Dom. Firms same industry w. 10km 189.61 342.47 0 1839
No. of Dom. Firms same industry w. 20km 311.16 466.98 0 2177
No. of Dom. Firms same industry w. 50km 442.99 529.75 0 2305
No. of Dom. Firms other industries w. 2km 174.87 256.31 0 1477
No. of Dom. Firms other industries w. 5km 871.89 1215.05 0 5509
No. of Dom. Firms other industries w. 10km 2255.41 2816.27 0 10629
No. of Dom. Firms other industries w. 20km 4198.82 4362.99 0 14007
No. of Dom. Firms other industries w. 50km 6533.28 5449.62 0 16315
Tot. Rev. of FDI Firms same industry w. 2km 100093.29 626292.73 0 31232608
Tot. Rev. of FDI Firms same industry w. 5km 328837.22 1135717.29 0 39137876
Tot. Rev. of FDI Firms same industry w. 10km 957467.25 2242035.04 0 46199108
Tot. Rev. of FDI Firms same industry w. 20km 2882964.91 5081311.32 0 72626352
Tot. Rev. of FDI Firms same industry w. 50km 6484466.72 9947152.11 0 79454896
Tot. Rev. of Dom. Firms same industry w. 2km 266918.53 879812.54 0 56786672
Tot. Rev. of Dom. Firms same industry w. 5km 1085313.87 2491800.48 0 59184680
Tot. Rev. of Dom. Firms same industry w. 10km 2531337.59 4690283.07 0 60782644
Tot. Rev. of Dom. Firms same industry w. 20km 4421958.43 6606477.32 0 63819400
Tot. Rev. of Dom. Firms same industry w. 50km 6845696.40 8274545.71 0 65283704
Forward Link Manufacturing within 2km 37617.66 271070.67 0 17667644
Forward Link Manufacturing within 5km 122793.13 442392.01 0 18044086
Forward Link Manufacturing within 10km 357022.36 755365.05 0 18044148
Forward Link Manufacturing within 20km 1133495.24 1640861.77 0 19821206
Forward Link Manufacturing within 50km 3133920.07 3938335.80 0 22581422
Backward Link Manufacturing within 2km 58218.98 361762.98 0 15738135
Backward Link Manufacturing within 5km 192268.78 629518.34 0 18898828
Backward Link Manufacturing within 10km 594485.27 1336049.96 0 35745540
Backward Link Manufacturing within 20km 1802038.94 3028895.42 0 56167772
Backward Link Manufacturing within 50km 4454358.90 6277958.30 0 61560848
Forward Link Service within 2km 18809.66 100777.43 0 3231617
Forward Link Service within 5km 120686.37 354250.81 0 4279436
Forward Link Service within 10km 371498.34 680569.41 0 4805906
Forward Link Service within 20km 691641.92 924463.45 0 5518592
Forward Link Service within 50km 1127771.62 1222494.12 0 6451718
Backward Link Service within 2km 19549.29 167056.40 0 9920492
Backward Link Service within 5km 127136.05 601172.86 0 13172639
Backward Link Service within 10km 397668.17 1229185.76 0 14228132
Backward Link Service within 20km 700315.62 1750618.28 0 16847164
Backward Link Service within 50km 1058043.97 2302171.41 0 19576840
Total Labor force within 2km 15793.16 20774.29 0 121229
Total Labor force within 5km 71830.16 79005.63 0 357626
Total Labor force within 10km 205165.73 209403.77 0 783254
Total Labor force within 20km 491031.33 477715.79 0 1409818
Total Labor force within 50km 957948.55 806019.73 0 2071620
HHI 429.69 709.47 33 7802
Observations 164349
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4.C Empirical Appendix
Table C.5: Number of FDI Firms and TFP Growth of Domestic Firms, only southern
Vietnam
Dep. Var.: 4Log(TFPik,t) Circle Radius
2km 5km 10km 20km 50km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Ordinary Least Squares without controls
4 Log No. of FDI ﬁrms within industry 0.304∗ 0.331∗∗ 0.326∗∗ 0.282∗ 0.217+
(0.119) (0.116) (0.121) (0.119) (0.113)
R2 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.08
Observations 55500 55500 55500 55500 55500
Panel B: Ordinary Least Squares with controls
4 Log No. of FDI ﬁrms within industry 0.267∗∗ 0.316∗∗ 0.338∗∗ 0.313∗∗ 0.210+
(0.097) (0.096) (0.105) (0.108) (0.105)
R2 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.08
Observations 55500 55500 55500 55500 55500
Panel C: 2SLS, Instrumented Lagged Dependent Variable
4 Log No. of FDI ﬁrms within industry 0.277∗ 0.376∗∗ 0.418∗∗ 0.339∗ 0.226+
(0.116) (0.121) (0.136) (0.136) (0.131)
4 Log No. of FDI ﬁrms in other industries =0.122∗∗ =0.117∗ =0.109+ =0.078 =0.130∗
(0.042) (0.059) (0.063) (0.055) (0.060)
4 Log No. of dom. ﬁrms within industry 0.039 =0.055 =0.116+ =0.118 =0.072
(0.064) (0.063) (0.069) (0.087) (0.132)
4 Log No. of dom. ﬁrms in other industries =0.012 0.035 0.038 0.013 0.024
(0.033) (0.030) (0.041) (0.049) (0.053)
4Log(TFPi,t−1) 0.535∗∗∗ 0.524∗∗∗ 0.519∗∗∗ 0.528∗∗∗ 0.538∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046)
Observations 32797 32797 32797 32797 32797
First Stage F-statistic 717.16 668.89 630.20 643.14 663.84
Panel D: Placebo Test, Lead of Change in Foreign Firms
Lead 4 Log No. of FDI ﬁrms within industry =0.005 =0.011 =0.011 0.007 0.033
(0.026) (0.033) (0.031) (0.027) (0.027)
4Log(TFPi,t−1) 0.429∗∗∗ 0.428∗∗∗ 0.427∗∗∗ 0.429∗∗∗ 0.430∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.065) (0.064) (0.065) (0.065)
Observations 19750 19750 19750 19750 19750
First Stage F-statistic 324.06 320.94 321.37 320.97 323.58
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province-Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent Variable is annual TFP growth, deﬁned as log(TFPik,t)− log(TFPik,t−1). Our main explanatory variable is 4 Log
No. of FDI ﬁrms, deﬁned as the annual change of the log of number of foreign invested ﬁrms within a circle of radius RD. Estimations
include a lagged dependent variable 4log(TFPi,t−1) that is instrumented with its lagged value in levels log(TFPik,t−2). The control
variables (Panels B, C, and D) are measured for each ﬁrm within a circle of radius RD over time, and calculated as annual change in
logarithms. They include the number of domestic ﬁrms in the same industry k, the number of foreign ﬁrms in all other manufacturing
industries, the number of domestic ﬁrms in all other manufacturing industries, and the labor force (total number of workers) of all
manufacturing industries. Further included is the annual change of the Herﬁndahl-Index at the industry level. All estimations include
year ﬁxed eﬀects, province-year ﬁxed eﬀects, and industry ﬁxed eﬀects. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the
industry level. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001.
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Table C.6: Number of FDI Firms and TFP Growth of Domestic Firms, only northern
Vietnam
Dep. Var.: 4Log(TFPik,t) Circle Radius
2km 5km 10km 20km 50km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Ordinary Least Squares without controls
4 Log No. of FDI ﬁrms within industry 0.144∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.131∗ 0.132+ 0.138
(0.047) (0.053) (0.055) (0.073) (0.085)
R2 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Observations 32650 32650 32650 32650 32650
Panel B: Ordinary Least Squares with controls
4 Log No. of FDI ﬁrms within industry 0.135∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.103∗ 0.093 0.111
(0.044) (0.048) (0.046) (0.066) (0.078)
R2 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06
Observations 32650 32650 32650 32650 32650
Panel C: 2SLS, Instrumented Lagged Dependent Variable
4 Log No. of FDI ﬁrms within industry 0.138∗∗ 0.159∗∗ 0.109+ 0.076 0.078
(0.052) (0.054) (0.060) (0.075) (0.083)
4 Log No. of FDI ﬁrms in other industries =0.074∗∗ =0.042+ 0.028 0.003 =0.014
(0.027) (0.024) (0.040) (0.028) (0.022)
4 Log No. of dom. ﬁrms within industry 0.026 0.079 0.090 0.120 0.079
(0.038) (0.050) (0.059) (0.080) (0.094)
4 Log No. of dom. ﬁrms in other industries 0.010 0.020 =0.001 0.070 0.055
(0.021) (0.024) (0.033) (0.046) (0.059)
4Log(TFPi,t−1) 0.507∗∗∗ 0.504∗∗∗ 0.506∗∗∗ 0.507∗∗∗ 0.507∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043)
Observations 19663 19663 19663 19663 19663
First Stage F-statistic 595.35 591.44 589.63 584.41 579.18
Panel D: Placebo Test, Lead of Change in Foreign Firms
Lead 4 Log No. of FDI ﬁrms within industry 0.039 0.037 =0.015 =0.009 0.005
(0.047) (0.038) (0.036) (0.044) (0.038)
4Log(TFPi,t−1) 0.453∗∗∗ 0.454∗∗∗ 0.455∗∗∗ 0.454∗∗∗ 0.454∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.082) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083)
Observations 11411 11411 11411 11411 11411
First Stage F-statistic 275.87 278.08 275.26 273.90 276.24
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province-Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent Variable is annual TFP growth, deﬁned as log(TFPik,t)− log(TFPik,t−1). Our main explanatory variable is 4 Log
No. of FDI ﬁrms, deﬁned as the annual change of the log of number of foreign invested ﬁrms within a circle of radius RD. Estimations
include a lagged dependent variable 4log(TFPi,t−1) that is instrumented with its lagged value in levels log(TFPik,t−2). The control
variables (Panels B, C, and D) are measured for each ﬁrm within a circle of radius RD over time, and calculated as annual change in
logarithms. They include the number of domestic ﬁrms in the same industry k, the number of foreign ﬁrms in all other manufacturing
industries, the number of domestic ﬁrms in all other manufacturing industries, and the labor force (total number of workers) of all
manufacturing industries. Further included is the annual change of the Herﬁndahl-Index at the industry level. All estimations include
year ﬁxed eﬀects, province-year ﬁxed eﬀects, and industry ﬁxed eﬀects. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the
industry level. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001.
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Table C.7: Total Revenue FDI Firms and TFP Growth of Domestic Firms, including
Ward-Time FE
Dep. Var.: 4Log(TFPik,t) Circle Radius
2km 5km 10km 20km 50km
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Ordinary Least Squares without controls
4 Log Tot. Rev. of FDI ﬁrms 0.020∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.016 0.012 0.001
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.013) (0.011)
R2 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
Observations 81640 81640 81640 81640 81640
Panel B: Ordinary Least Squares with controls
4 Log Tot. Rev. of FDI ﬁrms 0.019∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.014 0.011 0.002
(0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.011)
R2 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18
Observations 81640 81640 81640 81640 81640
Panel C: 2SLS, Instrumented Lagged Dependent Variable
4 Log Tot. Rev. of FDI ﬁrms within industry 0.016+ 0.019∗ 0.013 0.003 =0.004
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.011)
4 Log Tot. Rev. of FDI ﬁrms in other industries =0.012∗ 0.003 0.005 0.007 =0.002
(0.006) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
4 Log Tot. Rev. of dom. ﬁrms within industry =0.007 =0.012 =0.005 =0.007 =0.035
(0.005) (0.009) (0.012) (0.016) (0.029)
4 Log Tot. Rev. of dom. ﬁrms in other industries =0.034∗ =0.074∗∗∗=0.077∗∗∗=0.021 0.037
(0.014) (0.016) (0.020) (0.034) (0.118)
4Log(TFPi,t−1) 0.543∗∗∗ 0.543∗∗∗ 0.545∗∗∗ 0.546∗∗∗ 0.545∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Observations 47670 47670 47670 47670 47670
First Stage F-statistic 865.96 864.81 873.16 884.12 896.28
Panel D: Placebo Test, Lead of Change in Foreign Firms
Lead 4 Log Tot. Rev. of FDI ﬁrms 0.004 0.006 0.003 0.000 0.005
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
4Log(TFPi,t−1) 0.470∗∗∗ 0.471∗∗∗ 0.470∗∗∗ 0.470∗∗∗ 0.470∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.059) (0.059)
Observations 27832 27832 27832 27832 27832
First Stage F-statistic 537.74 537.95 535.70 535.98 536.12
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ward-Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent Variable is annual TFP growth, deﬁned as log(TFPik,t) − log(TFPik,t−1) . Our main explanatory variable is 4 Log
Tot. Rev. of FDI ﬁrms, deﬁned as the annual change of the log of the total revenue of foreign invested ﬁrms within a circle of radius RD .
Estimations include a lagged dependent variable 4log(TFPi,t−1) that is instrumented with its lagged value in levels log(TFPik,t−2) . The
control variables (Panels B, C, and D) are measured for each ﬁrm within a circle of radius RD over time, and calculated as annual change in
logarithms. They include the sum of total revenue of all other domestic ﬁrms in the same industry k , the sum of total revenue of foreign ﬁrms
in all other manufacturing industries, the sum of total revenue of domestic ﬁrms in all other manufacturing industries, and the labor force
(total number of workers) of all manufacturing industries. Further included is the annual change of the Herﬁndahl-Index at the industry level.
All estimations include time ﬁxed eﬀects, ward-time ﬁxed eﬀects, and industry ﬁxed eﬀects. Huber-White standard errors in parentheses are
clustered at the industry level. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001.
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